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Abstract 
n the light of the current political and economic conditions in Egypt, Public Private 
Partnership projects appear as an effective solution in order to help the government 
in enhancing its infrastructure, utilities and services using the technical skills and 
capabilities of the private partner. Although Public Private Partnerships are used all over 
the world, they can be of particular importance in developing countries which seek a 
quick and effective in improving its projects. Accordingly, Public Private Partnerships 
started to be used in Egypt and there are several projects under study for future 
implementation. The two key success factors for PPP projects are a proper risk allocation 
and a suitable contract so that the risks are adequately covered and are properly assigned 
to the party who is the best at managing them.  
In this research, the top 59 risk factors that affect PPP projects are identified from the 
Literature Review and are grouped into several critical risk groups and included in a 
questionnaire which is distributed among a number of experts (25 experts) who worked 
internationally and in the Egyptian Market. The results of the survey showed that the top 
26 risks are from the following groups: Financial and Macroeconomic risk group,  
Commercial risk group,  Legal risk group, Political risk group, Regulatory risk group, 
Government maturity risk group, Technical risk group, Production risk group, and 
Unforeseen risk group.  
An attempt for mapping the identified risks and the risk allocation identified in the survey 
is done to contract clauses of two PPP projects contracts where the risk allocation is 
defined clearly in the clause (public private or both). In some cases, the risk allocation 
I 
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according to the survey results was perfectly conforming to the risk allocation according 
to the real case contracts such as in the case of the Performance Security risk, the Permits 
risk, the Unforeseen Geotechnical conditions risk and the Latent Defect risk. In other 
cases, the risk allocation according to the survey results was not conforming to the risk 
allocation according to the real case contracts such as in the case of 
Nationalization/expropriation risk and the Government Corruption risk. 
In addition, a prototype for Risk Decision Support System for the top ranked risks in the 
survey was developed using Crystal Ball software in order to determine the overall 
severity and the overall contingency percentage of the project. 
Finally the top risks are compared to the critical risks obtained from the previous studies 
in China, India and Singapore and the top risks identified were conforming to a great 
extent. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) came into existence as a result of continuous 
challenges facing the public sector in its attempts to improve its services, facilities and 
infrastructure which is in many cases demanding challenging economic resources. 
Accordingly, the public sector resorted to the partnership with the private sector in order 
to deliver projects or public services by benefiting from the private sector‟s experience, 
financial ability, management and technical skills. Consequently, PPP was used in 
various sectors all over the world especially in the infrastructure sector as it is considered 
as a “catalyst for economic growth” (Babatunde, 2012). PPP scheme is believed to be 
able to deliver better value for money especially for infrastructure projects (Hwang et al., 
2012). 
In order to ensure the success of the partnership between the public and the private 
sectors, many aspects have to be taken into consideration to get the best outcomes out of 
such collaboration. One of the most important factors that should be thoroughly studied 
in projects executed under the PPP scheme is the proper and appropriate risk 
management. Otherwise, PPP can in this case raise the cost of the project instead of 
realizing better value for money (Marques and Berg, 2011). The first step towards a good 
application of risk management is conducting a sound risk identification and risk 
allocation between the private sector and the public sector in a way that each party bears 
the risks that it can manage the best (Hwang et al., 2012). Accordingly, some risks will be 
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borne by the public sector; other risks will be borne by the private sector while the rest of 
the risks should be shared between both parties or transferred to third parties. 
The main objective of this research is to identify the critical risk factors associated with 
PPP projects in Egypt especially under the current economic and political conditions 
(post January 2011 revolution). These major risk factors are identified through a 
comprehensive Literature Review, a contract risk analysis and an extensive process of 
interviewing experts. The obtained risk factors are qualitatively and quantitatively 
analyzed in order to obtain a comprehensive risk ranking to develop a proper risk 
allocation between parties.   
All the risks obtained through the Literature Review and through asking experts are 
mapped to two actual PPP contracts in order to determine which risks are covered and 
how the covered risks are allocated between both parties. The risk allocation obtained 
from the real case contracts is compared to the risk allocation obtained through the survey 
results and a complete interpretation is developed for all risks.  
Also, the top ranked risks obtained from the survey are compared to the top ranked risks 
associated with PPP projects in different countries which are China, India and Singapore. 
This is considered as a validation process for the risks obtained. 
Afterwards, from the most critical risks which have the highest severity, a computerized 
Risk Decision Support System is developed to help the end user (who can be from the 
public or the private sector) in calculating the overall severity of the PPP project in 
addition to the contingency percentage associated with the whole project. Developing the 
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Risk Decision Support System is based on data obtained from the first PPP project in 
Egypt (New Cairo Waste Water Treatment Plant).  
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1.2 Problem Statement 
The long term nature of PPP contracts require to identify the key concepts present in the 
relationship between the public partner and the private partner such as the management of 
risks, quality of service required, value for money, how to handle disputes and how to 
deal with changes that may occur during the project‟s lifetime. 
There are several success factors that contribute to the success of any PPP project such as 
the effective procurement, project implementability, government guarantee, favorable 
economic and political conditions and available financial market.  
However, there are two major causes of PPP failure which are the contractual 
incompleteness in addition to the imperfect allocation of risks. Accordingly, drafting 
proper PPP contracts, having a complete set of PPP documents and careful risk allocation 
are crucial in order to guarantee the success of any PPP project. Proper risk allocation can 
decrease the costs associated with risks during the project‟s lifetime. Accordingly, many 
benefits may arise from a proper contractual arrangement between the private and the 
public sector (Marques and Berg, 2011). This can be achieved through bringing the 
strengths of both parties together.  
Therefore, both the public partner (the government) and the private partner (the 
developer) should cooperate from the start of the project in order to reach the optimum 
risk allocation for both parties. Proper risk allocation can help in developing a successful 
risk matrix. Generally, typical risks associated with PPP projects are legal, technical, 
political and commercial risks. The public partner should not transfer all the risks to the 
private partner; rather, the risks should be allocated by being transferred to the party who 
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will be better in handling this specific risk. The public partner should play the role of a 
regulator, facilitator and policy maker for the private partner to work under the PPP 
scheme. On the other hand, the private partner should always seek optimized solutions 
for the benefit of the project and to realize the “Value for money” as unlike other 
projects, PPP projects are “output focused”.  
It has been noticed that there is an increasing attention towards the PPP scheme 
especially in the developing countries as PPP is a way for the public authorities to 
improve their infrastructure, provide better services to the end user through educational, 
water and wastewater, transportation projects with the help and expertise of the private 
sector (Ke et al., 2009).  
In this research, the risk analysis procedure for PPP projects will be applied in Egypt. 
There has been an increasing involvement of the private sector with the public sector in 
various projects after many efforts have been deployed by the Egyptian government to 
standardize the process of partnerships between the private and public sector. This was 
done through the issuance of laws and through the establishment of the PPP Central Unit 
affiliated to the Ministry of Finance. Hence, the need for a proper methodology for 
drafting contracts and for risk analysis of PPP projects is crucial in order to get the best 
outcomes of the projects executed under the PPP scheme not only for the public and 
private sectors involved in each project but also for the customer (the service user) who 
will get a better service that will help in enhancing the economic reform in the country. 
The second PPP Investment Summit was held in Egypt from March 24
th
 2013 to March 
27
th
 2013. The major objectives of this summit were to understand the laws and 
regulations behind the establishment of PPP in Egypt, to discuss the problems related to 
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the foreign exchange fluctuation, to deeply understand the role of lenders (bankers) and 
their perspective and to provide a better chance for the private sector to communicate 
with the public sector. The summit addressed various types of PPP projects, in 
transportation, healthcare, wastewater and water treatment and finally, power and 
electricity sectors. This summit was attended by representatives of the government in 
various sectors, representatives of the private sector in major contracting companies and 
banks representatives in order to bring together all the points of view in an enriching and 
beneficial discussion (2
nd
 Annual PPP investment Summit Egypt, 2013). 
Accordingly, in order to solve the deficiencies that may occur in PPP projects due to poor 
contract drafting and inadequate risk allocation, a strong and sound process should be 
applied to the Contract Management and Risk Analysis of PPP projects in Egypt. The 
aim of such process is to ensure that all the risks that may affect the project are properly 
covered and allocated to the suitable party that is able to manage them.  
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1.3 Objectives 
The major goal of this study is to perform a contract and risk analysis for PPP projects in 
Egypt by: 
1. Identifying and ranking the various risks affecting PPP projects in Egypt and 
determining their allocation.  
2. An attempt for mapping the identified risks and the risk allocation identified in 
step 1  to contract clauses where the risk allocation is defined clearly in the clause 
(public private or both)  
3. Developing a prototype for Risk Decision Support System for the top ranked 
risks. 
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1.4 Research Assumptions 
In order to conduct the research and in order to get the suitable output from the Decision 
Support System developed, it is assumed that the public party is the Egyptian 
government. Also, the second assumption is that the PPP projects that are implemented in 
Egypt and throughout this study can be in any sector: infrastructure, transportation, 
health, education, etc. The type of Public Private Partnership can be any type of 
agreement executed under the PPP scheme; it can be either Contractual or 
Institutionalized PPP. The different types of PPP are explained in the second chapter 
(Literature Review).  
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1.5 Methodology 
The most common and popular research methodology in this type of topics consists of 
four major steps which are listed and identified in the below figure (Ke et al., 2009):  
1- Topic Identification 
2- Data Collection 
3- Data Analysis and Processing 
4- Data Validation and Verification  
 
Figure 1: General Research Methodology (2009)-Source: Ke et al.  
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1.5.1 Topic Identification (Identifying Risk Factors for PPP projects) 
This is done through extensive Literature Review from journals, conference papers, 
books, articles, reports, etc. (Ke et al., 2009). This is in addition to interviewing experts in 
order to know the major risk factors that can affect projects developed under PPP scheme 
in Egypt. 
1.5.2 Data Collection (Questionnaire/Survey) 
A questionnaire is developed for all the risk factors obtained from the Literature Review 
and experts. The questionnaire‟s objective is to seek from each respondent to identify and 
assess the probability (likelihood of occurrence) and impact of each risk factor. Also, the 
respondent should determine, based on his/her own experience whether this risk should 
be better allocated to the private partner, the public partner or whether it should be shared 
between both parties. The respondents can be from the public, private or academic sector 
with a considerable background in PPP projects. 
1.5.3 Data Analysis and Processing 
In this step, the data obtained from the survey is statistically analyzed and normalized. 
After the survey is conducted, the risks can be ranked according to their severity based on 
the weights assigned by respondents. Based on the questionnaire‟s outcomes and data 
analysis, each risk should be allocated to the party that will be able to manage the most 
this specific risk.  
The survey results are compared to two actual case contracts for PPP projects in Egypt in 
order to determine how the risks are addressed and allocated in actual PPP contracts.  
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Also, a Risk decision Support System (computerized quantitative risk model) is 
developed using Crystal Ball for the most critical risks. The Model‟s objective is to 
obtain an overall contingency value for the whole project and to calculate the 
contingency percentage that should be taken into account for the project. 
1.5.4 Data Validation and Verification 
The verification is conducted by comparing the top risks identified through the survey 
results and included in the Risk Decision Support System to the ones identified in China, 
India and Singapore.  
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1.6 Thesis Structure 
The thesis starts by an introduction about PPP projects in the first chapter. Then, in the 
second chapter, a Literature Review is performed concerning PPP projects in the various 
continents as well as about risks and proper risk allocation methods and finally about 
questionnaires. In Chapter three, the problem statement is explained and detailed along 
with the methodology used for the study. Chapter four is dedicated for the analysis of the 
data obtained from the survey. Chapter five is concerned with the Contract mapping of 
risks included in two actual PPP contracts with the ones obtained through the survey 
results. Chapter six is concerned with the Risk Decision Support System development, its 
analysis and its verification. Finally, the seventh chapter includes the research‟s main 
conclusions along with further recommendations for future studies. 
 
Figure 2: Thesis Structure 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Overview for PPP 
2.1.1 Background 
Public Private partnership (PPP, also referred to as P3 or P³) is described as a venture 
between the government from one side and one or more private companies from the other 
side in which responsibilities, risks and rewards are shared between the public and the 
private parties for the aim of delivering a clearly defined and agreed upon activity which 
is collectively needed such as public services. PPP is an output-oriented long term 
relationship between the public and the private party (Marques, 2012).   Being focused on 
outputs rather than on inputs is a distinctive characteristic of a PPP project (Guidelines 
for Successful PPP Projects in Egypt). 
“PPP is best described as an arrangement between the private and public sectors to 
deliver cost effective and high quality services to the public sector over an extended 
period of time” (Quick, 2006) . 
The Canadian Council for PPP (2009) defines it as “A cooperative venture between the 
public and private sectors, built on the expertise of each partner that best meets clearly 
defined public needs through the appropriate allocation of resources, risks and 
rewards.”  
According to the Guidelines for Successful PPP Projects in Egypt published by the PPP 
Central unit, “A PPP is a contractual agreement between a Public Authority (the Client) 
and a private corporate entity (the Partner) spanning an extended term over 10 to 20 
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years or more for the provision of assets and related services. The Client defines its 
requirements by way of outputs and results without specifying (but validates) the detailed 
engineering.” 
Based on the General Regional Policy guidelines for successful Public Private 
Partnerships published by the European Commission Directorate (2003), the Private 
sector has 4 major roles under the PPP scheme which are as follows:  
 to provide supplementary capital; 
 to provide alternative management techniques and a good use of skills; 
 to provide value added to the consumer and the public at large; 
 to provide better identification and response to the public needs through the 
optimum use of available resources. 
Hwand et al. (2012) mentioned that in general, if an infrastructure project is expected to 
have a value greater than $50 million, then, the involvement of the private sector should 
be considered. Also, sometimes, the need for the private partner comes as a solution to 
some problems caused by the deficiencies present at the public partner's side. Recent 
years have witnessed an increased cooperation between the private and the public sector 
especially in the infrastructure sector all over the world as it is believed that PPP can 
deliver a better Value for Money (VFM) for facilities, projects and services.  According 
to the World Bank (2013), since the financial crisis which took place from 2008 and until 
2011, the involvement of the Private Sector in Infrastructure and Public Services projects, 
whether in developing or developed countries can help in providing a source of funding 
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for the projects. The Public sector will benefit from the efficiency and skills of the Private 
Partner while incentivizing it to deliver the PPP projects on time and within budget.  
The following chart shows the amount of PPP investment in US $ billions in the domain 
of infrastructure between 1990 and 2007 in developing countries (Ke et al., 2009): 
 
Figure 3:  PPP investment in infrastructure projects in developing countries (2009)-Source: Ke et al.  
From the above chart, it is noticed that the investment amount in PPP projects has been 
increasing since 1990 and till 2006 when it reached more than US $ Sixty Billions. This 
obvious increase shows an expanding interest in the Private Sector involvement in order 
to meet the funding gap that faces the Public Sector especially in infrastructure projects.  
Among the various attempts done by the Egyptian Government in order to enhance the 
PPP projects in Egypt, Egyptian Law No. 67 for the year 2010 which was established and 
dedicated to PPP projects in Egypt, defines a “PPP Contract” as “Contract concluded 
between the Administrative Authority and a Project Company under which the Project 
Company is entrusted to undertake all or some of the following activities: financing, 
constructing, equipping and operating infrastructure projects and public utilities and 
making their services available or financing and rehabilitating such utilities” such that 
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the facility or the project is capable of providing the service to the end user throughout 
the lifetime of the PPP Contract.  
2.1.2 History and Start 
The idea of PPP was initiated in the 19
th
 century in England when Sir Edwin Chadwick, 
the social reformer, started applying the principle of operating a monopoly through doing 
an auction in which the winner bidder will be the one who presents the best offer. This 
idea appeared in order to solve the problems caused by the franchising. This principle 
was applied in Europe as well as in the United States in various infrastructure projects. In 
this case, the government played the role of the regulator (Marques, 2010). Starting from 
the 20
th
 century, this concept started to extend by Harold Demsetz, the economics 
professor at University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), whose idea was that the 
competition between different bidders should be through an open bid under the 
supervision and responsibility of the government.  However, some points in Demsetz‟ 
principles needed more improvement such as quality of service and network expansion. 
“In the 1980s and the 1990s, neoliberalism and the funding requirements of capital 
projects for essential infrastructures” made several countries choose the privatization 
which was a better option for energy and telecommunications projects while PPPs were 
preferred for the water sector and transportation projects (Marques, 2010). According to 
the statistics done in 2012, the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI)
1
 Project 
                                                 
1
 “The Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Database is a joint product of the World Bank’s 
Infrastructure Economics and Finance Department and the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
(PPIAF). Its purpose is to identify and disseminate information on private participation in infrastructure 
projects in low- and middle-income countries. The database highlights the contractual arrangements used 
to attract private investment, the sources and destination of investment flows, and information on the main 
investors. By providing critical data and analysis to government policy-makers, consumer representatives, 
the donor community, and other stakeholders, the database contributes to the public debate on the private 
provision of infrastructure.” (World Bank, 2012) 
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Database contains information on more than 6,000 infrastructure projects in 139 low- and 
middle-income countries (World Bank, 2012). According to the PPIAF (Public Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility), starting from 2006, Albania, Egypt, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Nigeria, Tanzania and Turkey established PPP units (Tserng, H.P. et al., 
2012). There has been an increasing attention towards PPP projects which was as well 
reflected in the number of papers written and addressing PPP. Ke et al. (2009) performed 
a study concerned with the research trend of PPP in Construction journals and it was 
found out that from 1998 till 2009, 170 papers out of 4106 papers (around 4.14 %) were 
about PPP related topics. 
2.1.3 PPP structure among Project Procurement Options 
There is no standardized nomenclature used for describing the different PPP categories as 
each case has to be studied and understood separately. This is a proof of the continuous 
evolution in the domain of PPPs.  However, there is a scale for Public-Private 
Partnerships which is defined by the degree of the Private sector involvement which 
ranges from the Design Build (DB) where the private sector only designs and builds the 
project up to the privatization (Private Divestiture) by giving the private sector not only 
full control over the investment, operation and maintenance but also a permanent 
ownership of the facility's assets. In this case, the government only plays a regulatory role 
ensuring the protection of the customer from monopoly in addition to requiring some 
minor maintenance and/or investment in some cases. Privatization is done either by 
selling the facility's assets to investor(s), by performing a management buyout or by 
selling the facility's shares in the national stock market. The private divestiture can either 
be complete or partial where the government can still have a certain level of control over 
Page | 18  
 
the facility by owning a certain percentage of the company's assets (Guidelines for 
Successful Public-Private Partnerships, 2003).  
In the "Finance Only" model which is located at the start of PPP spectrum, the private 
partner provides financial services to the projects through lease payments which transfer 
the commercial risks to the private entity. This type of agreement can last for a period 
ranging from five to fifteen years.  The involvement of the private entity can take place in 
another type of PPP called "Operation and Maintenance Contracts" (O & M) also known 
as "Operation and Management Contracts". In this type of contractual agreement, the 
ownership stays public while the private partner operates and maintains the facility for a 
short period of time (which can be extended though). This type of PPP is useful for 
communities with recent PPP history or for a private partner who wants a little risk 
exposure. Also, this type of agreement ensures a smooth transition from public 
ownership.  Another type of PPP is called "Build-Finance" in which the private partner is 
responsible for building the project or facility as well as financing it during the 
construction period only (Canadian Council for Private-Public Partnerships, 2009). In the 
lease or affermage contracts, the assets of the project are owned by the Public Partner 
who is also responsible for the investment costs. However, the end users (the consumers) 
in this case deal with the Private Partner and not with the Public Partner. In 
a lease contracts, a portion of the payments by the end users goes to the Public Sector as 
owner of the assets in the form of a lease fee and the remainder is given to the operator 
(The Private Partner). In this case, the Public Partner bears less risk as it is guaranteeing a 
fixed payment irrespective of the revenues. In the case of an affermage, the Private sector 
retains its fees and the additional fees (that are charged to customers) are paid to the 
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Public sector. In this case, the Private Sector is the party that is guaranteeing receiving its 
fees (World Bank, 2013).  
According to the European Union, PPPs can be categorized into two major types: 
Contractual PPPs and Institutionalized PPPs (Marques and Berg, 2012). In the case of a 
"Contractual Public Private Partnership", the exact relationship between the private and 
the public partner as well as the rights and responsibilities of each party relative to the 
other are clearly specified in the contractual terms. One of the best models to describe 
this relationship is the "concession model" in which the private sector concessionaire is in 
direct contact with the final user (the customer) by undertaking the investment, 
constructing, operating and maintaining the service or the facility for a certain period of 
time, charging customers for such service and afterwards, the ownership goes back to the 
public partner. The concession contracts are characterized by being long term 
relationships (usually between 20 and 35 years or even longer) between the private and 
the public partner. They can be used in various sectors especially in water and 
transportation (such as highways).  Design-Build-Finance-Operate (DBFO) or Design-
Build-Finance-Maintain-Operate (DBFMO) is another type of PPP which is similar to the 
concession model except for the fact that in this type of PPP (DBFO) or (DBFMO), the 
project or facility recovers its costs not through charging the users for the service but 
mainly through public subvention. The DBFO and the DBFMO differ in the fact that in 
the latter, the private partner carries also the responsibility of the maintenance of the 
facility or project (Marques, 2012). 
One of the most well-known forms of PPP is the "Build-Operate-Transfer" (BOT) system 
in which the private partner builds and operates the project or facility, transferring it to 
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the public partner at the end of the contractual period. In this case, the ownership of the 
facility remains, during the whole contractual period, in the hands of the public sector.  
BOT system is considered as the most popular type of PPP used and adopted (Ke et al., 
2009). However, the whole idea in this type of PPP consists in transferring the 
construction and operation risks to the private partner.  The Private party in BOT projects 
is generally referred to as “the concessionaire” (2010). In the Build-Own-Operate-
Transfer (BOOT) form, the facility's ownership becomes also private during the whole 
contractual period. According to the Guidelines for Successful PPP Projects in Egypt 
published by the PPP Central unit, there are other versions of PPP such as Rehabilitate-
Operate and Transfer (ROT) or the Build-Own-Operate (BOO). Each type of the 
aforementioned PPP types has its own strengths, weaknesses and risks which have to be 
taken into consideration for each project (Ke et al., 2009).  
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The below table shows a summary for the most common types of PPP: 
 
         Name 
Meaning Role of private sector 
DB Design and Build Designs and Builds 
OM 
Operation and 
Management 
Contracts 
Operates and maintains 
the facility 
Concession 
 
Undertakes the 
investment, constructs, 
operates and maintains 
the project 
BOT 
Build Operate 
Transfer 
Builds, operates and 
transfers the project at 
the end of the 
contractual period. 
BOOT 
Build Own 
Operate Transfer 
Builds, owns operates 
and transfers the 
project at the end of 
the contractual period. 
DBFO 
Design Build 
Finance Operate 
Designs, builds,  
finances and  operates 
the facility 
DBFMO 
Design Build 
Finance 
Designs, builds,  
finances, maintains and 
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There are various spectrums explaining the different kinds of PPP. According to the 
Canadian Council for PPP (2009), below is a figure explaining the categorization of PPPs 
based on the degree of the public and private sector involvement and based on the extent 
of risk allocation between different parties (Ke et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 4: The Scale of Public Private Partnership according to the PPP council (2009)-Source: Canadian 
Council for PPP 
  
Maintain 
Operate 
operates  the facility 
ROT 
Rehabilitate, 
Operate and 
Transfer 
Does the necessary 
repairs for the facility, 
operates and transfers. 
Table 1: Summary for the Most Common types of PPP 
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Also, according to the World Bank (2011), the below figure shows another spectrum 
explaining the different PPP arrangements. 
 
Figure 5: The Scale of Public Private Partnership according to the World Bank (2011)-Source: World Bank 
Concerning “Institutionalized PPP”, it means creating a joint entity or more precisely a 
third company formed by the public and the private sectors in order to ensure delivering 
the necessary benefit to the public. This can be achieved as well through selling a part of 
the assets of the public sector to the private sector. Usually, the third party or company 
that is designed to bear the risks is called a “Special Purpose Vehicle” (SPV). In this case, 
the public sector remains in control though remaining as a shareholder or through some 
special rights while the private sector is responsible for the technical management and 
operations. This type of relationships can be very beneficial as it gives the public sector 
the power and authority over the project while the public sector will benefit from the 
private sector‟s experience. However, on the other hand, problems and conflicts may 
arise between both sectors which can have negative implications on the end customers 
through higher service rates (Marques and Berg, 2012). 
Quick (2003) discussed the fact that the private sector is more suitable to directly provide 
the service to the end user in exchange for a fee in the case of economic infrastructure 
such as toll roads and concessions are the optimum solution in the cases where the private 
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sector provides the service to the public sector in other projects such as hospitals, prisons, 
schools, courts and police stations.  
According to the Guidelines for Successful PPP Projects in Egypt published by the PPP 
Central unit, the below figure describes the different degrees of private sector 
participation in projects ranging from the Works and Services Contracts up to the 
Concessions Contracts and finally the Privatization. 
 
Figure 6: Degree of Private Sector Participation in PPP projects according to the PPP Central Unit in Egypt-
Source: Guidelines for Successful PPP projects in Egypt 
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2.2 PPP around the world 
2.2.1 The Americas 
In the United Stated the BOT (Build, Operate and Transfer) method is the same as the 
BOOT (Build, Own, Operate and Transfer) method in Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand. In some cases, BOT projects have not witnessed success such as in Mexico 
where the Mexican government had to take over 23 BOT toll road projects as well as pay 
$5 billion in debt to the Mexican Banks and $2.6 billion to construction companies. The 
failure of PPP projects is accordingly caused by improper risk allocation whether to 
private or public partners as well as some supply and demand related problems. In the 
United States, in order to solve the demand problems, two major principles are applied. 
The Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRV) is a way of support provided by the 
government in order to solve the problem that may arise for the private company if the 
revenues are less than anticipated. On the other hand, the Toll Revenue Cap (TRC) is 
applied if the demand is higher than anticipated. This principle consists in sharing the 
extra revenues between the private and public sectors (Ashuri, B et al., 2011). 
2.2.2 Oceania 
2.2.2.1 Australia 
The involvement of the private sector in the public infrastructure projects has started 
particularly in New South Wales (NSW) and in Victoria especially in the provision of 
roads. Victoria witnessed the prosperity of the partnership between the public and the 
private sector. This was named “Partnerships Victoria”. Partnership Victoria was focused 
on a main objective which is “Value for Money.” This term is generally used to describe 
Page | 26  
 
a commitment established in order to ensure that the money spent brings the best possible 
results and outcomes. It is based on the philosophy of “Gain-share, pain-share”.  (Quick, 
2003) 
The Australian PPP market is characterized by the lack of standardization which is 
widespread in the various Australian states, a lack of international contractors, some 
unfair tendering processes and a common trend for risk transfer.  Many experts think that 
Australia should improve its contract documents, its ethics as well as adopt better risk 
management in order to improve the application of PPP concepts (Quick, 2003). 
According to the Australian Centre for Public Infrastructure, the PPP agreement is output 
focused. This is the basic difference between the PPP and the traditional procurement 
model. The government is rather focused on the end use of the project/facility rather than 
on the methods or techniques that are used to achieve this end use. This makes the 
government play the role of the regulator or more precisely “eyes-on/hands-off” (Quick, 
2006). 
According to Quick (2006), typical project documents for PPP projects in Australia are: 
- The Concession deed (or Project Agreement) 
- Output specifications 
- Construction Contract 
- Operation and Maintenance agreement 
- Financing documents. 
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Starting November 2003, the Victorian State Government promoted a “National PPP 
Ministerial Council” in order to provide better enhancement for PPP Projects as well as to 
develop a new national PPP market.  (Quick, 2006) 
In 2005, PPP projects accounted for approximately 8 % of the total infrastructure projects 
executed in Australia (Ke at al., 2009). 
2.2.3 Europe 
2.2.3.1 European Union 
According to General Regional Policy guidelines for successful Public Private 
Partnerships published by the European Commission Directorate, in Europe, recent years 
have witnessed a great increase of PPP projects. The history of Member States countries 
of the European Union (EU) differs from one country to the other.  The European 
Commission that is responsible for the regional policy has shown a great attention to the 
implementation of PPP projects. The continuous efforts and studies implemented by the 
European Commission in this domain helped in having a complete view about the 
strengths and weaknesses of the PPP projects. It has been found that “successful PPPs 
require an effective legislative and control framework and each partner should recognize 
the objectives and the needs of the other party”. There are major issues that have to be 
ensured when applying PPPs such as time impact, choosing the most suitable PPP type 
for the project, ensuring that the goals and objectives of the end user are realized, 
conforming to the regional regulations and avoiding monopoly (2012). According to 
Hwang et al., the PPP scheme occurs to a great extent in the water sector with different 
forms. For instance, in France and Spain, the private sector is mainly responsible for the 
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operation of the whole water system. In Holland and Belgium, the private sector is only 
partially responsible for the operation of the water system. In England and Wales, the 
private sector may own the assets while the public sector is the party responsible for the 
water provision (Hwang et al., 2012). 
2.2.3.2 Portugal 
A comparison was established between the two major types of PPP (Contractual and 
Institutionalized) in the water sector in Portugal. The major outcome of this study was 
that proper risk allocation is a crucial tool that ensures the success of any project under 
the PPP scheme. In Portugal, the private participation in governmental projects started in 
1993 through purely contractual PPPs. As the government wanted to have a proper 
regulation and supervision over the private companies entering into PPPs, a special 
institute was established for that purpose called “the IRAR” (Institute for the Regulation 
of Water and Waste) which was replaced afterwards by “the ERSAR” (Water and Waste 
Services Regulatory Authority) which aimed at supervising the service quality and which 
had a “nonbinding” opinion concerning all the tender documents. Until that time, PPPs 
were only of contractual type. Starting from 1998, PPPs started to take the 
institutionalized type as well by creating mixed companies between the public and the 
private sectors. The private partner is always chosen for both cases (whether contractual 
PPPs or institutionalized PPPs) through an open bid.  However, it has been noticed that 
there has been problems associated with the implementation of PPPs in Portugal whether 
for contractual or institutionalized PPPs. For instance, statistics were developed in 
December 2009 mentioning that at that time, 25 of the 30 signed PPP contracts were 
concessions (contractual PPPs) while the rest were institutionalized PPPs with 60% of the 
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PPP projects that were negotiated. The main causes of such a problem is related to an 
improper risk allocation between the private and public sectors which proves the 
importance of a good application of risk allocations and risk study before the start of the 
project(Marques and Berg, 2011)  
2.2.3.3 Turkey 
In Turkey, the concession method was rarely used under the Concessions Law of 1910. 
However, the Concessions Law of 1910 provided only general guidelines but not detailed 
procedure. Concessions contracts are reviewed by the Council of State. In 1984, the first 
BOT law (Law No. 3096) was established. The amendments to the aforementioned law 
appeared in 1994, in law No. 3996 in a new law applicable in various sectors such as 
energy, transportation, communication and municipal services.  In Turkey, the BOT 
system is now used for most of the infrastructure projects especially airports while the 
normal concession scheme is used to give the private party the right of operations of 
public properties such as ports. However, the PPP scheme in Turkey has shown some 
proofs of deficiencies due to the absence of any entity affiliated to the government whose 
role is to monitor and supervise the PPP projects in hand. Consequently, in 2009, a draft 
law was proposed which includes amendments and improvements to the previous laws 
and regulations such as the following: 
- Defining PPP according to the law. Accordingly, PPP is a general term under 
which many definitions can be extracted such as BOT, BO, etc. 
- The draft PPP law encloses a standardized format that can be followed by nearly 
all PPP projects. 
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- PPP can be used in any project type such as state hospitals, prisons, water and 
energy projects, transportation, etc.  
- Risks should be properly allocated between the private and public partners 
according to one criterion: the partner that is better able to manage the risk will be 
the one who bears it (Ozeke, 2009).  
2.2.3.4 United Kingdom 
It has been found that the United Kingdom takes the first place in performing studies 
about PPP projects in terms of the number of published papers. The United Kingdom is 
considered as the founder country of the PPP concept. The countries that follow are the 
United States, Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, China and Germany (Ke et al., 2009). 
There is a term used in the UK called Private Finance Initiative (PFI) which is considered 
there as one of the types of PPP. It is based on the fact that the public sector pays 
periodically (monthly or annually) the private sector provider for the supply of service or 
project delivered through an asset developed by or transferred to the private sector 
provider (Quick, 2006) (Marques, 2010). This type of partnership started for health 
projects (such as hospitals) and educational projects (such as schools) and is now used for 
other sectors such as transportation, water and wastewater treatment plants. This concept 
can be useful and effective in projects where costs are difficult to be paid such as projects 
in developing countries. This concept started to be widely used in the UK and was 
encouraged by the government in 1992. By 1997, PFI projects in the domains of 
transportation, health, defense, office accommodations, prison, education and water 
started to be delivered. In fact, 1997 is considered as the year when PPP projects were 
officially introduced in the English community (Ke et al., 2009). 
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However, there was an obvious delay in the delivery of those projects. Since this date, 
various efforts have been undertaken to improve this concept in the UK through the Bates 
Committee who attempted to get the public sector more acquainted with PFI. In the year 
2000, a major entity mainly owned by the private sector was established in order to 
further develop PFI concept by offering the public sector project management skills, by 
providing support to them and by providing initial capital for projects.  New guidelines 
were established as well for whole life cycle service costing for PFI. In the period from 
1999 to 2004, the standardization of the PFI scheme continued over 4 editions (SoPC1, 2, 
3 and 4) until reaching the phase where all PFI schemes in the UK should be compliant 
with this standardized form of Contracts. This standardization aims at reducing the time 
and costs associated with various negotiations throughout the project as well as allowing 
for a proper risk allocation technique instead of allocating all the risks to the private 
sector (Quick, 2006). According to the National Audit Office report that is assessing the 
performance of PFI construction projects in the United Kingdom and that was issued in 
2009, PFI projects were on time 69% of the time and on budget 65% of the time till that 
year (Quick, 2006). In 2005, PPP formed around 15 % of infrastructure projects 
performed in the United Kingdom (Ke et al., 2009).  
2.2.4 Asia 
2.2.4.1 China 
According to the study done by Xu et al. (2010), the Chinese economy has been recently 
prospering and growing at a fast rate: between 2006 and 2010, 2,400 infrastructure 
projects were developed with a total budget of RMB (Renminbi, the Chinese currency) 
470 billion. This wide expansion is to serve the huge population of the PRC (People‟s 
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Republic of China) which is expected to jump from 536 million in 2005 to 827 million in 
2025. This makes the government or the public sector in general look for the intervention 
of the private sector.  The Bird‟s Nest (National Stadium) in Beijing and Beijing Metro 
Line 4 (BJL4) are two major examples of PPP projects in China. In order to ensure the 
success of the adoption of the PPP principle in China, studies were established in order to 
determine the critical success factors (CSF) for PPP projects. CSFs are defined as the 
areas of activity in which favorable results are crucial for a manager in order to achieve 
his goals. According to the study done in 2010, 18 critical success factors were identified 
in China and they were grouped into 5 main factors which are: 
1- Stable macroeconomics environment 
2- Shared responsibility between the public and the private sector 
3- Transparent and efficient procurement 
4- Stable political and social environment 
5- Wise government control and supervision 
However, it is important to note that these main factors can change from year to another 
based on the actual conditions in the country and based on the time at which the study 
was made (Chan, A. et al., 2010). The proof is that in 2001, the major critical success 
factors for BOT projects in China were slightly different (Hwang et al., 2012):  
1- Appropriate Project Identification 
2- Stable Political and economic situation 
3- Attractive financial package 
4- Acceptable toll/tariff levels 
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5- Reasonable risk allocation 
6- Selection of Suitable Subcontractors 
7- Management Control 
8- Technology transfer 
The following table shows a comparison between the critical success factors associated 
with PPP projects identified in 2001 and the ones identified in 2010 (approximately 10 
years later) in China: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Critical Success Factors 
for PPP projects in 
China 
2001 2010 
Appropriate Project 
Identification 
Stable macroeconomics 
environment 
Stable Political and 
economic situation 
Shared responsibility 
between the public and 
the private sector 
Attractive financial 
package 
Transparent and efficient 
procurement 
Acceptable toll/tariff 
levels 
Stable political and social 
environment 
Reasonable risk allocation 
 
Shared responsibility 
between the public and 
the private sector 
Selection of Suitable 
Subcontractors 
Wise government control 
and supervision 
Management Control  
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Technology Transfer  
Table 2: Comparison between Critical Success Factors for PPP projects in 2001 and 2010 (2012, 2010)-Sources: 
Hwang et al. and Xu et al.  
According to the study performed by Xu et al. (2010) and which is aiming to develop a 
model that helps in calculating the risk level of PPP projects in China, it has been found 
that the top 10 risks affecting PPP projects are: 
1- Government Intervention 
2- Poor public decision making process 
3- Government corruption 
4- Financing risk 
5- Inadequate law and supervision system 
6- Public credit 
7- Subjective project evaluation method 
8- Interest rate fluctuation 
9- Conflicting or imperfect contract 
10- Change in Market demand 
These risks were obtained through and extensive literature review and a 2 round Delphi 
survey which helped in identifying those risks. Then, data analysis was performed 
through statistical and analytical tools in order to rank those risks.  
2.2.4.2 India 
According to Lyer and Sagheer (2010), the necessary financing for infrastructure projects 
in India for the next five years is approximately $ 448 billion in the water, ports, roads 
and airports projects. However, this cannot be achieved in India without the intervention 
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of the private sector. Public Private Partnership is considered as a solution to enhance and 
improve India‟s infrastructure. One of the best models and examples for Public Private 
Partnerships comes within the Sustainable Cities Programme (SCP) which is supported 
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) started in 1990. The main 
objective of the SCP is to provide an improved and enhanced environment for 
management and planning. The Indian City of Chennai joined the SCP in 1995. 
Accordingly, in order to implement such programme which aims to improve the 
environmental and managerial conditions in the city, the private partner‟s participation 
along with the government is important and crucial and hence the “Private-Public 
Partnerships” (Sarangi, 2002). However, according to the study performed by Lyer and 
Sagheer (2010) which was conducted through and extensive literature review, interviews 
and case studies, the major risks affecting BOT projects in India are: 
1. Preinvestment risks: The project may be prone to cancellation or inadequate bid 
preparation. 
2. Delay in financial closure: The private party may not have enough financial 
ability to execute the project. 
3. Resettlement and rehabilitation operations: These may be necessary for habitants 
due to the new project, such as in the case of road projects requiring the 
displacement of habitants to allow the work to take place. 
4. Delay in land acquisition: This may be due to political opposition or delays in 
permits. 
5. Permit/approval risks: This may be due to the government corruption, poor 
documentation or poor coordination among the public sector parties. 
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6. Technology risks: Sometimes, the technology adopted may not be beneficial or 
suitable for the project. 
7. Design and Latent Defect Risk: These risks may occur due to poor geological 
studies or deficiency in design. 
8. Cost Overrun risks: This risk occurs when the project cannot be completed within 
the specified budget. This can be due to a certain party‟s fault or may be due to 
reasons beyond the party‟s control such as inflation or interest rate fluctuation. 
9. Schedule risk: This risk occurs if the project cannot be completed within the 
expected time. 
10. Direct political risks: This may be due to changes in law, nationalization or 
problems in getting the necessary approvals for the project.  
2.2.4.3 Taiwan 
According to the New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory, “a national PPP unit can be 
considered an endogenous equilibrium outcome of a game.” A national PPP unit is a 
large unit including several governments which is responsible for regulations and advice 
for PPP projects such as Treasury PPP Taskforce/ Partnerships UK, PFI Promotion 
Office in Japan, the National PPP taskforce on Taiwan and the Public and Private 
Infrastructure Investment Management Center in Korea. Taiwan has an abundant 
experience in PPPs. “Of the 39 departments of the Taiwan government, only the Ministry 
of Transportation and Communications implements an average of 10 or more PPP 
projects annually.” One of the largest PPP projects in the world is located in Taiwan, 
which is “Taiwan High Speed Rail Bank of Taiwan Project.” PPP in Taiwan represent 
around 12.7 % of the annual investment of Taiwan in the domain of infrastructure.  
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Below is a summary for the annual percentage of PPP in various countries with respect to 
the total number of projects in the country, according to 2011‟s statistics: 
Country PPP Contribution 
United Kingdom 10-15 % 
Australia 5-20 % (average 10 %) 
Korea 5-14 % 
Taiwan 12.7 % 
Table 3: Annual PPP project percentage in different countries (2012)-Source: Tserng, H.P. et al. 
According to Tserng, the key to successful PPP projects is Government credibility at the 
public opinion. Therefore, the National PPP taskforce in Taiwan helps in enhancing and 
increasing the trust and credibility between the private and public sectors (Tserng, H.P. et 
al., 2012). 
2.2.5 Middle East 
2.2.5.1 Kuwait 
Kuwait is rapidly moving to the increase of PPP projects on its land.  The number of 
potential Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) projects in Kuwait is probably the most 
significant in the Middle East with over $25 billion worth of projects whether under study 
or already started.  (2
nd
 Annual PPP Investment Summit in Kuwait).In its attempts to 
improve the PPP scheme in Kuwait, the Kuwaiti Government has established a PPP 
project guidebook in addition to Law No. 7/2008 which established the basis for the 
application of infrastructure PPP Projects in Kuwait. According to the guidelines 
published by the State of Kuwait, the PPP law limits the PPP contract to 30 years. It can 
be however extended to a period that can reach 40 years. However, when no specific 
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period is stated in the contract, it is deemed to be assumed as 25 years. “A Project 
exceeding KD 60 million must be carried out by a PPP Project company that will be a 
special-purpose vehicle formed as a Kuwaiti Joint Stock Company.” The evaluation and 
supervision of PPP projects in Kuwait takes place in the Partnership Technical Bureau 
(PTB). The PTB helps in providing standardized PPP contracts, increase and enhance the 
credibility for the PPP market. 
2.2.5.2 United Arab Emirates 
The concept of PPP has been relatively recent for the United Arab Emirates especially 
that it was more common for the Emirati government to be responsible for the 
procurement for any project without much depending on a private partner. Actually, there 
are around 10 PPP projects all over the country which proves that PPP in the United Arab 
Emirates is still at its first stages of implementation. Therefore, political support is 
necessary in order to encourage the private partners to invest in the country. Also, it is 
crucial to get the end customer more knowledgeable about the PPP concept so that it can 
gain more credibility (Dulaimi et al., 2010).  
2.2.6 Africa 
In developing countries, the public sector is not the major responsible for development 
anymore. On the other hand, the private sector started to play an important role by taking 
part in the delivery of a public service, project or facility (Dansereau, 2005). According 
to the World Bank, “Cooperation between business, civil society and government can 
only produce a win-win situation for all as it provides long-term benefits to the business 
sector while meeting the social objectives of civil society and the state by helping create 
stable social and financial environments.” (2002) In Nigeria for instance, there has been 
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an increase in the projects executed under PPP scheme especially when it comes to 
infrastructure projects. In order for Nigeria to improve its infrastructure to meet the 
standards, the country needs from $ 12 to $15 Billion annually, thus, the role of the 
private sector became crucial in such developing countries. According to a study done for 
the projects that are most suitable for PPP application in developing countries and 
especially Nigeria, it has been found that PPP scheme can applied in approximately all 
the project types whether water and wastewater, power and electricity, transportation, 
educational and real estate. The study‟s output was also to determine the critical success 
factors (CSFs) in order to ensure the success of PPP projects which were as follows: “ 
1- Competitive procurement 
2- Realistic assessment for costs and benefits 
3- Favorable framework 
4- Proper risk allocation 
5- Government intervention and guarantees 
6- Political support 
7- Stable economic conditions 
8- Sound economic policy 
9- Availability of suitable financial market 
The above critical success factors should be studied with utmost care in order to endure 
the success of PPP projects (Babatunde, 2012).   
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2.3 Egypt Overview: PPP in Egypt 
In Egypt, in an attempt towards economic reform, the involvement of the private sector 
with the government has increased. A legal framework for PPP projects in Egypt has 
been issued called the PPP Law (67 for the year 2010) in addition to the establishment of 
standard PPP Contracts, procurement documents as well standardized procedures. In 
addition to that, a new body has been established at the Ministry of finance called the 
PPP Central Unit.  
2.3.1 PPP Law: 
The PPP Law in Egypt is “Law No. 67 for Partnerships with the Private Sector in 
Infrastructure Projects and Public Utilities.” It was approved by the Parliament in May 
2010. It is divided into 4 chapters as follows (and 39 articles): 
1- Chapter 1: General Provisions 
2- Chapter 2: The Supreme Committee for Public Private Partnership Affairs and the 
PPP Central Unit 
3- Chapter 3: Tendering and Awarding Procedures 
4- Chapter 4: Substantive Provisions of the PPP Contract 
This law aims at unifying and standardizing the PPP scheme in the various projects as the 
PPP scheme is characterized by uniqueness.  
2.3.2 Role of PPP Central Unit 
According to the PPP Central Unit website, The PPP Central Unit is a unit that has been 
established by the Ministry of finance since June 2006 in order to supervise and assure 
the proper implementation of PPP projects in Egypt. The PPP Central unit seeks the help 
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and advice of international experts in order to enhance the success of PPP Projects in 
Egypt through the following:  
 establishing standard contracts for PPP as well as proper guidelines and 
methodology, 
 “Coordinating the PPP program across Line Ministries, private sector and 
funding market”, 
 providing technical coordination over PPP projects,  
 studying potential projects where PPP can be a better option (“PPP‟able 
Projects”), 
 studying tender documents,  
 ensuring the application of proper risk allocation between the public and private 
sector,  
 benefiting from the previous experience of other countries in the domain of PPP, 
 acting as the “Public Face” for PPP in Egypt who is responsible for spreading 
news, 
 issuing a quarterly PPP booklet to all stakeholders, 
 Hosting a yearly PPP summit called “MENA Region PPP summit”, (The summit 
took place from March 24
th
 2013 till March 27
th
 2013 in Cairo), 
 Providing sessions, trainings and workshops for both the private and public sector 
in order to get them more acquainted with PPP projects. 
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2.3.3 PPP Projects in Egypt 
2.3.3.1 First PPP Project in Egypt 
The first PPP project that took place in Egypt was “New Cairo Waste Water Treatment 
Plant”. The PPP was an “Institutionalized PPP” in which the private sector‟s duties was 
to design, finance, construct, operate, maintain and transfer the waste water treatment 
plant whose capacity is 250,000 m³/day (Tarek, 2011). 
The PPP‟s duration for this project is 20 years at the end of which the private partner 
should transfer the plant in good operational condition as mentioned in the Contract. The 
Public entities in this project were: 
 the Ministry of Housing (MHUUD), 
 the Ministry of Investment (MoI) and  
 The Ministry of Finance (MoF) and more specifically the PPP Central Unit.  
The main consultant for the PPP Central unit was the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC).  The IFC is considered as “the private sector arm of the World Bank group.” 
(Valente, 2010). Since 2006, IFC in Egypt has been giving advisory services to the 
ministry of Finance in order to enhance the application of PPP aiming to improve the PPP 
at the country (IFC, 2013). 
While the World Bank “provides support to governments on developing the enabling 
environment for PPPs and sector reform, through technical assistance and as part of 
broader sector support facilities or facilities to support the development of PPPs. The 
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World Bank Group also supports a number of knowledge management tools and 
collaborates on initiatives to support governments” (World Bank, 2013) 
The private partner was a joint venture between Orascom and Aqualia, a Spanish water 
company named “Orasqualia”. The total value of Orasqualia‟s bid was $ 490 million. 
This joint venture is the one who won the bid face to other 6 bidders including Veolia, 
Befasa, Metito and Kharafi. In June 2009, the contract was signed. The Contract was 
signed between the New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA) and Orasqualia referred 
to as the Service Provider.  NUCA is responsible for planning and developing new water 
and wastewater communities in Egypt (Osgood, 2009).  The main regulator of the project 
is the Water Sector Regulator (EWRA) which is responsible for supervising, reviewing 
and monitoring all activities related to the water and wastewater sectors (Osgood, 2009). 
The project ended in 2012 with total project duration of 2 years.  (Draz, 2012) Under the 
PPP scheme for water and wastewater projects in Egypt, the service provider (the 
investor or the developer) who is in this case Orasqualia will be periodically paid as soon 
as the plant enters in to the operation phase (Osgood, 2012).  
New Cairo Waste Water Treatment Plant won the title of the “Water Deal of the Year” in 
2009 which is a prize given by the Global Water Intelligence (GWI).  (Tarek, 2011)  
The following figure shows the project‟s structure: 
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Figure 7: Key Stakeholders in Water and Wastewater Projects 
2.3.3.2 Future PPP projects in Egypt 
According to the PPP Central Unit Website, there are several PPP projects that have been 
and are being studied for future construction. Below is a list of projects which are 
expected to start and which are in the tendering phase: 
1- Mowasat Specialized University Hospital Project 
Location: Alexandria. 
Contracting Authority: Alexandria University 
Project Status: Construction will start on April 30
th
 2013 
Work description: Design, Finance, Construct and Operate the hospital. 
2- 6th of October Waste Water Treatment Plant Extension  
Location: 6
th
 of October City. 
Contracting Authority: Ministry of Water and Wastewater Utilities 
Project Status: Under Tendering 
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Project Capacity: 150,000 m³/day. 
Work description: Design, Finance, Construct and Operate the wastewater treatment 
facility (Osgood, 2009). 
3- Abu Rawash Waste Water Treatment Plant Upgrade  
Location: West Bank of the Nile in Giza. 
Contracting Authority: Ministry of Water and Wastewater Utilities 
Project Status: Under Tendering 
Project Capacity: 1.6 million m³/day. 
Work description: Design, Finance, Construct and Operate the wastewater treatment 
facility. 
Concerning the projects under the feasibility study, there are several projects with various 
ministries which are expected to take place under the PPP scheme and below is a list for 
those projects according to the PPP Central Unit: 
1. Ain Shams to 10th of Ramadan Railway project 
2. Al Zaqazeeq University Hospital Project 
3. Cairo Contact Centers Park Project in Al Maadi 
4. Hurghada Sea Desalination Plant 
5. New Pediatric Hospital Project-Ain Shams University 
6. Recycling Solid Waste into Energy Projects 
7. River Bus Project 
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8. Safaga Industrial Port 
9. Sharm El Sheikh Desalination Plant 
10. Shubra to Banha Highway Project 
11. Smouha Maternity University hospital and Blood Bank Project 
12. Specialized center for neurosurgery and car road accident project-Ain Shams 
University 
13. Suez Canal specialized University hospital project 
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2.4 Risks affecting PPP Projects 
According to Ke et al. (2009), in the period from 1998 to 2003, the papers published and 
tackling PPP scheme were initially studying 3 major aspects in PPP which are the risks 
associated with PPPs. Procurement method in PPP and financial issue in PPP. Among 
these 3 major points of interest, papers published about risk management for PPPs 
account for approximately 21 % of the total number of papers published and concerning 
PPPs.  The below figure shows the major points of interest of PPP papers from 1998 to 
2008: 
 
Table 4: Areas of concern in PPP papers from 1998 to 2003 (2009)-Source: Ke et al.  
Accordingly, it is noticed that risks associated with PPP along with their management 
techniques occupy a considerable percentage and is considered as an area of concern 
among the various topics and issues related to PPP.  This is related to the nature of PPP 
projects which is characterized by the presence of many risks which demands a sound 
risk balance and allocation between both the private and public partner (Hwang et al., 
2012).  It is believed that a proper risk allocation among parties is the most challenging 
issue when designing a PPP contract. This is due to the fact that an improper risk 
allocation is one of the major causes of failure of PPP projects (Marques and Berg, 2011). 
ISO 2009 defines a risk as “The effect of uncertainty on objectives.” This means that risk 
is an uncertain event that can affect the project‟s objectives or outcomes if it occurs. 
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Risks can affect three major aspects of any project which are cost, time and quality. 
Because of the long term nature of PPP projects, which can range from 20 to 40 years or 
even sometimes exceeds this period, and because PPP projects are based on expected and 
pre-specified assumptions, sometimes, these expectations and forecasts lack accuracy to a 
great extent as it may be difficult to make accurate predictions for 10 years especially in 
unstable economic, technological and political conditions as well supply and demand 
forecasts (Cruz and Marques, 2013). When the Traditional procurement method is used, 
risks do not disappear but they are simply passed to the end customer and taxpayers. The 
below figure is an illustration showing the difference in principle between the traditional 
procurement model and the PPP mode. When using the traditional model for delivering 
the project, the base cost is higher, in addition to the presence of a cost assigned for the 
inefficiency risk which is mainly due to the lack of experience of the government in 
certain areas such as construction and technology. However, in the case of project 
executed under the PPP scheme, along with a sound risk allocation between the private 
and public sectors, the base cost is reduced thanks to the PPP incentives. In spite of 
adding a risk premium to account for the different risks affecting the project in addition 
to the financing cost, the net result is that the total cost is less in the case of PPP projects 
than in the case of traditional project without passing the risks and the extra cost to the 
end user. Also, in general and in most of the projects executed under the PPP scheme, the 
payment to the private sector occurs when the project starts operating. This payment can 
be by the government (the public sector) or by end users. This is an incentive for the 
private partner to complete the project on time and within budget (Marques and Berg, 
2011) 
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Figure 8: Comparison between PPP projects and traditional projects in terms of cost (2011)-Source: Marques 
and Berg 
However, there is a point of view mentioning that not all risks are harmful since they can 
carry opportunities as much as threats in some cases (Marques and Berg, 2011).  
There are several risks that can affect PPP projects, especially infrastructure projects 
which are: technical, construction, operations, revenue, financial, resources, production, 
force majeure, political, regulatory, environmental, commercial and unforeseen risks 
(Marques and Berg, 2011). 
According to the Guidelines for Successful PPP Projects in Egypt published by the PPP 
Central unit, the most common risks affecting PPP projects are: 
 Timing and Planning 
 Unforeseen geotechnical conditions 
 Technical design issues 
 Operation Cost Overrun 
 Time overrun during construction 
 Supply and demand 
 Operational service costs 
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 Inflation 
 Change of legislation 
 Insurance 
 Technological risks 
According to Marques and Berg (2011), the major risks affecting infrastructure projects 
executed under PPP scheme are: 
 Technical risks 
 Construction risks 
 Operating risks 
 Revenue risks 
 Financial risks 
 Force Majeure 
 Regulatory/political risks 
 Environmental risks 
 Project default risks 
Therefore, for each project, a proper risk allocation should be performed as well as the 
determination of the probability (likelihood of occurrence) and impact. This will help in 
expecting the financial and economic consequences of these potential risks.  On the other 
hand, it should be noted that there is an optimal level of risk transfer beyond which, the 
desired Value for Money cannot be achieved for a specific project. This is because 
allocating more risks to the private partner may increase the project costs. The optimum 
level of risk transfer is shown in the following figure: 
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Figure 9: Optimum Level of Risk transfer to ensure realizing the Value for Money (2011)-Source: Marques and 
Berg 
The following section shows in details the risk allocation method as well as the benefits 
of a proper risk allocation between the public and private partners. 
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2.5 Identification, Classification and Allocation of risks related to 
PPP Projects 
According to the Guidelines for Successful PPP Projects in Egypt published by the PPP 
Central unit, “Risk allocation is at the heart of how PPPs are structured.”  
The most well-known and efficient concept for risk allocation is known as the 
“Abrahamson” principle which is based on allocating the risk to the party who will be 
best in managing this risk. There are criteria that make the party eligible for bearing the 
risk which are: 
- Having a risk that is within the party‟s control and which can be dealt with 
efficiently. 
- Having a risk that can be mitigated or transferred through different ways such as 
insurance or service premiums. 
- Having a risk that gives the party bearing it an economical benefit (Quick, 2003) 
Therefore, the party who will be better in managing the risk means the party who can 
handle this risk at “the least cost.” (Hwang et al., 2012)  
In other words, if the public sector is able to bear a certain risk; then it should not be 
transferred to the private sector as doing that may increase the project‟s costs. For 
instance, allocating customers related risks (such as supply and demand risks) to the 
private partner put its assets at the stake. On the other hand, the public sector (the 
government) can be better in knowing the consumption forecasts and accordingly can be 
more appropriate to bear such risk.   
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Marques and Berg (2011) specify a useful methodology that ensures a proper risk 
analysis and evaluation which is described in the below figure: 
 
Figure 10: Proper Risk Analysis Methodology 
This methodology starts by the step of the risk identification which is an essential step for 
the project and which should started as early as possible in the project‟s lifetime (Hwang 
et al., 2012). Then the risks should be properly classified. There are various 
classifications of risks; for instance, one of the possible classifications is dividing the 
risks as follows (Marques and Berg, 2011) 
- Macro Level Risks: the Risks that are beyond the project‟s boundaries and 
however, have the power to affect the whole project, 
- Meso Level Risks: the risks that occur within the project, 
- Micro Level Risks: the risks that occur within the project parties in the project. 
Another risk classification is dividing the risks into: 
- Global Risks (General Risks): external risks affecting the project such as legal, 
political commercial and environmental risks 
Risk 
Identification 
Risk 
classification 
and allocation 
Evaluation of 
Risk 
probabillity 
Quantification 
of Risk Impact 
Risk 
Minimization 
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- Elemental Risks (Project Risks):  risks within the project such as construction, 
operation, project default and revenue risks.  
The following figure shows a third way to classify risks associated with PPP projects. 
This happens by dividing the risks into 3 major categories: Production risks, commercial 
risks and context risks.  
 
Figure 11: One of the adopted risks classification techniques for PPP projects (2011)-Source: Marques and Berg 
   
A proper risk allocation is beneficial as it can decrease economic costs to both parties 
(the private and the public sector).  In order to start a proper and effective risk 
management, first the risks that can affect a certain project have to be specified.  Then, 
the probability and impact of each risk should be quantified. The severity of each risk can 
be determined by multiplying the probability by the impact for each risk. This way, all 
the risks can be ranked for a specific project (Marques and Berg, 2011). This stage has to 
be started from the bidding process. A complete risk matrix should be developed for all 
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the risks associated with a certain project (Marques and Berg, 2011). In order to conduct 
a proper allocation of risks, some known rules can be applied. For instance, it is believed 
that the environmental, political and regulatory risks should be borne by the public sector. 
On the other hand, production risks, construction risks, supply and demand risks should 
be borne by the private sector. Some risks, such as operation, maintenance and design 
depend on the project conditions and circumstances. Some risks are controversial such as 
Force Majeure. The following figure shows a popular risk allocation matrix for general 
risks affecting PPP projects: (Marques and Berg, 2011) 
 
Figure 12: Risk Allocation Matrix for PPP projects (2011)-Source: Marques and Berg 
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2.6 Questionnaires 
According to the guidelines published by the corporate research and Consultation team of the 
Kirkess Council, “A questionnaire is simply a „tool‟ for collecting and recording information 
about a particular issue of interest. It is mainly made up of a list of questions, but should also 
include clear instructions and space for answers or administrative details.”  The questionnaire 
can be either requesting qualitative or quantitative answers (or both). 
The below are the major steps to develop a proper and sound questionnaire: 
 
Figure 2-10: Major steps for developing a questionnaire-Source: “Questionnaires, Research and Consultation 
Guidelines” 
One important aspect concerning the questionnaire is thinking about the output that the 
questionnaire will deliver. This will make a difference in the questionnaire design stage. 
Specifying the analysis method that will be used for the information and data extracted 
from the questionnaire is an important objective to take into consideration while 
developing the questionnaire.  
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2.7 Computerized models 
According to Xu et al. (2012), developing a computerized tool is beneficial as it helps 
“reducing human and mathematical errors as data can be directly inputted by project 
participants and data analysis is then performed by the computerized procedure instead 
of the manual calculation.”  Xu et al. (2012) introduced a computerized risk evaluation 
model for Public Private Partnership projects which can determine the probability and 
severity of the risk factors associated with the PPP projects, it has the option of choosing 
the percentage and weight of the user‟s opinion compared to the experts‟ opinion which 
is part of the model‟s initial database. In other words, the data analyzed out of a 
questionnaire has been inserted in the model as the “experts‟ opinion”. This opinion can 
affect the results obtained out of the model to a certain extent which can be chosen by the 
end user. Meanwhile, the end user‟s opinions also have a certain weight which will also 
be specified by him/her. Finally, after the end user chooses these factors, the model has 
the ability to compute the risk level of each factor as well as the overall risk level of the 
project and accordingly, the end user can choose whether this project is beneficial to go 
for or whether it is too risky to be considered.  
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
and Research Design 
3.1 Description of research path 
An adverse risk is an uncertainty concerning any event that may occur in the future and 
which, by its occurrence, will negatively affect the project by causing time impact, cost 
impact or both. PPP projects are affected by various types of such risks as they are based 
on collaboration between both the public sector and the private sector. In order to ensure 
the success of PPP projects, risks should be taken into consideration. In other words, 
there should be a proper risk allocation between both the private and public partner in 
order to ensure the success of the project. The risks should be identified to the public and 
to the private partner starting from the conceptual design phase of the project. Therefore, 
a proper risk analysis should be done for each project in which the PPP scheme will be 
applied to allow first the public partner to decide whether to go or not to go in the project 
and second once decided to go for the project, to allow the public and the private partners 
to work efficiently together.  
There are various phases for risk analysis that should be carefully done in order to ensure 
properly taking all the risks into consideration. First the risks affecting the project should 
be identified. Then, the risks probability and impact should be determined in order to 
calculate the severity of the risks. Afterwards, the risks are ranked according to their 
severity and the top severe risk are the ones who will be taken to the next step which is 
the quantitative risk analysis through the statistical analysis as well as the model 
development using Crystal Ball. The next step involves presenting the results and 
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validating the model development in order to check its applicability to the end users 
whether they are from the public sector or from the private sector. Concerning the last 
step which is “beyond presentation”, it includes presenting the research findings, the 
recommendations in addition to any future work. The below figure illustrates the process: 
 
Figure 13: Risk Analysis Process 
Moreover, the risks identified throughout the research will be mapped to actual contract 
clauses in order to determine how the risks are addressed and allocated in real PPP 
contracts in Egypt. An interpretation is added to each risk and its way of presentation in 
the actual PPP contract. In case the risk is not addressed in the contract, a proper wording 
is proposed to the risk. This section of the research aims to develop a template for the 
drafting of future PPP contracts.  
1-Identifying 
the risks 
2- Quantifying 
the Risks 
3- Risk 
Analysis 
4- Presenting 
the results 
5- Beyond 
Presentation 
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3.2 Methodology 
The methodology for this research was developed by adapting the framework adopted in 
two papers written by Xu et Al. in 2010 and in 2012. The first paper aimed at developing 
a computerized risk evaluation model for PPP projects in China while the second aimed 
at developing a risk assessment model for PPP projects in China. This research is 
focusing on applying the research framework to Egypt and by doing changes so that this 
research can cope with the actual conditions in the country. The figure below is an 
illustration for the methodology that will be used and explained in the next pages: 
 
Figure 14: Thesis Methodology 
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3.2.1 Identify Risk Factors  
The first step in the methodology consists of identifying the risk factors. This is done 
through the literature review (Chapter 2) and by interviewing experts. Then, similar risk 
factors are grouped into different Critical Risk Groups. 
3.2.2 Questionnaire/Survey 
3.2.2.1Questionnaire Design 
The Questionnaire is composed of risk factors. Those different risk factors were 
identified from the literature review performed concerning various risks that can affect 
PPP projects around the world. After collecting all the risk factors from the literature 
review and after interviewing the necessary experts, the different risk factors were 
divided into different risk groups. The grouping of the risks was according to the 
literature review, namely, according to the study developed by Xu et Al. in 2012. Also, 
some of the risk groups were obtained by asking experts in the domain of risks and 
construction (working in both the private and the academic sectors) and the other were 
based on the personal knowledge of the researcher. Therefore, similar risks were included 
under the same title (under the same Critical Risk Group, CRG). The final grouping of 
risk factors with all the different risks under each group is as follows: 
# Risk Factor 
Factor 1: Macroeconomic and Financial Risks 
1 Interest Rate Fluctuation 
2 Inflation 
3 Foreign exchange fluctuation  
4 Price Change 
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5 Operation cost overrun 
6 Revenue Risk 
7 Inability of concessionaire 
8 Subjective Project evaluation method 
9 Insufficient project finance supervision 
Factor 2: Commercial and Market Environmental Risks 
10 Market competition 
11 Supply and demand  
12 Change in Market demand 
13 Public Credit 
Factor 3: Legal Risks 
14 Performance Security Risk 
15 Permits Risks 
16 Delay in project approvals/permits 
17 Legislation changes 
18 Dispute resolution  
19 Change in tax regulation 
20 Government policy 
Factor 4: Political Risks 
21 Political/Public opposition 
22 Swings in Public Opinion 
23 Political Risk 
24 Nationalization/expropriation 
Factor 5: Regulatory Risks 
25 Regulatory/Contractual Risk 
26 Government Intervention 
Factor 6: Government Maturity Risks 
27 Poor public decision making process 
28 Government corruption 
29 Inadequate law and supervision system 
Factor 7: Technical Risks 
30 Imperfect contract documents 
31 Deficiency of design 
32 Quality Assurance 
33 Quality Control 
34 Latent Defect Risk 
35 Lack of supporting infrastructure 
Factor 8: Construction and Operational Risks 
36 Project/operation changes 
37 Inability of concessionaire 
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38 Provision of transformers, substations or backup power 
39 Construction Risk 
40 Organization risk 
41 Coordination risks 
42 Land acquisition 
43 Physical Obstacles that cannot be avoided 
44 Maintenance Risks 
45 Access and delivery of site 
46 Connection of Public utilities to boundaries of site 
47 
Connection to boundary of Site of telephone lines and natural gas 
provision 
Factor 9: Resources Risks 
48 Labor unavailability 
49 Material shortage 
Factor 10: Production Risks 
50 Third party delay/violation 
51 Planning risks 
52 
Supervision, organization and control for inspection of Construction 
works 
53 Technological Risks 
54 Completion risk 
Factor 11: Environmental Risks 
55 Sustainability Risk 
56 Antiquities Risks 
Factor 12: Unforeseen Risks 
57 Unforeseen Weather conditions 
58 Unforeseen geotechnical conditions 
59 Force majeure 
Factor 13: Other Risk(s) (Please Specify) 
60   
Table 5: Risks and grouping of Risk Factors 
In order to fill the survey, the respondent should specify the probability (likelihood of 
occurrence) and the impact of each risk on the project based on the respondent‟s 
experience and point of view. The probability and impact are both chosen on the Likert‟s 
scale raging form 1 to 5 as follows: 
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Risk 
Probability 
Value Description 
Very Low 
(VL) 
1 Almost no possibility of occurrence 
Low (L) 2 Unlikely to occur 
Medium (M) 3 Likely to occur 
High (H) 4 Very Likely to occur 
Very High 
(VH) 
5 Almost certain to occur 
       Risk Impact Value Description 
Very Low 
(VL) 
1 No serious Influence on the project 
Low (L) 2 Slightly affecting the project's performance 
Medium (M) 3 Moderately affecting the project's performance 
High (H) 4 Significantly affecting the project's performance 
Very High 
(VH) 
5 Catastrophic, where the project would be aborted 
Table 6: Descriptive terms P and I 
Moreover, the respondent should specify whether this specific risk will be borne 
by/allocated to the private party, the public party or whether it will be shared by both 
parties. Also, the respondent has the right to add any risk factor which was not before 
included in the aforementioned risks.  
Below is a definition for the parties in order to unify the point of view according to which 
the survey is answered: 
- The Private Party is the developer, the Service Provider or in other words the 
contracting company which is going to Build, Operate and Transfer the project at 
the end of the Concession period. 
- The Public Party is the government to which the project is affiliated. For instance, 
in the case of a hospital, the public party is the Ministry of Health. Also, the 
researcher considered the regulator (such as the PPP Central Unit affiliated to the 
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Ministry of Finance) among the public respondents although their main role is to 
guarantee the service.  
The finalized questionnaire is presented below: 
# Risk Factor 
Probability Impact Private's 
Risk 
Public's 
Risk 
Both 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Factor 1: Macroeconomic and Financial Risks 
1 Interest Rate Fluctuation                           
2 Inflation                           
3 Foreign exchange fluctuation                            
4 Price Change                           
5 Operation cost overrun                           
6 Revenue Risk                           
7 Inability of concessionaire                           
8 
Subjective Project evaluation 
method                           
9 
Insufficient project finance 
supervision                           
Factor 2: Commercial and Market Environmental Risks 
10 Market competition                           
11 Supply and demand                            
12 Change in Market demand                           
13 Public Credit                           
Factor 3: Legal Risks 
14 Performance Security Risk                           
15 Permits Risks                           
16 
Delay in project 
approvals/permits                           
17 Legislation changes                           
18 Dispute resolution                            
19 Change in tax regulation                           
20 Government policy                           
Factor 4: Political Risks 
21 Political/Public opposition                           
22 Swings in Public Opinion                           
23 Political Risk                           
24 Nationalization/expropriation                           
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Factor 5: Regulatory Risks 
25 Regulatory/Contractual Risk                           
26 Government Intervention                           
Factor 6: Government Maturity Risks 
27 
Poor public decision making 
process                           
28 Government corruption                           
29 
Inadequate law and 
supervision system                           
Factor 7: Technical Risks 
30 Imperfect contract documents                           
31 Deficiency of design                           
32 Quality Assurance                           
33 Quality Control                           
34 Latent Defect Risk                           
35 
Lack of supporting 
infrastructure                           
Factor 8: Construction and Operational Risks 
36 Project/operation changes                           
37 Inability of concessionaire                           
38 
Provision of transformers, 
substations or backup power                           
39 Construction Risk                           
40 Organization risk                           
41 Coordination risks                           
42 Land acquisition                           
43 
Physical Obstacles that 
cannot be avoided                           
44 Maintenance Risks                           
45 Access and delivery of site                           
46 
Connection of Public utilities 
to boundaries of site                           
47 
Connection to boundary of 
Site of telephone lines and 
natural gas provision                           
Factor 9: Resources Risks 
48 Labor unavailability                           
49 Material shortage                           
Factor 10: Production Risks 
50 Third party delay/violation                           
Page | 67  
 
51 Planning risks                           
52 
Supervision, organization and 
control for inspection of 
Construction works                           
53 Technological Risks                           
54 Completion risk                           
Factor 11: Environmental Risks 
55 Sustainability Risk                           
56 Antiquities Risks                           
Factor 12: Unforeseen Risks 
57 
Unforeseen Weather 
conditions                           
58 
Unforeseen geotechnical 
conditions                           
59 Force majeure                           
Factor 13: Other Risk(s) (Please Specify) 
60                             
Table 7: Finalized Questionnaire 
3.2.2.2 Population  
The respondents for this survey are from the private Egyptian sector, public Egyptian 
sector and academic sector (who are teaching in Egypt) as well. All the respondents have 
worked in the domain of Construction Engineering in Egypt and abroad. All of them have 
worked in Egypt while some of them have, in addition to the Egyptian based experience, 
worked abroad whether in the Gulf, Africa, Australia, the United States and Canada. The 
guidelines of the questionnaire set by the researcher are to answer the questionnaire based 
on the Egyptian Construction market.  
All of the respondents should have been involved in PPP projects in Egypt. Respondents 
should have been involved in different types of PPP projects: educational, water and 
waste water, residential and transportation projects.  The page of the survey dedicated for 
the professional background of the respondent in the domain of Construction and in the 
domain of PPP is presented as follows: 
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Name of 
Respondent:    
 
Current Title : 
   
 
Experience of 
Respondent in 
the domain of 
Construction 
0-5 years 5-10 years 
10-15 
years 
more than 15 years 
        
     
Domain of work 
of respondent 
Public Sector 
Private 
Sector 
Academic 
Sector 
Both and/or other 
(please specify) 
        
          
Work location 
and background 
of the respondent 
Egypt  
Other 
(Please 
specify) 
  
  
        
          
PPP experience 
of survey 
respondent 
0-2 years 2-4 years 4-6 years more than 6 years 
        
     Type of PPP 
projects that the 
respondent has 
been involved 
with 
Transportation Educational Health 
Other (please 
specify) 
        
     Work location 
and background 
of the respondent 
in the domain of 
PPP 
Egypt  
Other 
(Please 
specify) 
  
  
        
Table 8: Background Info of the Experts 
3.2.2.3 Sample Size 
The sample size for this questionnaire is equal to 25 respondents all having a 
considerable background in the domain of Construction Engineering and in PPP projects 
in Egypt. The majority of the respondents have more than ten years of experience in the 
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domain of Construction and more than two years (up to six years of experience) in PPP 
projects. 
3.2.2.4 Definition of Risk Factors 
Definitions are provided in the questionnaire for all the risk factors presented in the 
survey in order to get a unified point of view from all the respondents about each risk 
factor. The researcher included the definitions based on the understanding acquired from 
the literature review and after asking experts: 
# Risk Factor Definition 
Factor 1: Macroeconomic and Financial Risks 
1 Interest Rate Fluctuation 
Risk that an interest-earning asset, such as a bank loan, will 
decline in value as interest rates change.  
2 Inflation 
A persistent increase in the level of consumer prices or a 
persistent decline in the purchasing power of money, caused 
by an increase in available currency and credit beyond the 
proportion of available goods and services. 
3 Foreign exchange fluctuation  Change and swing in foreign exchange rates. 
4 Price Change Any changes that occur in the prices.  
5 Operation cost overrun 
Amount by which the actual cost exceeds the budgeted, 
estimated, original, or target cost. 
6 Revenue Risk 
Risks associated with the project's revenues coming from 
end users. 
7 Inability of concessionaire 
Financial inability of the private party in performing the 
works. 
8 
Subjective Project evaluation 
method 
Subjective evaluations are open to interpretation, so one 
evaluator may be very different from another. This can be 
unfair to the project which may be evaluated more severely 
based on an individual's personal perspective. (and vice 
versa) 
9 
Insufficient project finance 
supervision 
Lack of financial supervision on the project. 
Factor 2: Commercial and Market Environmental Risks 
10 Market competition 
In the case of competition on market, if there will be 
competitors for the project and/or facility. 
11 Supply and demand  
Risks associated with supply and demand of the end 
customer such as for instance toll roads or healthcare 
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facilities. 
12 Change in Market demand 
If during the construction of the project and/or after the 
project's completion, the needs of the end user differ. 
13 Public Credit 
The reputation of, or general confidence in, the ability or 
readiness of a government to fulfill its pecuniary 
engagements. 
Factor 3: Legal Risks 
14 Performance Security Risk Bearing the risk of the performance security and getting it. 
15 Permits Risks 
Time and Cost impacts resulting from not getting the 
necessary permits for the project. 
16 
Delay in project 
approvals/permits 
Any delay that occurs in the project due to legal reasons and 
issues for approval and/or getting necessary permits. 
17 Legislation changes 
Any changes to the countries laws after the tendering 
process. 
18 Dispute resolution  
Risks associated with disputes arising between the public 
and the private party, and/or arbitration (if it occurs) 
19 Change in tax regulation 
Increase of taxes which can have a cost impact on the 
project. 
20 Government policy Risks caused by poor governmental regulations and policies. 
Factor 4: Political Risks 
21 Political/Public opposition 
Risks associated with public opposition such as riots or 
protests. 
22 Swings in Public Opinion 
Change in public opinion such as lack of public support to 
the project or to the government. (Such as the ministry to 
which the project is affiliated.) 
23 Political Risk Any political risk that may affect the project. 
24 Nationalization/expropriation Risks associated with nationalization of the project. 
Factor 5: Regulatory Risks 
25 Regulatory/Contractual Risk 
All the risks associated with Egyptian regulations as well as 
with the Contract.  
26 Government Intervention 
Sometimes, the public sector (as he is generally the owner 
and regulator) does many interventions on the private party's 
work which can lead to delays. 
Factor 6: Government Maturity Risks 
27 
Poor public decision making 
process 
Inadequate and poor decisions from the government's side 
and which have an effect on the project. 
28 Government corruption All the corruption problems related to the government.  
29 
Inadequate law and 
supervision system 
If there is any deficiency in the laws as well as in the 
supervision of works. 
Factor 7: Technical Risks 
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30 
Imperfect contract 
documents 
Any problem in the Contract documents such as 
discrepancies between various documents or poor 
contractual conditions which do not reserve each party's 
rights. 
31 Deficiency of design 
If there is any problem in the design that can affect the 
project such as having an unsafe design or a non-
constructible design. 
32 Quality Assurance 
The goal of QA is to improve development and test 
processes so that defects do not arise when the product is 
being developed. Lack of quality assurance can have cost 
and time impact. 
33 Quality Control 
The goal of QC is to identify defects after a product is 
developed and before it's released. Poor Quality Control can 
drastically affect the project as it may lead to great time and 
cost impacts. 
34 Latent Defect Risk 
Any present defect which will have a negative effect on the 
project such as materials defects or defects present in the 
produced works. 
35 
Lack of supporting 
infrastructure 
If the already present and poor infrastructure negatively 
affects the project. 
Factor 8: Construction and Operational Risks 
36 Project/operation changes 
Risk caused by any change that occurs in the project due to 
the change of the owner's point of view. This change can be 
within the project's scope of work or in its operations. 
37 Inability of concessionaire 
The technical inability of the private party to execute the 
works on site. 
38 
Provision of transformers, 
substations or backup power 
Risks associated with delivering power sources to the site. 
39 Construction Risk All risks associated with the construction process on site. 
40 Organization risk 
All risks associated with the organization of work on site 
such as the mobilization, equipment, materials, progress of 
work, etc. 
41 Coordination risks 
Proper coordination should be present on site between the 
Owner, Contractor and Consultant as well as between the 
Contractor and his subcontractors in order not to affect the 
works on site. 
42 Land acquisition 
Any problems that may arise and cause delays for the 
Contractor to continue his works due to the land. 
43 
Physical Obstacles that 
cannot be avoided 
This risk refers to any physical prevention on site which 
avoids work and which was not accounted for. 
44 Maintenance Risks 
The risks originating from any maintenance operation 
required on site whether during the project or at the end of 
the project. 
45 Access and delivery of site 
Risks associated with delivering the site to the Contractor as 
well providing the necessary access to the site. 
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46 
Connection of Public utilities 
to boundaries of site 
Risks associated to the provision of utilities to the site such 
as potable water, sewage network, etc. 
47 
Connection to boundary of 
Site of telephone lines and 
natural gas provision 
Risks associated to the telephone line and natural gas 
provision. 
Factor 9: Resources Risks 
48 Labor unavailability 
Lack of presence of labor or a certain type of labor (such as 
skilled labor) which affects the works on site. 
49 Material shortage 
Lack of presence of necessary material(s) on site which 
prevent the completion of construction.  
Factor 10: Production Risks 
50 Third party delay/violation 
The delays or cost impacts caused by a third party other the 
private partner and the public partner such as sub-contractors 
delays. 
51 Planning risks 
The risks associated with planning originate from poor 
project planning which can lead to delays and cost impact. 
Also, not following the project's time schedule and going out 
of schedule can seriously affect the project.  
52 
Supervision, organization 
and control for inspection of 
Construction works 
Inspection of works on site can be challenging as poor 
organization of inspection can have time and cost impacts. 
53 Technological Risks 
Many risks associated with technology can affect the project 
such as introducing a new technology to the project, a new 
construction method, a new software, etc. 
54 Completion risk 
All the risks associated with the completion and handing 
over processes of the project. 
Factor 11: Environmental Risks 
55 Sustainability Risk 
Environmental risks associated with the project and which 
presence will affect sustainability and lean construction 
objectives. 
56 Antiquities Risks 
In the case any antiquities are found on site and they were 
not expected or accounted for, this may have time impact.  
Factor 12: Unforeseen Risks 
57 
Unforeseen Weather 
conditions 
Unexpected weather conditions that are not accounted for 
and which do not conform to Egypt's expectations at that 
time of the year. 
58 
Unforeseen geotechnical 
conditions 
Any geotechnical data discovered on site and which was not 
present in the geotechnical report and which will have 
impacts on the construction on site 
59 Force majeure 
Any events that happens as it out of the party's control and 
could not have been expected or accounted for 
Table 9: Risk Factors Definitions 
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3.2.2.5 Limitations of the questionnaire 
The questionnaire/survey depends essentially on the respondents opinions. However, 
there are many factors that can affect the opinion given by the expert, such as: 
1- Subjective Estimation of risk 
a. Anchoring: This happens when the respondent starts with an initial 
estimate which is modified along the way while filling the questionnaire. 
b. Linguistic Imprecision: If the same word or expression can be interpreted 
differently by the respondents which will lead to a lack of unification in 
the point of view from which the question is answered.  
2- Psychological factors affecting opinions 
a. Conformity: This difference arises between a respondent answers the 
survey independently and another who answers it collectively (among a 
group of other respondents).  
b. Bias: If the survey is solved collectively, then, respondents may be 
affected by their seniors or managers in taking the decision. 
c. Personality: The personality of the survey‟s solver may affect his/her 
answers to the survey.  (Rodger, C., Petch, J, 1999) 
Accordingly and because of these limitations, it is preferred for each respondent to 
answer the survey individually to get the full point of view and vision without being 
affected by another person in his/her surroundings. 
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3.2.3 Calculations 
3.2.3.1 Risk Allocation 
Concerning the risk allocation analysis, its calculation is based on the “Majority 
Opinion”. In other words, if more than 50% of the survey respondents allocated a certain 
risk to the public party, then this risk will be allocated to the public party. The same 
applies if the majority of the respondents (more than 50 % of the respondents) choose to 
allocate a certain risk to the private party or whether they choose that this risk will be 
borne by both the private and public sector (Shared risk). In the case that for a certain 
risk, neither choice exceeds 50 %, then, in this case, it will be assumed that this specific 
risk will be allocated separately based on the project (“Project Dependent”) (Hwang et 
Al., 2012).  
3.2.3.2 Risk Severity 
The aim of the survey/questionnaire is to calculate the severity of each risk. The Risk 
Severity is calculated by multiplying the probability by the impact of each risk. (Which 
are both obtained from the survey results).  
3.2.3.3 Risk Ranking (Qualitative Risk Analysis) 
After calculating the severity of risks by multiplying the risk probability by the risk 
impact, the values are normalized. The objective of the normalization procedure is to 
unify and adjust the data to a common scale so it can be better interpreted and analyzed.  
In order to get the normalized value for each risk, the following formula is applied: 
Normalized Value = 
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After the normalization is performed, then, the risks can be properly ranked according to 
their severity from highest to lowest. Only risks with values equal or greater than 0.4 will 
be selected to be entered into the crystal ball model for further analysis. According to Xu 
et Al., only the risk factors with a normalized value equal or greater than 0.5 are included. 
(2012) However, since the researcher found that there were risk factors with a value close 
to 0.5, such as values equal to 0.48 and 0.47, then, the researcher widened the range and 
took into account the risk factors with a normalized value equal to or greater than 0.4. 
3.2.4 Mapping Risk Factors with actual Contract Clauses 
All the risk factors and risk groups are then included in a survey in which the respondents 
are asked to fill, based on their personal experience, the probability and the impact of 
each risk and to allocate this specific risk to the party which, in their opinion will be able 
to manage this risk. In addition,  the risk factors obtained from the literature and used in 
the survey will be mapped to two actual PPP contract clauses  in order to determine how 
those risks are presented in real case contracts and whether they are properly covered or 
not. Also, the risk allocation obtained from the survey results as to public or private 
partner will be compared to the actual risk allocation in the contracts and accordingly, 
interpretations will be developed concerning the best and most beneficial risk allocation. 
3.2.5 Crystal Ball Model Development (Quantitative Risk Analysis) 
In this research, a model or in other words a Decision Support System is developed for 
risk analysis, “A model is a spreadsheet that has taken the leap from being a data 
organizer to an analysis tool” (“Oracle” 2008). 
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The Crystal Ball does a number of iterations through Monte Carlo Simulation and shows 
the overall risk level of the project (overall severity) in addition to the percentage of 
contingency cost according to the confidence intervals. Also, the Crystal Ball‟s output, 
through Sensitivity Analysis is showing the highest assumptions impacting the Decision 
Support System‟s results whether in terms of their probability or in terms of their impact. 
In other words, it specifies the criticality of the uncertain variables and determines which 
the uncertain values that have the greatest impact on the Decision Support System‟s 
deliverables. Crystal Ball can as well perform correlation and historical data fitting. “If 
historical data are available, the data-fitting feature can be used to compare the data to 
the range of results and calculate the parameter values that yield the best fit to the data” 
( Anderman, 2003). 
3.2.5.1 Model Limitations 
There are several limitations to the framework:   
1. The public partner is Egyptian based. In other words, this survey/questionnaire is 
assuming that the public party is the Egyptian government or an Egyptian governmental 
agency. 
2. The PPP projects are all done in Egypt. 
3. The PPP projects that are implemented in Egypt and throughout this study can be in 
any sector: infrastructure, transportation, health, education, etc.  
4. The type of Public Private Partnership is general, i.e. it can be a Build Operate Transfer 
(BOT) model or any other PPP scheme as explained in the literature above. 
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3.2.6 Data Validation 
The data validation is performed through the comparison of the top ranked risks obtained 
through the survey results to the top ranked risks obtained from the literature review in 
China, India and Singapore.  
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Chapter 4: Survey Analysis  
4.1 Background information of the respondents 
The Questionnaire was distributed among 25 respondents form the Public Sector, Private 
Sector and Academic Sector.  Among the respondents, 72 % (18 respondents out of 25) 
have a more than 10 year experience in the domain of Construction Engineering: 36% of 
the respondents have more than 15 years of experience in the domain of Construction 
Engineering and 36 % of the respondents have an experience in the domain of 
Construction Engineering ranging from 10 to 15 years.  28% of the respondents have an 
experience ranging from 0 to 10 years. This is illustrated in the below figure and the 
below table: 
 
Figure 15: Experience of the respondents in the domain of Construction Engineering 
Table 10: Experience of the respondents in the domain of Construction Engineering 
Experience of Respondent in the domain of Construction 
Answer Options Response Percent Response Count 
0-5 years 4.0% 1 
5-10 years 24.0% 6 
10-15 years 36.0% 9 
more than 15 years 36.0% 9 
Total Number 25 
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Concerning the domain of work of the respondents, 92 % of them have worked or are 
working in the private sector. 20 % of them have worked in the public sector and 20 % 
have worked in the Academic sector as illustrated in the below figure and table: 
 
Figure 16: Domain of work of the respondents 
 
Domain of work of the respondent 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Public Sector 20.0% 5 
Private Sector 92.0% 23 
Academic Sector 20.0% 5 
Total Number 25 
Table 11: Domain of work of the respondents 
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All the respondents to the questionnaire have worked and are currently working in Egypt 
as shown in the below table and the below figure. 
Work location and background of the respondent 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
Egypt 100.0% 25 
Other (please specify) 10 
Total Number 25 
Table 12: Work location of the respondent 
 
Figure 17: Work location and background of the respondents 
However, 10 out of the 25 respondents have worked in other countries such as Australia, 
Saudi Arabia, Algeria, United States, The United Kingdom, Canada, Africa, etc.  as 
shown in the below table: 
Number 
Other  countries in which the respondents have 
worked 
1 United Kingdom 
2 Saudi 
3 International 
4 
previous experience at the states of Qatar and 
Kuwait 
5 Algeria, USA 
6 Canada 
7 Africa 
8 Australia, Algeria, UAE 
9 Gulf 
10 Regional 
Table 13: Other countries in which the respondents have worked 
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Concerning the experience of the respondents in PPP projects, 44% of the respondents 
(11 respondents out of 25) have an experience in PPP projects ranging from 2 to 4 years. 
12 % of the respondents have more than 6 years of experience in PPP projects. 8 % of the 
survey respondents have an experience ranging from 4 to 6 years while 36 % of the 
respondents (9 respondents out of 25 ) have a recent experience in PPP projects which is 
ranging from 0 to 2 years. 
 
Figure 18: PPP experience of the survey respondent 
 
PPP experience of survey respondent 
Answer Options 
Response 
Percent 
Response 
Count 
0-2 years 36.0% 9 
2-4 years 44.0% 11 
4-6 years 8.0% 2 
more than 6 years 12.0% 3 
Total Number 25 
Table 14: PPP experience of the survey respondent 
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The respondents have worked in different types of PPP projects such as educational, 
transportation, health, wastewater treatment, housing, power, etc. Approximately, 80 % 
of the respondents have worked in transportation PPP projects, 56 % of the respondents 
have worked in health PPP projects and 45% of the respondents have worked in 
educational projects as it is shown in the below figure: 
 
Figure 19: Types of PPP projects that the respondents have worked in 
 
Table 15: Types of PPP projects that the respondents have worked in 
 On the other hand, 20 respondents out of the 25 have worked in other PPP project types 
than the above mentioned transportation, educational and health projects as shown in the 
below table: 
Number Other  PPP project types 
1 Water Treatment 
2 Water Treatment 
3 Wastewater 
4 Sewage Treatment 
5 Sewage Treatment Plant 
6 Water Treatment Projects 
7 
Infrastructure-Waste Water 
Treatment 
8 Water 
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9 Wastewater Treatment 
10 Infrastructure 
11 
Infrastructure (wastewater 
Treatment Plant) 
12 Sewage treatment Plant 
13 Waste Water Treatment 
14 Waste Water 
15 Waste and Airports 
16 Housing 
17 Residential 
18 Affordable Housing project 
19 Utilities 
20 Utilities and power 
Table 16: Other PPP project types that the respondents have been involved with 
All the respondents have been involved in PPP projects in Egypt while 5 respondents 
have been involved in PPP projects in other countries such as Canada, Australia, Saudi 
Arabia and Malaysia. This is illustrated in the below table: 
Number Other (please specify) 
1 Canada 
2 Australia 
3 Saudi Arabia 
4 Malaysia (Conference) 
5 Regional 
Table 17: Other countries in which the respondents have worked in the domain of PPP 
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4.2 Risk Factors Analysis 
In this section of the Questionnaire, there are 12 risk factors with various risks under each 
title. The respondents were asked to determine, based on their past experience in the 
domain of PPP projects, the probability (the likelihood of occurrence) as well as the 
impact (the effect) of each risk on a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 represents the least 
probability and the smallest impact and 5 represents the highest probability and the 
largest impact. Also, the respondent had to determine which party will bear this specific 
risk: whether the private party, the public party or whether this risk will be borne equally 
by both the private and the public party. In the next pages, each risk factor group is 
presented along with the subsidiary risk factors under each group with a summary for the 
25 responses for each risk. For each risk, the number and percentage of respondents who 
assigned the probability, the impact and the risk allocation of each risk factor is 
presented. 
  
Page | 85  
 
4.2.1 Factor 1: Macroeconomic and Financial Risks 
1- Interest Rate Fluctuation 
2- Inflation 
3- Foreign Exchange Fluctuation 
4- Price Change 
5- Operation Cost Overrun 
6- Revenue Risk 
7- Inability of Concessionaire 
8- Subjective Project Evaluation method 
9- Insufficient Project Finance Supervision 
4.2.1.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Interest Rate Fluctuation 0 7 9 9 0 25 
Inflation 0 2 5 12 6 25 
Foreign Exchange Fluctuation 0 4 2 8 11 25 
Price Change 1 2 9 10 3 25 
Operation Cost Overrun 2 5 10 7 1 25 
Revenue Risk 5 3 9 7 1 25 
Inability of Concessionaire 8 7 7 2 1 25 
Subjective Project Evaluation 
Method 
8 3 13 1 0 25 
Insufficient project finance 
supervision 
9 5 6 2 3 25 
Table 18: Risk Factor 1: Probability 
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Figure 20: Risk Factor 1: Probability 
From the above table and the above figure, it is noticed that most of the respondents 
(around 72 %) determined that the interest rate fluctuation has a high probability of 
occurrence. The same applies for the probability of inflation. In the light of the actual 
conditions that are prevailing in the country, 44 % of the respondents chose that the 
foreign exchange fluctuation has a high likelihood of occurrence. Concerning the 
Operation Cost overrun risk, the revenue risk and the inability of concessionaire, the 
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majority of the respondents chose that they are likely to occur but not with a high 
probability. This is due to the fact that the Private Partner chosen is usually a competent 
one. The same applies for the subjective project evaluation method. While for the 
insufficient project finance supervision, 36% of the respondents assessed a very low 
probability of occurrence to it. 
4.2.1.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Interest Rate Fluctuation 0 7 5 12 1 25 
Inflation 0 4 5 8 8 25 
Foreign Exchange 
Fluctuation 
1 2 3 8 11 25 
Price Change 1 7 7 7 3 25 
Operation Cost Overrun 2 4 9 9 1 25 
Revenue Risk 1 3 6 9 6 25 
Inability of Concessionaire 2 4 5 7 7 25 
Subjective Project 
Evaluation Method 
7 5 7 5 1 25 
Insufficient project finance 
supervision 
4 3 9 2 7 25 
Table 19: Risk Factor 1: Impact 
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Figure 21: Risk Factor 1: Impact 
Concerning the Impact of the above mentioned risk factors from the point of view of the 
respondents, the respondents‟ answers were that the Interest rate fluctuation and the 
foreign exchange fluctuation will have a significant or catastrophic impact on the project. 
This is normal and true in light of the actual conditions in the country. The same applies 
for the inflation risk where 64 % of the respondents chose that it will have a great effect 
on the PPP project. Also, 56 % of the respondents mentioned that the financial inability 
of the concessionaire can seriously affect the project. 60 % of the respondents‟ choices 
were that the risk that the project does not realize the necessary revenue can drastically 
have an impact on the project. The insufficient project finance supervision in addition to 
the subjective project evaluation method both have a moderate impact on the project. 
Concerning the Operations cost overrun risk, it has moderate to significant effect on the 
project. 
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4.2.1.3 Risk Allocation 
Party's risk 
Answer Options 
Private's 
Risk 
Public's 
Risk 
Both 
Response 
Count 
Interest Rate Fluctuation 8 3 14 25 
Inflation 6 5 14 25 
Foreign Exchange Fluctuation 9 4 12 25 
Price Change 10 2 13 25 
Operation Cost Overrun 19 0 6 25 
Revenue Risk 9 6 10 25 
Inability of Concessionaire 9 2 14 25 
Subjective Project Evaluation Method 6 3 16 25 
Insufficient project finance supervision 11 1 13 25 
Table 20: Risk Factor 1: Risk Allocation 
 
Figure 22: Risk Factor 1: Risk Allocation 
The survey respondents allocated the interest rate fluctuation risk, the inflation risk, price 
change risk, inability of concessionaire risk, subjective project evaluation method and the 
insufficient project finance supervision risks to both the private and public parties. 76 % 
of the respondents chose that the Operations cost overrun risk will be allocated to the 
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private party while for foreign exchange fluctuation and the revenue risk, neither choices 
(private, public or both) exceeded 50 % of the respondents and accordingly, it is assumed 
that in this case, the allocation of this specific risk will be dependent on the project.  
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4.2.2 Factor 2: Commercial and Market Environmental Risks 
10- Market Competition 
11- Supply and Demand 
12- Change in Market Demand 
13- Public Credit 
4.2.2.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Market Competition 4 9 8 3 1 25 
Supply and demand 2 7 9 6 1 25 
Change in market demand 5 9 6 3 2 25 
Public credit 2 4 9 6 4 25 
Table 21: Risk Factor 2: Probability 
 
Figure 23: Risk Factor 2: Probability 
As illustrated in the above table and figure, the supply and demand risks as well as the 
public credit risk are likely to occur with a percentage of 36 % each. The market 
competition and the change in market demand are less likely to occur with the same 
percentage (36 %) each. 
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4.2.2.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Market Competition 1 9 7 7 1 25 
Supply and demand 1 8 5 8 3 25 
Change in market demand 1 6 6 8 4 25 
Public credit 1 2 9 6 7 25 
Table 22: Risk Factor 2: Impact 
 
Figure 24: Risk Factor 2: Impact 
From the above table and figure, it is found that 52% of the respondents chose that the 
public credit risk has a high impact on the project. Also, 48 % of the respondents assessed 
a significant to catastrophic impact on the project due the change in market demand.  
While for the market competition and the supply and demand risks, they will have a 
slight to moderate impact on the project. 
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4.2.2.3 Risk Allocation 
Party's Risk 
Answer Options 
Private's 
Risk 
Public's 
Risk 
Both 
Response 
Count 
Market Competition 9 3 13 25 
Supply and demand 6 4 15 25 
Change in market demand 3 6 16 25 
Public credit 5 7 13 25 
Table 23: Risk Factor 2: Risk Allocation 
 
Figure 25: Risk Factor 2: Risk Allocation 
Concerning the Risk Allocation, all risks included under this risk factor, i.e. Market 
competition risks, supply and demand risks, change in market demand risks and public 
credit risks were allocated to both the private and the public parties. 
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4.2.3 Factor 3: Legal Risks 
14- Performance Security Risk 
15- Permits Risk 
16- Delay in Project Approvals/Permits 
17- Legislation Changes 
18- Dispute Resolution 
19- Change in Tax Regulation 
20- Government Policy 
4.2.3.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Performance Security Risk 4 13 3 2 3 25 
Permits Risks 4 5 10 4 2 25 
Delay in Project 
approvals/permits 
5 4 7 9 0 25 
Legislation changes 1 4 9 8 3 25 
Dispute resolution 0 3 13 8 1 25 
Change in tax regulation 1 3 9 10 2 25 
Government policy 1 1 10 8 5 25 
Table 24: Risk Factor 3: Probability 
 
Figure 26: Risk Factor 3: Probability 
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According to the survey responses, 52 % of the respondents chose that the dispute 
resolution risk is likely to occur.  52 % of the respondents think that the government 
policy risk is very likely or almost certain to occur. Concerning the change in tax 
regulation risk, the percentage of respondents who think that this risk is likely to occur or 
very likely to occur are 36 % and 40 % respectively. The majority of the respondents (64 
%) chose that the permits risk has a high probability of occurrence. Also, the delays in 
project approvals risk and legislation changes risk have a considerably high probability of 
occurrence which in the researcher‟s opinion is logical as the delays in the project‟s 
approval and the changes in laws can happen frequently during the project‟s lifetime. On 
the other hand, 52 % of the respondents allocated a low likelihood of occurrence to 
performance security risks. 
4.2.3.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Performance Security Risk 1 9 5 4 6 25 
Permits Risks 2 1 9 9 4 25 
Delay in Project 
approvals/permits 
2 3 7 9 4 25 
Legislation changes 2 1 5 10 7 25 
Dispute resolution 0 1 6 15 3 25 
Change in tax regulation 0 2 6 9 8 25 
Government policy 0 2 5 11 7 25 
Table 25: Risk Factor 3: Impact 
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Figure 27: Risk Factor 3: Impact 
Among all the risks under risk factor 3, 60 % of the experts determined that the dispute 
resolution risk can significantly affect the project‟s performance which in the researcher‟s 
opinion is perfectly logical. Also, 36 % of the respondents chose that there will be a 
considerable impact on the project due to the permits risks, the delay in project approvals 
and permits and the change in tax regulation risks. 68 % of the respondents think that the 
legislation changes can have a great effect on the project while 72 % of them think that 
the project will be greatly affected by the government policy risk. On the other hand, 40 
% of the respondents think that the performance security risk will be slightly affecting the 
project‟s performance. 
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4.2.3.3 Risk Allocation 
Party's risk 
Answer Options Private's Risk Public's Risk Both 
Response 
Count 
Performance Security Risk 14 1 10 25 
Permits Risks 5 2 18 25 
Delay in Project approvals/permits 5 4 16 25 
Legislation changes 8 5 12 25 
Dispute resolution 7 0 18 25 
Change in tax regulation 9 5 11 25 
Government policy 6 4 15 25 
Table 26: Risk Factor 3: Risk Allocation 
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Figure 28: Risk Factor 3: Risk Allocation 
The respondents chose that the permits risk, the delay in project‟s approvals and permits, 
the dispute resolution risks and the government policy risks should be allocated to both 
parties. 56 % of the respondents think that the performance security risk should be borne 
by the private party. Concerning the legislation changes and the change in tax regulation, 
they should be dependent on the project and should be allocated on individual project 
cases.    
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4.2.4 Factor 4: Political Risks 
21- Political/Public Opposition 
22- Swings in Public Opinion 
23- Political Risk 
24- Nationalization/Expropriation 
4.2.4.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Political/Public Opposition 3 3 7 5 7 25 
Swings in public opinion 5 3 5 8 4 25 
Political Risk 1 1 5 11 7 25 
Nationalization/expropriation 5 5 6 5 4 25 
Table 27: Risk Factor 4: Probability 
 
Figure 29: Risk Factor 4: Probability 
Due to the actual political conditions in the country, 72 % of the survey respondents think 
that political risks are either very likely or almost certain to occur. 48 % of the 
respondents think that political and public opposition risks and swings in public opinion 
risks have a high likelihood of occurrence. 40 % of the respondents assigned a low 
probability to nationalization/expropriation risks. 
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4.2.4.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Political/Public Opposition 1 1 7 5 11 25 
Swings in public opinion 3 1 6 6 9 25 
Political Risk 0 0 6 12 7 25 
Nationalization/expropriation 0 4 4 5 12 25 
Table 28: Risk Factor 4: Impact 
 
Figure 30: Risk Factor 4: Impact 
Among the above mentioned risks, and according to the above table and the above figure, 
a large portion of the respondents (48%) determined that the nationalization/expropriation 
risks will have a catastrophic effect on the project. Also, the same percentage (48 %) 
chose that the political risks currently occurring in the country can significantly affect 
PPP projects in Egypt. Also, 64 % of the respondents think that the political/public 
opposition will have a huge impact on the project and 60 % of the respondents think of 
the same huge impact due to the swings in public opinion risk. 
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4.2.4.3 Risk Allocation  
Party's Risk 
Answer Options Private's risk Public's risk Both 
Response 
Count 
Political/Public Opposition 3 6 16 25 
Swings in public opinion 5 4 16 25 
Political Risk 7 2 16 25 
Nationalization/expropriation 14 4 7 25 
Table 29: Risk Factor 4: Risk Allocation 
 
Figure 31: Risk Factor 4: Risk Allocation 
The respondents chose that the political/public opposition risks, swings in public opinion 
risks and political risks should be borne by both the private and public partners in the PPP 
projects. On the other hand, 56 % of the respondents allocated the 
nationalization/expropriation risk to the private partner.  
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4.2.5 Factor 5: Regulatory Risks 
25- Regulatory/Contractual Risk 
26- Government Intervention 
4.2.5.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Regulatory/Contractual 
Risk 
1 4 13 5 2 25 
Government 
Intervention 
2 1 15 5 2 25 
Table 30: Factor 5: Probability 
 
Figure 32: Risk Factor 5: Probability 
Concerning the regulatory and Contractual risks and the government intervention risks, 
the respondents think that they are likely to occur with a percentage of 52 % and 60 % of 
the respondents respectively. For both risks, 28 % of the respondents only think that they 
are very likely or almost certain to occur.  
4.2.5.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Regulatory/Contractual Risk 1 4 8 6 6 25 
Government Intervention 0 6 9 7 3 25 
Table 31: Risk Factor 5: Impact 
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Figure 33: Risk Factor 5: Impact 
Concerning the impact assigned by the survey respondents, for the regulatory/contractual 
risks, 32 % of the respondents think that it has a moderate impact, while 24 % think that 
it has a significant impact on the PPP project and 24 % think that it has a great impact on 
the project. The Government Intervention risk was chosen to have a moderate impact on 
the project by 36 % of the respondents, 24 % of the respondents chose this risk to be 
slightly affecting the project while no respondent mentioned that it has no serious 
influence on the project.  
4.2.5.3 Risk Allocation 
Party's risk 
Answer Options 
Private's 
risk 
Public's 
risk 
Both 
Response 
Count 
Regulatory/Contractual Risk 11 2 12 25 
Government Intervention 10 4 11 25 
Table 32: Risk Factor 5: Risk Allocation 
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Figure 34: Risk Factor 5: Risk Allocation 
Concerning the risk allocation for the above 2 risks, the percentage of respondents 
allocating the risk to either party never exceeded 50 % and accordingly, both risks will be 
allocated based on the specific project type.  
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4.2.6 Factor 6: Government Maturity Risks 
27- Poor Public Decision Making Process 
28- Government Corruption 
29- Inadequate Law and Supervision System 
4.2.6.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Poor public decision making 
process 
0 6 4 7 8 25 
Government corruption 4 5 2 6 8 25 
Inadequate law and supervision 
system 
6 6 4 5 4 25 
Table 33: Risk Factor 6: Probability 
 
Figure 35: Risk Factor 6: Probability 
Concerning the Government maturity risks, 60 % of the respondents assigned a high 
likelihood of occurrence to poor public decision making process and to government 
corruption risks. On the other hand, 48 % of the respondents‟ opinion was that the 
inadequate law and supervision system risks have a low probability of occurrence. 
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4.2.6.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Poor public decision making 
process 
0 3 4 10 8 25 
Government corruption 1 2 8 6 8 25 
Inadequate law and supervision 
system 
1 5 5 9 5 25 
Table 34: Risk Factor 6: Impact 
 
Figure 36: Risk Factor 6: Impact 
Concerning the impact of the Government maturity risks, 72 % of the respondents chose 
to assign a high impact associated with poor public decision making process which, in 
their opinion, will have a tremendous impact on the PPP project. Also, the government 
corruption had a great negative impact on the PPP project as per 59 % of the respondents 
while for 56 % of the respondents, the inadequate law and supervision system could have 
drastic impacts on the project. 
 
 
Page | 107  
 
4.2.6.3 Risk Allocation 
Party's risk 
Answer Options 
Private's 
risk 
Public's 
risk 
Both 
Response 
Count 
Poor public decision making process 9 6 10 25 
Government corruption 15 3 7 25 
Inadequate law and supervision system 9 8 8 25 
Table 35: Risk Factor 6: Risk Allocation 
 
Figure 37: Risk Factor 6: Risk Allocation 
In the risk allocation section for this particular risk factor, and according to the opinion of 
60 % of the respondents, the government corruption risks will be borne by the private 
party. Meanwhile, the poor public decision making process and the inadequate law and 
supervision system risks will be allocated according to the project and therefore will be 
project dependent. 
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4.2.7 Factor 7: Technical Risks 
30- Imperfect Contract Documents 
31- Deficiency of Design 
32- Quality Assurance 
33- Quality Control 
34- Latent Defect Risk 
35- Lack of Supporting Infrastructure 
4.2.7.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Imperfect contract documents 6 8 7 2 2 25 
Deficiency of design 8 8 5 4 0 25 
Quality Assurance 3 13 5 4 0 25 
Quality Control 2 11 8 4 0 25 
Latent Defect Risk 2 14 7 1 1 25 
Lack of supporting infrastructure 2 5 5 10 3 25 
Table 36: Risk Factor 7: Probability 
 
Figure 38: Risk Factor 7: Probability 
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There are several technical risks that can be associated with PPP projects and based on 
the survey responses, 40 % of the respondents chose that the risk of lack of supporting 
infrastructure is very likely to occur for PPP projects in Egypt. On the other hand, some 
risks, in the opinion of the majority of the respondents do not have a high probability 
such as the imperfect contract documents, deficiency of design, quality assurance, quality 
control and latent defect risks.  
4.2.7.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Imperfect contract documents 0 4 8 9 4 25 
Deficiency of design 2 1 3 11 8 25 
Quality Assurance 1 2 7 12 3 25 
Quality Control 1 3 5 13 3 25 
Latent Defect Risk 2 1 7 9 6 25 
Lack of supporting infrastructure 1 0 3 11 10 25 
Table 37: Risk Factor 7: Impact 
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Figure 39: Risk Factor 7: Impact 
In spite of previously assigning low probability to the risk of imperfect contract 
documents, deficiency of design, quality assurance, quality control and latent defect risks, 
in case of their occurrence, these risks will have significant impact on the PPP project. 
The lack of supporting infrastructure risk will have a great impact on the project in the 
opinion of 84 % of the respondents. 
4.2.7.3 Risk Allocation  
Party's risk 
Answer Options 
Private's 
risk 
Public's 
risk 
Both 
Response 
Count 
Imperfect contract documents 5 4 16 25 
Deficiency of design 8 3 14 25 
Quality Assurance 9 2 14 25 
Quality Control 8 2 15 25 
Latent Defect Risk 13 0 12 25 
Lack of supporting infrastructure 3 5 17 25 
Table 38: Risk Factor 7: Risk Allocation 
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Figure 40: Risk Factor 7: Risk Allocation 
The respondents allocated all the above mentioned risks to both parties together except 
one risk which is the latent defect risk which is borne by the private party in their 
opinion.  
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4.2.8 Factor 8: Construction and Operational Risks 
36- Project/Operations Changes 
37- Inability of Concessionaire 
38- Provision of Transformers, Substations or backup power 
39- Construction risk 
40- Organization risk 
41- Coordination risk 
42- Land acquisition 
43- Physical Obstacles that cannot be avoided 
44- Maintenance risks 
45- Access and Delivery of site 
46- Connection of Public Utilities to boundaries of site 
47- Connection to boundary of site of telephone lines and natural gas provision 
4.2.8.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Project/Operation changes 3 8 6 8 0 25 
Inability of concessionaire 9 7 6 3 0 25 
Provision of transformers, 
substations or backup power 
4 12 6 3 0 25 
Construction risk 2 11 9 2 1 25 
Organization risk 6 6 10 3 0 25 
Coordination risks 3 8 9 4 1 25 
Land acquisition 9 6 9 1 0 25 
Physical obstacles that cannot be 
avoided 
6 11 7 0 1 25 
Maintenance risks 3 6 10 4 2 25 
Access and delivery of site 4 13 6 2 0 25 
Connection of public utilities to 
boundaries of site 
5 6 9 3 2 25 
Connection to boundary of site of 
telephone lines and natural gas 
provision 
5 8 6 4 2 25 
Table 39: Risk Factor 8: Probability 
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Figure 41: Risk Facto 8: Probability 
Concerning the Construction and Operational risks, most of the respondents assigned a 
low likelihood of occurrence to Project/operations changes risks, the technical inability of 
the concessionaire, the risk of providing transformers, substations or backup power, any 
construction risk, land acquisition risks, the risks of the presence of physical obstacles 
that cannot be avoided, the risks associated with the access and delivery of site  and the 
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risks of connecting the telephone lines and natural gas to the boundaries of site. On the 
other hand, other risks have, in the opinion of the respondents a higher probability of 
occurrence such as the organization risks, coordination risks, maintenance risks and 
connections of public utilities to boundaries of the site. 
4.2.8.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Project/Operation changes 2 8 6 8 1 25 
Inability of concessionaire 2 2 5 13 3 25 
Provision of transformers, 
substations or backup power 
1 5 6 8 5 25 
Construction risk 2 3 9 7 4 25 
Organization risk 2 3 13 5 2 25 
Coordination risks 1 5 13 4 2 25 
Land acquisition 2 0 8 9 6 25 
Physical obstacles that cannot be 
avoided 
1 3 8 7 6 25 
Maintenance risks 2 7 8 5 3 25 
Access and delivery of site 4 6 7 7 1 25 
Connection of public utilities to 
boundaries of site 
1 4 5 7 8 25 
Connection to boundary of site of 
telephone lines and natural gas 
provision 
3 3 7 8 4 25 
Table 40: Risk Factor 8: Impact 
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Figure 42: Risk Factor 8: Impact 
According to the respondents‟ opinion, 52 % of the respondents think that the technical 
inability of the private party can lead to significant effects on the project. Also, the 
majority of the respondents chose that moderate impacts can affect the project due to 
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organization risks, coordination risks, risks of providing transformers and backup power 
as well as construction risks.  
4.2.8.3 Risk Allocation  
Party's risk 
Answer Options 
Private's 
risk 
Public's risk Both 
Response 
Count 
Project/Operation changes 13 2 10 25 
Inability of concessionaire 8 2 15 25 
Provision of transformers, substations or 
backup power 
9 2 14 25 
Construction risk 19 0 6 25 
Organization risk 16 0 9 25 
Coordination risks 11 1 13 25 
Land acquisition 3 8 14 25 
Physical obstacles that cannot be avoided 7 5 13 25 
Maintenance risks 15 3 7 25 
Access and delivery of site 8 5 12 25 
Connection of public utilities to boundaries of 
site 
5 9 11 25 
Connection to boundary of site of telephone 
lines and natural gas provision 
6 11 8 25 
Table 41: Risk Factor 8: Risk Allocation 
 
Figure 43: Risk Factor 8: Risk Allocation 
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In this risk factor group, the respondents allocated four risks to the private sector which 
are project/ operations changes risks, construction risks, organization risks and 
maintenance risks. On the other hand, the risks associated with the access and delivery of 
site, the connection of public utilities, telephone lines and natural gas to the boundaries of 
site will be allocated according to the project. Meanwhile, the technical inability of the 
private party, the provision of backup power risks, the coordination risks, land acquisition 
risks and the risks of the presence of physical obstacles that cannot be avoided will be 
borne by both parties in the opinion of the majority of the respondents.  
4.2.9 Factor 9: Resources Risks 
48- Labor unavailability 
49- Material Shortage 
4.2.9.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Labor unavailability 8 8 6 2 1 25 
Material shortage 1 13 7 4 0 25 
Table 42: Risk Factor 9: Probability 
 
Figure 44: Risk Factor 9: Probability 
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The labor unavailability risk has a low probability of occurrence in the opinion of 64 % 
of the respondents. The same applies for the probability of the materials shortage risk 
which is unlikely to occur in the opinion of 52 % of the respondents. 
4.2.9.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Labor unavailability 3 1 13 7 1 25 
Material shortage 2 3 8 11 1 25 
Table 43: Risk Factor 9: Impact 
 
Figure 45: Risk Factor 9: Impact 
The labor unavailability risk can moderately affect the project in the opinion of 52 % of 
the respondents while the material shortage can moderately affect the project in the 
opinion of only 32 % of the respondents. On the other hand, 48 % of the respondents 
think that the material shortage can significantly affect the PPP project.  
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4.2.9.3 Risk Allocation 
Party's risk 
Answer Options 
Private's 
risk 
Public's risk Both 
Response 
Count 
Labor unavailability 18 1 6 25 
Material shortage 18 1 6 25 
Table 44: Risk Factor 9: Risk Allocation 
 
Figure 46: Risk Factor 9: Risk Allocation 
72 % of the respondents assigned the risks of labor unavailability and the materials 
shortage to the private party. 
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4.2.10 Factor 10: Production Risks 
50- Third Party Delay/Violation 
51- Planning Risks 
52- Supervision, Organization and Control for inspection of Construction works 
53- Technological Risks 
54- Completion Risks 
4.2.10.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Third Party delay/violation 2 6 12 4 1 25 
Planning risks 3 6 11 4 1 25 
Supervision, organization 
and control for inspection of 
construction works 
2 10 11 1 1 25 
Technological risks 3 12 7 3 0 25 
Completion risks 2 8 5 7 3 25 
Table 45: Risk Factor 10: Probability 
 
Figure 47: Risk Factor 10: Probability 
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According to the survey responses, third party delay/violation risks, planning risks, 
supervision, organization and control for inspection of construction works are likely to 
occur. Technological risks are less likely to occur in PPP projects while completion risks 
can occur with a high probability according to 40 % of the survey respondents. 
4.2.10.2 Impact 
 
 
Figure 48: Risk Factor 10: Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Third Party delay/violation 0 7 11 5 2 25 
Planning risks 0 6 11 6 2 25 
Supervision, organization and 
control for inspection of 
construction works 
0 4 14 5 2 25 
Technological risks 2 6 10 5 2 25 
Completion risks 0 3 6 9 7 25 
Table 46: Risk Factor 10: Impact 
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According to 64 % of the survey respondents, completion risks can have significant 
effects on the PPP project. Supervision, organization and control for inspection of 
construction works risks, planning risks and third party violation risks have moderate 
effects on the PPP project.  
4.2.10.3 Risk Allocation 
Party's risk 
Answer Options 
Private's 
risk 
Public's 
risk 
Both 
Response 
Count 
Third Party delay/violation 14 0 11 25 
Planning risks 13 3 9 25 
Supervision, organization and control for 
inspection of construction works 
17 1 7 25 
Technological risks 15 3 7 25 
Completion risks 12 1 12 25 
Table 47: Risk Factor 10: Risk Allocation 
 
Figure 49:  Risk Factor 10: Risk Allocation 
According to the responses to the survey, the risks associated with third party 
delay/violation, planning risks, supervision, organization and control for inspection of 
construction works and technological risks will be borne by the private partner. The 
Completion risks will be allocated based on the project.   
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4.2.11 Factor 11: Environmental Risks 
55- Sustainability Risk 
56- Antiquities Risk 
4.2.11.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Sustainability risk 6 8 7 3 1 25 
Antiquities risk 9 7 7 1 1 25 
Table 48 : Risk Factor 11: Probability 
 
 
Figure 50: Risk Factor 11: Probability 
Sustainability risks and antiquities risks are less likely to occur according to the majority 
of the survey respondents with a percentage of 56 % and 64 % respectively. 
4.2.11.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Sustainability risk 3 3 10 6 3 25 
Antiquities risk 2 8 5 5 5 25 
Table 49: Risk Factor 11: Impact 
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Figure 51: Risk Factor 11: Impact 
Concerning the impact of the above mentioned risks, according to the opinion of the 
majority of the survey respondents, sustainability risks and antiquities risks will have 
slight to moderate effects on the project in case they occur. 
4.2.11.3 Risk Allocation  
Party's risk 
Answer Options 
Private's 
risk 
Public's 
risk 
Both 
Response 
Count 
Sustainability risk 6 8 11 25 
Antiquities risk 5 9 11 25 
Table 50: Risk Factor 11: Risk Allocation 
 
Figure 52: Risk Factor 11: Risk Allocation 
According to the opinions of the respondents, the allocation of the sustainability risks and 
the antiquities risks will be dependent on the project. 
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4.2.12 Factor 12: Unforeseen Risks 
57- Unforeseen Weather Conditions 
58- Unforeseen Geotechnical Conditions 
59- Force Majeure 
4.2.12.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
unforeseen Weather conditions 13 5 6 1 0 25 
unforeseen Geotechnical 
conditions 
5 10 9 1 0 25 
Force Majeure 2 7 8 7 1 25 
Table 51: Risk Factor 12: Probability 
 
 
Figure 53: Risk Factor 12: Probability 
According to the Egyptian climate, 52 % of the respondents assigned an almost 
impossible probability of occurrence to the unforeseen weather conditions. 60 % of the 
respondents assigned a low probability to unforeseen geotechnical conditions. On the 
other hand, 32 % of the respondents assigned a moderate probability to Force Majeure 
and 32 % of the respondents assigned a high probability to the same risk factor. 
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4.2.12.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
unforeseen Weather 
conditions 
7 7 7 4 0 25 
unforeseen Geotechnical 
conditions 
1 5 8 9 2 25 
Force Majeure 0 3 5 9 8 25 
Table 52: Risk Factor 12: Impact 
 
 
Figure 54: Risk Factor 12: Impact 
68 % of the respondents determined that the Force Majeure risk will have a significant 
effect on the PPP project. 36 % of the respondents assigned a significant impact due to 
the risk of unforeseen geotechnical conditions while 56 % of the respondents assigned a 
slight impact on the project in case unforeseen weather conditions occur. 
4.2.12.3 Risk Allocation  
Party's risk 
Answer Options 
Private's 
risk 
Public's 
risk 
Both 
Response 
Count 
unforeseen Weather 
conditions 
14 1 10 25 
unforeseen Geotechnical 
conditions 
13 2 10 25 
Force Majeure 5 0 20 25 
Table 53: Risk Factor 12: Risk Allocation 
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Figure 55:  Risk Factor 12: Risk Allocation 
The survey respondents determined that the unforeseen weather conditions and the 
unforeseen geotechnical conditions risks will both be borne by the private sector. On the 
other hand, the Force Majeure will be allocated to both parties. 
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4.2.13 Factor 13: Other Risks 
60- Death or Bodily Injury 
61- Safety Breaches 
4.2.13.1 Probability 
Probability 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Death or Bodily Injury 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Safety Breaches 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Table 54: Risk Factor 13: Probability 
Two new risk factors were added by one of the respondents. The first one being the death 
or bodily injury that can occur in the project with a moderate probability and the other 
one is safety breaches that can occur onsite with a high probability. 
4.2.13.2 Impact 
Impact 
Answer Options 1 2 3 4 5 
Response 
Count 
Death or Bodily Injury 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Safety Breaches 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Table 55: Risk Factor 13: Impact 
According to the respondent‟s opinion, the risk of death or bodily injury on site has a 
catastrophic effect on the project while safety breaches can have serious effects on the 
project. 
4.2.13.3 Risk Allocation  
The respondent‟s opinion was that both risks should be borne by the private and public 
parties. 
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Chapter 5: Study of Actual PPP 
contracts 
5.1 Risk Allocation according to the survey responses 
Concerning the risk allocation analysis, as it is previously mentioned, it is calculated 
based on the “Majority Opinion”. In other words, if more than 50% of the survey 
respondents allocated a certain risk to the public party, then this risk will be allocated to 
the public party. The same applies if the majority of the respondents (more than 50 % of 
the respondents) choose to allocate a certain risk to the private party or whether they 
choose that this risk will be borne by both the private and public sector (Shared risk). In 
the case that for a certain risk, neither choice exceeds 50 %, then, in this case, it will be 
assumed that this specific risk will be allocated separately based on the project (“Project 
Dependent”) (Hwang et al., 2012).  
Below is a summary for the risk allocation based on this concept applied on the survey 
results: 
# Risk Factor Risk Allocation 
Private 
(%) 
Public 
(%) 
Both 
(%) 
Factor 1: Macroeconomic and Financial Risks 
1 Interest Rate Fluctuation Both 32 12 56 
2 Inflation Both 24 20 56 
3 Foreign exchange fluctuation Project Dependent 36 16 48 
4 Price Change Both 40 8 52 
5 Operation cost overrun Private's risk 76 0 24 
6 Revenue Risk Project Dependent 36 24 40 
7 Inability of concessionaire Both 36 8 56 
8 
Subjective Project evaluation 
method 
Both 24 12 64 
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9 
Insufficient project finance 
supervision 
Both 44 4 52 
Factor 2: Commercial and Market Environmental Risks 
10 Market competition Both 36 12 52 
11 Supply and demand Both 24 16 60 
12 Change in Market demand Both 12 24 64 
13 Public Credit Both 20 28 52 
Factor 3: Legal Risks 
14 Performance Security Risk Private 56 4 40 
15 Permits Risks Both 20 8 72 
16 
Delay in project 
approvals/permits 
Both 20 16 64 
17 Legislation changes Project Dependent 32 20 48 
18 Dispute resolution Both 28 0 72 
19 Change in tax regulation Project Dependent 36 20 44 
20 Government policy Both 24 16 60 
Factor 4: Political Risks 
21 Political/Public opposition Both 12 24 64 
22 Swings in Public Opinion Both 20 16 64 
23 Political Risk Both 28 8 64 
24 Nationalization/expropriation Private 56 16 28 
Factor 5: Regulatory Risks 
25 Regulatory/Contractual Risk Project Dependent 44 8 48 
26 Government Intervention Project Dependent 40 16 44 
Factor 6: Government Maturity Risks 
27 
Poor public decision making 
process 
Project Dependent 36 24 40 
28 Government corruption Private 60 12 28 
29 
Inadequate law and supervision 
system 
Project Dependent 36 32 32 
Factor 7: Technical Risks 
30 Imperfect contract documents Both 20 16 64 
31 Deficiency of design Both 32 12 56 
32 Quality Assurance Both 36 8 56 
33 Quality Control Both 32 8 60 
34 Latent Defect Risk Private 52 0 48 
35 
Lack of supporting 
infrastructure 
Both 12 20 68 
Factor 8: Construction and Operational Risks 
36 Project/operation changes Private 52 8 40 
37 Inability of concessionaire Both 32 8 60 
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38 
Provision of transformers, 
substations or backup power 
Both 38 8 56 
39 Construction Risk Private 76 0 24 
40 Organization risk Private 64 0 36 
41 Coordination risks Both 44 4 52 
42 Land acquisition Both 22 32 56 
43 
Physical Obstacles that cannot 
be avoided 
Both 28 20 52 
44 Maintenance Risks Private 60 12 28 
45 Access and delivery of site Project Dependent 32 20 48 
46 
Connection of Public utilities to 
boundaries of site 
Project Dependent 20 36 44 
47 
Connection to boundary of Site 
of telephone lines and natural 
gas provision 
Project Dependent 24 44 32 
Factor 9: Resources Risks 
48 Labor unavailability Private 72 4 24 
49 Material shortage Private 72 4 24 
Factor 10: Production Risks 
50 Third party delay/violation Private 56 0 44 
51 Planning risks Private 52 12 36 
52 
Supervision, organization and 
control for inspection of 
Construction works 
Private 68 4 28 
53 Technological Risks Private 60 12 28 
54 Completion risk Project Dependent 48 4 48 
Factor 11: Environmental Risks 
55 Sustainability Risk Project Dependent 24 32 44 
56 Antiquities Risks Project Dependent 20 36 44 
Factor 12: Unforeseen Risks 
57 Unforeseen Weather conditions Private 56 4 40 
58 
Unforeseen geotechnical 
conditions 
Private 52 8 40 
59 Force majeure Both 20 0 80 
Table 56: Risk Allocation based on survey analysis 
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5.2 Mapping Risk Factors with real case Contract Clauses 
In order to make sure that the risk factors which are included in the questionnaire are 
applied and taken into account in actual PPP contracts, a mapping is performed between 
the risk factors included in the questionnaire and actual PPP contract clauses. The aim of 
this process is to determine how the risk factors included in the questionnaire are 
addressed in actual PPP contracts.  
Also, the risk allocation obtained from the survey responses and which were presented in 
the previous section are compared to the allocation of the same risks to the parties in the 
actual contract(s) and accordingly, an interpretation is developed concerning which risk 
allocation is more beneficial according to each risk factor. The aim of this section is to 
compare between the views of the PPP risk allocation of the respondents and the actual 
allocation of risks in real contracts. In case of contradiction between the two views a 
wording is recommended to make sure that the clause is interpreted clearly to address the 
risk allocation. 
The two contracts that are used for this study are: 
1- New Cairo Wastewater treatment Plant 
2- Alexandria University New Hospital Project 
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5.2.1 New Cairo Wastewater treatment Plant 
Location: New Cairo 
Contracting Authority:  The New Urban Communities Authority (NUCA).  
Project Status: Construction ended in 2012 
Work description: Design, finance, construct, operate, maintain and transfer the waste 
water treatment plant whose capacity is 250, 000 m³/day. 
The Public entities in this project were: 
 the Ministry of Housing (MHUUD), 
 the Ministry of Investment (MoI) and  
 The Ministry of Finance (MoF) and more specifically the PPP Central Unit.  
The main consultant for the PPP Central unit was the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC).   
The private partner was a joint venture between Orascom and Aqualia, a Spanish water 
company named “Orasqualia”.  
5.2.2 Alexandria University New Hospital Project 
Location: Alexandria. 
Contracting Authority: Alexandria University 
Project Status: Construction will start on April 30
th
 2013 
Work description: Design, Finance, Construct and Operate the hospital. (230 beds) 
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In the following table, the risk factors that are covered in the contracts are presented with 
an interpretation for each risk covered. The structure of the table is as follows: the first 
and second columns are for the sub-clause number corresponding to the risk factor in 
both PPP contracts. The third column contains the exact wording of the clauses in both 
contracts in addition to the risk allocation in case it is clearly stated in the contract. The 
interpretation section is to analyze the clause in both contracts and in order to compare 
the risk allocation of the contracts to the risk allocation obtained from the survey results.  
Details # Risk Factor Risk Allocation 
Factor 1: Macroeconomic and Financial Risks 
1- Interest Rate Fluctuation 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
34.2 
Revision Request by NUCA: NUCA may issue a Revision Request if 
any of the following Re-Equilibrium events occur: 1- Change in Law 
giving rise to an increase in the return on equity indicated in the 
financial model submitted by the Service Provider 2- Change in 
adopted international standards that giving rise to an increase in the 
return on equity indicated in the financial model submitted by the 
Service Provider. 
- 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
- - - 
Interpretation 
In New Cairo Waste Water Treatment Plant Project, if there is a 
change in law or in international standards, then, a revision can be 
done to the Contract. However, this matter is not addressed in 
Alexandria University New Hospital Project. In the opinion of the 
survey respondents, the Interest Rate Fluctuation risk shall be borne 
by both parties. Although the Interest Rate Fluctuation is not stated 
explicitly in either contract, this risk can be covered by including it 
under the change in the adopted international standards.  
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
2- Inflation 
Interpretation 
 
There are no clauses in the contract clearly covering the inflation. In 
the light of the actual case in the country, the inflation risks should be 
covered under the contract. According to the survey results, this risk 
was allocated to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
3- Foreign exchange fluctuation 
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Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
34.1 
Revision Request by the Service Provider: The Service Provider may 
issue a Revision Request if any of the following Re-Equilibrium 
events occur: Change in adopted international standards giving rise 
to a Material Adverse Effect, subject to approval by NUCA. 
- 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
- - - 
Interpretation 
Similar to the Interest Rate Fluctuation Risk, the Foreign Exchange 
Fluctuation risk is not explicitly addressed in the Contracts. 
Moreover, according to the questionnaire results, the allocation of 
this risk will be dependent on the project conditions. As the PPP 
project is sometimes financed by foreign lenders, there may be 
different currencies. The Foreign Exchange Fluctuation can 
sometimes be dramatic which can increase the cost of the debt. Also, 
if the revenues of the project will be in a currency which is different 
from the currency of the debt, the lender will want to be compensated 
for any change in the exchange rate of the devalued currency. 
(“World Bank” 2013) 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
4- Price Change 
Interpretation 
There were no specific clauses addressing the issue of price change in 
the contracts. This risk was allocated to both parties according to the 
survey results. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
5- Operation cost overrun 
Interpretation 
Both PPP contracts did not cover the operation cost overrun. This is 
considered as a deficiency in both contracts as there should be a 
clause in the contract concerning the Operation Cost Overrun in the 
project. For instance, in the case of power generation project, the 
increase of the cost of fuel can expose the project to the risk of 
Operation Cost overrun. Similarly, in the case of water treatment 
plant, any increase in the cost of power can expose the project to the 
same risk. Also, there may be increases in the costs attributed to 
wages due to inflation that may occur in workers‟ wages which can 
also seriously affect the project (“World Bank”, 2013). Based on the 
Survey Results, this risk shall be borne by the Private Party. 
Private (Based 
on the Survey 
Results) 
6- Revenue Risk 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
25.2 & 
34 
25.2 Quarterly Payment Order In the Event that the Plant is not 
capable of producing Effluent at its full capacity for reasons 
attributed to the Service Provider, NUCA shall issue a notice to the 
Service Provider within 2 Business Days from its knowledge of such 
Private 
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Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
event and shall give the Service Provider 60 days as cure period. In 
case the Service Provider does not remedy the event within such 
period, the Capacity Charge and Fixed Operating Charge 
components of STC paid to the Service Provider by NUCA starting 
from the date of issuance of NUCA's notice to the Service Provider in 
this concern shall be prorated to the volume of Effluent effectively 
produced by the Plant for a period not to exceed 3 month. After this 
period, if the capacity of the Plant is not restored to its full capacity, 
it shall be deemed as a Service Provider Event of Default.34 
Contract Re-Equilibrium The Service Provider may issue a Revision 
Request if the Minimum Volumes and Strength have not been reached 
and/or the Maximum Volumes and Strength have been exceeded 
based on the average volume of Influent for a period of 3 consecutive 
months previous to the issuance of a Revision Request by the Service 
Provider. The basis for computation of compensation to either Party 
shall be to restore the Service Provider's return on equity to the same 
economic position as per the financial model submitted by the Service 
Provider. 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
- - - 
Interpretation 
In the hospital project, the revenue risk was not addressed. The 
revenue risk is dependent on the type of the project. Therefore, the 
allocation of such risk should be dependent on the project. However, 
in New Cairo Waste Water Treatment Plant, the revenue risk was 
allocated to the Private Party since it is the Party responsible for the 
operation of the Plant and hence, responsible for generating its 
revenues. 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
7- Inability of concessionaire 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
27.3.1 
27.3.1 Service Provider Events of default: the occurrence of a 
Service Provider Bankruptcy Event which does not result from either 
a NUCA Event of Default or a Force Majeure Event, if such breaches 
reach 26 weeks consecutively or 52 weeks interrupted, NUCA shall 
immediately send an Early Termination Notice for a Service Provider 
Event of Default. 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
32.2 & 
35.6 
32.2 Service Provider Events of default: the occurrence of a Service 
Provider Bankruptcy Event which does not result from either a 
NUCA Event of Default or a Force Majeure Event, a notice shall be 
sent specifying the Event of Default.   35.6 Variations: If the Service 
Provider fails to obtain financing for a Variation where Service 
Provider has used all reasonable endeavors to obtain such financing, 
Private 
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Project AU may choose to finance such Variation. 
Interpretation 
The financial inability of the private party should be borne only by 
the private party who is unable to finance the construction of the 
project. However, a sub-clause was added in the hospital project 
concerning financing the works resulting from a variation order. In 
case the private partner is unable to finance them, then the public 
partner shall bear such responsibility which is a notable point to take 
into consideration. However, this does not totally conform to the 
survey results which mentioned that this risk shall be always borne 
by both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
8- Subjective Project evaluation method 
Interpretation 
 
This risk was not covered under the PPP contract. However, 
according to the survey results, the subjective project evaluation 
method should be borne by both parties. The Project shall be 
properly evaluated and studied in order to have the optimum risk 
allocation between parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
9- Insufficient project finance supervision 
Interpretation 
 
This risk was not covered under the PPP contracts as the proper and 
adequate finance supervision from the government‟s side is always 
assumed in the project. However, according to the survey results, this 
risk should be allocated to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
Factor 2: Commercial and Market Environmental Risks 
10- Market competition 
Interpretation 
 
There are no clauses in the contract related to the Market 
Competition risks because since the private partner has been awarded 
the project, it is assumed that there is not market competition. 
However, according to the survey results, this risk should be 
allocated to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
11- Supply and demand 
Interpretation 
 
The Supply and demand is usually not taken into account when 
drafting the PPP contract. However, according to the survey results, 
this risk should be allocated to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
12- Change in Market demand 
Interpretation 
 
The Change in Market demand is usually not taken into account when 
drafting the PPP contract. However, according to the survey results, 
this risk should be allocated to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
13- Public Credit 
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Interpretation 
 
The public credit is usually not taken into account when drafting the 
PPP contract. However, according to the survey results, this risk 
should be allocated to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
Factor 3: Legal Risks 
14- Performance Security Risk 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
20.3 
The Performance Security issued in the favor of NUCA from the 
Service Provider in the form of an unconditional and irrevocable 
bank guarantee issued by an Egyptian bank or a branch of an 
international bank registered with the Central Bank of Egypt 
guaranteeing the Service Provider's performance of its obligations 
under the Contract. Performance Security Risk: For the avoidance 
of doubt, if the Service Provider fails to deliver any subsequent 
Performance Security for the Operations Period and a Service 
Provider Event of Default shall be deemed to have occurred. In any 
event, NUCA shall only be entitled to liquidate the Performance 
Security, whether for the Construction Period or the Operations 
Period, upon the written approval of MoF. 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
22 
Performance Security Risk: For the avoidance of doubt, if the 
Service Provider fails to deliver any subsequent Performance 
Security to AU on time, AU shall be entitled to liquidate the current 
Performance Security and a Service Provider Event of Default shall 
be deemed to have occurred. AU shall also be entitled to draw on the 
full amount of the then valid Performance Security in the event that a 
Service Provider Event of Default has occurred. In any event, AU 
shall only be entitled to liquidate the Performance Security upon the 
written approval of MoF. 
Private 
Interpretation 
The risk allocation of the performance security to the private partner 
perfectly matches the survey results as the risk of the performance 
security should be solely borne by the private partner. 
Private (based 
on Survey 
Results) 
15- Permits Risks 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
9.2.2 & 
15 
9.2.2 Conditions Precedent under NUCA's responsibility: NUCA 
shall provide the Service Provider with approvals reflecting the 
rights of way for pipelines and roads between the Plant and the 
Waste Stabilization Ponds. 15 Building Approvals: The Service 
Provider shall be responsible for obtaining the Building Approvals at 
its own expense and for providing all the necessary documents for the 
acquisition of such Building Approvals. NUCA shall not be 
responsible for any delay in the Service Provider acquisition of 
Building Approvals except for NUCA Building Approval unless the 
delay resulted from a default by the Service Provider. 
Both 
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Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
15 
Approvals and Building Permit: 1-AU shall obtain and maintain, at 
its own expense the AU Approvals. AU shall provide reasonable 
assistance to the Service Provider in obtaining the Building Permit. 
2- The Service Provider shall obtain and maintain, at its own 
expense, all approvals necessary to perform the Construction Works 
and otherwise perform its obligations under this Contract. 3-The 
Service Provider shall, at its own expense, be responsible for  
preparing an application for a Building Permit (based upon the 
approved Working Drawings pursuant to Article 20) and for 
furnishing all necessary supporting documentation and  
approvals(except for the AU Approvals) including any environmental 
impact assessment that may berequired. AU shall not be responsible 
for any delay in acquiring any Building Permit if the delay is due to 
the incompleteness or inaccuracy of any Building Permit application 
or any supportingdocumentation furnished by the Service Provider. 
4- If the Building Permit has not been issued within thirty (30) Days 
after a complete and accurate Building Permit application (together 
with all supporting documentation) was submitted by the Service 
Provider and for reasons notattributable to the Service Provider or 
any of its Related Parties, then AU shall be responsible for obtaining 
the Building Permit. In case of such failure by the Service Provider to 
obtain a Building Permit for the Site within such period of thirty (30) 
Days which prevents the Construction Works from proceeding, AU 
shall grant the Service Provider an equivalent period of extension for 
suchdelay and the Capital Value of SAP will be paid on time unless 
further extension of ScheduledServices Availability Date is attributed 
to the Service Provider. 
Both 
Interpretation 
The risk allocation obtained out of both Contracts is conforming to 
the survey results. In fact, the risk of obtaining the permits should be 
borne by both the Private and the Public partners. The Public partner 
in both cases will obtain the necessary approvals while the Private 
Partner will obtain the approvals necessary for the Construction and 
Building permits. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
16- Delay in project approvals/permits 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
9.2.2, 
9.2.4 & 
15 
Conditions Precedent under NUCA's responsibility: 9.2.2 NUCA 
shall provide the Service Provider with approvals reflecting the 
rights of way for pipelines and roads between the Plant and the 
Waste Stabilization Ponds.9.2.4 NUCA shall provide its approval or 
comments on the Final Design and the Sludge Strategy submitted by 
the Service Provider within 30 days of its receipt. In case of 
requested amendments, NUCA shall further review the Service 
Provider's proposed amendments to the Final Design and/or Sludge 
Strategy. Following the approval of the Final Design, NUCA shall 
issue NUCA Building Approval. NUCA's approval shall not be 
unreasonably withheld or delayed.15 Building Approvals: The 
Service Provider shall be responsible  for obtaining the Building 
Both 
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Approvals at its own expense and for providing all the necessary 
documents for the acquisition of such Building Approvals. NUCA 
shall not be responsible for any delay in the Service Provider 
acquisition of Building Approvals except for NUCA Building 
Approval unless the delay resulted from a default by the Service 
Provider. 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
15 
Approvals and Building Permit: 1-AU shall obtain and maintain, at 
its own expense the AU Approvals. AU shall provide reasonable 
assistance to the Service Provider in obtaining the Building Permit. 
2- The Service Provider shall obtain and maintain, at its own 
expense, all approvals necessary to perform the Construction Works 
and otherwise perform its obligations under this Contract. 3-The 
Service Provider shall, at its own expense, be responsible for  
preparing an application for a Building Permit (based upon the 
approved Working Drawings pursuant to Article 20) and for 
furnishing all necessary supporting documentation and  
approvals(except for the AU Approvals) including any environmental 
impact assessment that may berequired. AU shall not be responsible 
for any delay in acquiring any Building Permit if the delay is due to 
the incompleteness or inaccuracy of any Building Permit application 
or any supportingdocumentation furnished by the Service Provider. 
4- If the Building Permit has not been issued within thirty (30) Days 
after a complete and accurate Building Permit application (together 
with all supporting documentation) was submitted by the Service 
Provider and for reasons notattributable to the Service Provider or 
any of its Related Parties, then AU shall be responsible for obtaining 
the Building Permit. In case of such failure by the Service Provider to 
obtain a Building Permit for the Site within such period of thirty (30) 
Days which prevents the Construction Works from proceeding, AU 
shall grant the Service Provider an equivalent period of extension for 
suchdelay and the Capital Value of SAP will be paid on time unless 
further extension of ScheduledServices Availability Date is attributed 
to the Service Provider. 
Both 
Interpretation 
The risk allocation obtained out of both Contracts is conforming to 
the survey results. In fact, the risk of obtaining the permits should be 
borne by both the Private and the Public partners. The Public partner 
in both cases will obtain the necessary approvals while the Private 
Partner will obtain the approvals necessary for the Construction and 
Building permits. This is similar to the Permits risk. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
17- Legislation changes 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
29 
Changes in Law: 1- The Service Provider shall notify NUCA of a 
Change in Law which has a Material Adverse Effect within 180 
Business Days as from such change in Law. The Change in Law shall 
be deemed to have occurred, on the date of enactment of the 
executive regulations, in the case that such regulations are required 
to fully assess the effect of such Change in Law. In the event that the 
Public 
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Project Service Provider incurs any Losses due to such duly notified Change 
in Law, it shall be entitled to claim compensation for Losses as 
determined by the Parties within ten (10) Business Days from receipt 
of notification by NUCA of occurrence of such Change in Law. In 
case the Parties fail to reach a solution in relation thereof, the 
Service Provider shall refer the matter to the Partnership Committee. 
2- In case it is established that the Losses incurred by the Service 
Provider were due to the Change in Law, NUCA shall compensate 
the Service Provider as determined by the Partnership Committee 
within 60 days from the date of the Partnership Committee's decision. 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
34 
Changes in Law: 1- Either Party may issue a Revision Request to the 
other Party if a Change in Law occurs, which directly gives 
rise to an increase or decrease in the return on equity indicated in 
the financial model submitted by the Service Provider as per Article 
5.1.7 exceeding half a percent (0.5%) of the Services Availability 
Payments for the relevant year after indexation in accordance with 
Annex 11. 2- The Parties shall meet within ten (10) Days of the date 
of such Revision Request and seek to agree the effect of the Change 
in Law. The basis for computation of any change to 
the Services Availability Payment shall be to restore the Service 
Provider’s return on equity to the same economic 
position as per the financial model submitted by Service Provider 
pursuant to Article 5.1.7. If the Parties are unable 
to agree on the effects of the Change in Law within thirty (30) Days 
of their meeting, the Independent Financial Expert shall determine 
the required value and form of compensation as per Article 34.3. In 
the event of any Dispute as to the determination of the applicable 
compensation, value and form, the Dispute shall be referred to the 
Partnership Committee. 3- The form, amount and timing of 
compensation shall depend on the type and extent of the Loss suffered 
or saving incurred as a result of the Change in Law and may take the 
form of: adjustment to the Services Availability Payments;   payment 
of a lump sum amount; any combination of the above; or any other 
measures, including changes to the Services. 4- Upon determining 
the compensation as provided above, AU and the Service Provider 
shall proceed diligently with the implementation of the compensation 
arrangements including but not limited to (i) obtaining any necessary 
approvals (including as the case may be approval from MoF as to the 
revised Services Availability Payment) and (ii) executing any 
amendments to the Contract or other legal documents as may be 
required or useful to reflect such amendments. 
Public 
Interpretation 
In the case of New Cairo Waste water treatment plant project, the 
private party has to be compensated by the public party. The public 
party will be the one to bear such risk. This is the case in Alexandria 
University new hospital project. The Change in Law is one of the 
risks that may have a huge impact on the project. According to the 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
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World Bank Guidelines, the Change in Law should be taken into 
account by the Private sector which conforms neither to the Survey 
results nor to the risk allocation of this risk in both contracts.  
18- Dispute resolution 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
37 
Dispute Settlement: 1- In the event that the Parties fail to reach  
an amicable solution to any Dispute  
within seven (7) Business Days from the  
notice of any party to the other of the  
occurrence of such Dispute, any of the Parties may refer the matter 
to the Partnership Committee which shall review and examine the 
Dispute and the proposed means of settlement. The Partnership 
Committee shall issue its decision within a period of 30 days from the 
date of the referral of the Dispute to it. 2- In the event the 
Partnership Committee fails to issue its decision, the Dispute shall be 
referred to the Chairman of NUCA and the Chairman of the Service 
Provider in order to settle the Dispute amicably. In the event that 
they are unable to settle the Dispute within 15 Business Days from 
the date of its referral, either Party may submit the Dispute to 
arbitration in accordance with the Cairo Regional Centre for 
International Commercial Arbitration (CRCICA). 
Both 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
42 
Dispute Settlement:  1- In the event that the Parties fail to reach  
an amicable solution to any Dispute  
within ten (10) Days from the  
notice of any party to the other of the  
occurrence of such Dispute, any of the Parties may refer the matter 
to the Partnership Committee which shall review and examine the 
Dispute and the proposed means of settlement. The Partnership 
Committee shall issue its decision within a period of 30 days from the 
date of the referral of the Dispute to it. 2- In the event the 
Partnership Committee fails to issue its decision, the Dispute shall be 
referred to the Chairman of the Service Provider in order to settle the 
Dispute amicably. In the event that they are unable to settle the 
Dispute within 20 Business Days from the date of its referral, either 
Party may submit the Dispute to arbitration in accordance with the 
Cairo Regional Centre for International Commercial Arbitration 
(CRCICA). 
Both 
Interpretation 
Concerning the Dispute Settlement risk, according to both contracts 
and based on the survey results, this risk shall be borne by both 
parties which is realistic. When a dispute arises, both parties will be 
affected and hence, both parties shall bear such risk. This conforms to 
the survey results.  
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
19- Change in tax regulation 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
29 
Changes in Law: 1- The Service Provider shall notify NUCA of a 
Change in Law which has a Material Adverse Effect within 180 
Business Days as from such change in Law. The Change in Law shall 
be deemed to have occurred, on the date of enactment of the 
Public 
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Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
executive regulations, in the case that such regulations are required 
to fully assess the effect of such Change in Law. In the event that the 
Service Provider incurs any Losses due to such duly notified Change 
in Law, it shall be entitled to claim compensation for Losses as 
determined by the Parties within ten (10) Business Days from receipt 
of notification by NUCA of occurrence of such Change in Law. In 
case theParties fail to reach a solution in relation thereof, the Service 
Provider shall refer the matter to the Partnership Committee. 2- In 
case it is established that the Losses incurred by the Service Provider 
were due to the Change in Law, NUCA shall compensate the Service 
Provider as determined by the Partnership Committee within 60 days 
from the date of the Partnership Committee's decision. 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
34 
Changes in Law: 1- Either Party may issue Revision Request to the 
other Party if a Change in Law occurs, which directly gives rise to an 
increase or decrease in the return on equity indicated in the financial 
model submittedby the Service Provider as per Article 5.1.7 
exceeding half a percent (0.5%) of the Services Availability Payments 
for the relevant year after indexation in accordance with Annex 11. 
2- The Parties shall meet within ten (10) Days of the date of such 
Revision Request and seek to agree the effect of the Change in Law. 
The basis for computation of any change to the Services Availability 
Payment shall be to restore the Service Provider’s return on equity to 
the same economic position as per the financial model submitted by 
Service Provider pursuant to Article 5.1.7. If the Parties are unable 
to agree on the effects of the Change in Law within thirty (30) Days 
of their meeting, the Independent Financial Expert shall determine 
the required value and form of compensation as per Article 34.3. In 
the event of anyDispute as to the determination of the applicable 
compensation, value and form, the Dispute shall be referred to 
thePartnership Committee. 3- The form, amount and timing of 
compensation shall depend on the type and extent of the Loss suffered 
or saving incurred as a result of the Change in Law and may take the 
form of: (a) adjustment to the Services Availability Payments; 
payment of a lump sum amount; any combination of the above; or 
any other measures, including changes to the Services. 4- Upon 
determining the compensation as provided above, AU and the Service 
Provider shall proceed diligently with the implementation of the 
compensation arrangements including but not limited to (i) obtaining 
any necessary approvals (including as the case may be approval from 
MoF as to the revised Services Availability Payment) and (ii) 
executing any amendments to the Contract or other legal documents 
as may be required or useful to reflect such amendments. 
Both 
Interpretation 
In the case of New Cairo Waste water treatment plant project, the 
private party has to be compensated by the public party. The public 
party will be the one to bear such risk. However, in the case of 
Alexandria University new hospital project, both parties will bear 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
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such risk and both parties shall collaborate in order to amend the 
contract due to any change in law that may happen. In fact, according 
to the opinion of the respondents in the survey, the allocation of this 
risk should be based on the project and should be taken individually 
(case by case). 
20- Government policy 
Interpretation 
 
The Government policy and laws are not covered under the PPP 
contract. However, the poor government policy, as per the survey 
results should be allocated to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
Factor 4: Political Risks 
21- Political/Public opposition 
Interpretation 
 
The risks included under the political and public opposition are not 
covered under the contracts except if included under “Force 
Majeure” risks. According to the experts‟ opinions in the survey, the 
majority allocated this risk to both parties. This risk can be covered 
through private insurances. However, there should be a clause 
concerning the events of riots, civil disturbances, wars, etc. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
22- Swings in Public Opinion 
Interpretation 
 
The swings in public opinion risks are not included in the contract. 
According to the experts‟ opinions in the survey, the majority 
allocated this risk to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
23- Political Risk 
Interpretation The political risk is not covered under the contracts. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
24- Nationalization/expropriation 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
27.2 
27.2 NUCA events of default:  Expropriation, requisition, 
confiscation or nationalization of the Plant or outstanding share 
capital of the Service Provider and/or the Service Provider Essential 
Rights, NUCA shall remedy the relevant Event of Default within 45 
days following the day of the notice; otherwise, the Service Provider 
shall be entitled to send to NUCA and Early Termination Notice. 
Public 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
32.1 
27.2 AU events of default:  Expropriation, requisition, confiscation 
or nationalization of the Hospital or any part of the Hospital or 
outstanding share capital of the Service Provider and/or the Service 
Provider Essential Rights, AU shall remedy the relevant Event of 
Default within 45 days following the day of the notice; otherwise, the 
Service Provider shall be entitled to send to NUCA and Early 
Termination Notice. 
Public 
Interpretation 
This risk is an instance where the survey results do not conform to 
the contracts‟ risk allocation where the nationalization and 
expropriation risk should be totally borne by the public partner and 
Private 
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the private partner should be properly compensated accordingly. 
According to the World Bank, in case of unilateral termination or in 
the case of expropriation, the Private Partner should be compensated 
by the Public Partner. 
Factor 5: Regulatory Risks 
25- Regulatory/Contractual Risk 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
13 
Relief from Responsibility:  The Service Provider shall not request to 
be relieved from any of its obligations under the Contract for reasons 
of the invalidity, inadequacy or inaccuracy of the Disclosed Data. 
However, the Service Provider is not denied the opportunity to 
present a suggestion to carry out the obligation affected by the 
invalidity, inadequacy or inaccuracy of the Disclosed Data subject to 
NUCA's approval. 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
13.2 
Relief from Responsibility:  The Service Provider may not request to 
be relieved from any of its obligations under the Contract for reasons 
of the invalidity, inadequacy or inaccuracy of the Disclosed Data. 
Private 
Interpretation 
In both contracts, the private partner should bear the contractual risks 
present in the contract and should not be relieved of his 
responsibilities due to the inaccuracy of the data in the contract. 
However, the survey results did not deliver the same results as some 
respondents allocated this risk to the private partner, other to the 
public partner while a third portion allocated this risk to both parties. 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
26- Government Intervention 
Interpretation 
 
The Government Intervention risk is not included in the contracts. 
According to the survey results, some respondents allocated this risk 
to the private partner, other to the public partner while a third portion 
allocated this risk to both parties 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
Factor 6: Government Maturity Risks 
27- Poor public decision making process 
Interpretation 
 
The risks related to the government decisions are not usually covered 
under the PPP contracts. According to the survey results, some 
respondents allocated this risk to the private partner, other to the 
public partner while a third portion allocated this risk to both parties 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
28- Government corruption 
Interpretation 
 
The risks related to the government decisions are not usually covered 
under the PPP contracts. The survey results determined that this risk 
will be allocated to the private party. However, there should be 
clauses in the Contract to cover events of government corruption 
Private (based on 
Survey Results) 
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such as bribery, etc. 
29- Inadequate law and supervision system 
Interpretation 
 
The risks related to the government decisions are not usually covered 
under the PPP contracts. According to the survey results, some 
respondents allocated this risk to the private partner, other to the 
public partner while a third portion allocated this risk to both parties 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
Factor 7: Technical Risks 
30- Imperfect contract documents 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
13 & 
14 
13- Relief from Responsibility:  The Service Provider shall not 
request to be relieved from any of its obligations under the Contract 
for reasons of the invalidity, inadequacy or inaccuracy of the 
Disclosed Data. However, the Service Provider is not denied the 
opportunity to present a suggestion to carry out the obligation 
affected by the invalidity, inadequacy or inaccuracy of the Disclosed 
Data subject to NUCA's approval. 14- Project Documents: The 
Service Provider shall perform its obligation as provided for in the 
Project Documents and shall not terminate any of the Project 
Documents, or introduce any amendment to any part of it which may 
adversely affect the performance by the Service Provider of its 
obligations under the Contract, without the prior written consent of 
NUCA, which shall not be reasonably withheld or delayed. 
Private 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
13.2 & 
14 
13.2- Relief from Responsibility:  The Service Provider may not 
request to be relieved from any of its obligations under the Contract 
for reasons of the invalidity, inadequacy or inaccuracy of the 
Disclosed Data. 14 - Project Documents: The Service Provider shall 
perform its obligation as provided for in the Project Documents and 
shall not terminate any of the Project Documents, or introduce any 
amendment to any part of it which may adversely affect the 
performance by the Service Provider of its obligations under the 
Contract, without the prior written consent of AU, which shall not be 
reasonably withheld or delayed. 
Private 
Interpretation 
In both contracts, the private partner should bear the contractual risks 
present in the contract and should not be relieved of his 
responsibilities due to the inaccuracy of the data in the contract. 
However, the survey results did not deliver the same results as some 
respondents allocated this risk to the private partner, other to the 
public partner while a third portion allocated this risk to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
31- Deficiency of design 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
20.2.2 
Responsibilities of the Service Provider:  The Service Provider shall 
be solely responsible for any deficiency in the design of the Plant 
(including the Final Design). The failure of NUCA to object to any 
design, drawing or specification (including the Final Design ), or any 
change thereto, shall not be construed as a waiver by NUCA of any 
Private 
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Plant 
Project 
of its rights under this Contract or in any way relieve the Service 
Provider of its obligations hereunder. Further to the a foregoing, the 
Service Provider shall: a- accept no review conducted by NUCA with 
respect to the design of the Plant (including the Final Design) will 
relieve the Service Provider of any of its obligations under the 
Contract, and that NUCA undertakes no responsibility as to the 
quality of engineering or construction of the design of the Plant 
(including the Final Design), the Plant or any component thereof; b- 
in no way represent or imply to any third party that, as a result of any 
review by NUCA, NUCA is responsible for the engineering or 
construction soundness of the design of the Plant (including the Final 
Design), or any component thereof, and c- be solely responsible for 
the technical feasibility, operational capability and reliability of the 
design of the Plant (including the Final Design), and each component 
thereof. 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
20.6.1 
Responsibilities of the Service Provider:  The Service Provider shall 
be solely responsible for any deficiency in the design of the Hospital 
(including the Design Documents). The failure of AU to object to any 
design, drawing or specification (including the Design Documents), 
or any change thereto, shall not be construed as a waiver by AU of 
any of its rights under this Contract or in any way relieve the Service 
Provider of its obligations hereunder. 
Private 
Interpretation 
In both contracts, it is clearly stated that the deficiency of design is 
the complete responsibility of the Private Partner and that the public 
partner is not responsible for any problem that may arise in the 
design. Since the private partner is contractually responsible for the 
design, therefore, any risk related to the design deficiency should be 
allocated and borne by him. However, according to the survey 
results, this risk shall be borne by both the public and the private 
partner. Accordingly, this risk is better allocated in both contracts and 
should not be borne by the private partner since it is the private 
partner‟s responsibility to perform the design and submit all the 
project‟s drawings based on the Good Industry Practice, Egyptian 
Law and relevant codes. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
32- Quality Assurance 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
20.2.4 
& 21.4 
20.2.4 Quality Assurance and Quality Control: Prior to the 
commencement of any activities related to the Construction Works, 
the Service Provider shall establish the Quality Assurance System to 
cover construction, operation and Plant Laboratory testing, which 
shall be provided to NUCA. 21.4 Service Quality Assurance: 1- The 
Service Provider shall implement a Quality Assurance System in 
accordance with Good industry Practice. 2- The Service Provider 
shall comply with the Quality Assurance System from the date of its 
submission to NUCA. 3- The Service Provider shall deliver the last 
updated O & M Manual to NUCA. 
Private 
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Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
21.4 
Quality Assurance System: 1- Prior to the commencement of any 
activities related to the Construction Works, the Service Provider 
shall establish a Quality Assurance System to cover construction, 
operation and testing, a copy of which shall be provided to AU. 2- 
AU shall have the right upon a three (3) Days' notice to examine the 
Quality Assurance System to confirm that any item of the 
Construction Works complies with the requirements 
of the Contract, without interfering or hindering Construction Works. 
3- If the Construction Works or 
any item thereof fails to conform in any material respect with the 
requirements of the Contract (including the Quality 
Assurance System), AU may give notice to the Service Provider of 
such failure. The Service Provider shall correct 
or start correcting the noncompliance as soon as possible but in any 
case within fifteen (15) Days of receipt of AU's 
notice. 
Private 
Interpretation 
In both contracts, the establishment of the Quality Assurance system 
is the sole responsibility of the private partner. However, the 
involvement of competent personnel from the public partner‟s side is 
important in order to ensure a good supervision system for the 
project. Accordingly, based on the survey results, the majority of the 
respondents allocated this risk to both the private and the public 
partners. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
33- Quality Control 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
20.2.4 
Quality Assurance and Quality Control: If the Construction Works 
or any item thereof fails to conform in any material respect with the 
requirements of the Contract (including the quality or safety 
requirements), NUCA, based on EWRA's recommendations, may give 
notice to the Service Provider of such failure. The Service Provider 
shall correct or materially start correcting the noncompliance as 
soon as possible but in any case within 15 days of receipt of NUCA's 
notice. 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
25.2 
Performance monitoring system: The Service Provider shall be 
responsible for monitoring its performance of this Contract during 
the Contract Duration, in the manner and at the frequencies required 
by this Contract and the Service Level specifications. The Service 
Provider shall establish a 
Performance Monitoring System which shall continuously monitor 
the delivery and quality of the Services and compliance with the 
Service Level Specifications and the other terms of the Contract. The 
Service Provider 
shall provide to AU relevant particulars of any aspects of its 
performance which fail to meet the requirements of this Contract. AU 
may at all reasonable times observe, inspect as to the adequacy of the 
monitoring procedures (including without limitation carrying out 
spot checks and appointing and independent third party to carry out 
Both 
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monitoring). The Service Provider shall undertake a comparison 
between its inspection and 
audit results and that of AU or other monitoring parties to reduce  
discrepancies and differences in the evaluation of criteria and 
standard. 
Interpretation 
In the New Cairo waste water treatment plant, the quality control is 
the sole responsibility of the Service Provider. However, in the 
hospital project, it is clearly stated that the Service Provider should 
monitor his own performance in the presence of a monitoring system 
by a third party appointed by the public partner. This complies with 
the survey results which allocated this risk to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
34- Latent Defect Risk 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
20.2.2 
& 
20.2.9 
(b) 
20.2.2 Responsibilities of the Service Provider:  The Service 
Provider shall be solely responsible for any deficiency in the design 
of the Plant (including the Final Design). The failure of NUCA to 
object to any design, drawing or specification (including the Final 
Design ), or any change thereto, shall not be construed as a waiver 
by NUCA of any of its rights under this Contract or in any way 
relieve the Service Provider of its obligations hereunder. Further to 
the foregoing, the Service Provider shall: a- accept no review 
conducted by NUCA with respect to the design of the Plant (including 
the Final Design) will relieve the Service Provider of any of its 
obligations under the Contract, and that NUCA undertakes no 
responsibility as to the quality of engineering or construction of the 
design of the Plant (including the Final Design), the Plant or any 
component thereof; b- in no way represent or imply to any third party 
that, as a result of any review by NUCA, NUCA is responsible for the 
engineering or construction soundness of the design of the Plant 
(including the Final Design), or any component thereof, and c- be 
solely responsible for the technical feasibility, operational capability 
and reliability of the design of the Plant (including the Final Design), 
and each component thereof. 20.2.9 (b) The Service Provider shall 
not be relieved from any of its obligations or liabilities relating to 
any defects or delays in the design or the Construction Works 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
20.6.1 
Responsibilities of the Service Provider:  The Service Provider shall 
be solely responsible for any deficiency in the design of the Hospital 
(including the Design Documents). The failure of AU to object to any 
design, drawing or specification (including the Design Documents), 
or any change thereto, shall not be construed as a waiver by AU of 
any of its rights under this Contract or in any way relieve the Service 
Provider of its obligations hereunder. 
Private 
Interpretation 
In this particular risk, the majority of the survey respondents 
allocated the latent defect risk to the private party which applies to 
both contracts discussed as the private partner is the one responsible 
for the design.  
Private (based 
on Survey 
Results) 
35- Lack of supporting infrastructure 
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Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
11.2.3 
& 31.1 
NUCA Warranties: NUCA warrants that the cables, piping and 
conduits located on the Site on the Date of Signature are in a status 
allowing the Service Provider to perform its obligations under the 
Contract. In case the above representation is found to be incorrect, 
NUCA shall compensate the Service Provider for all the properly 
justified costs incurred by the Service Provider to fix such cables, 
piping or conduits and time extension if so required, as shall be 
determined by the Performance Monitoring Committee. 31.1 
Compensation Events During the Construction period, in case of an 
electricity cut-off affecting the Plant Operation and resulting in cost 
of fuel for electric generator and in case of any failure of the Influent 
Pipeline System having a Material Adverse Effect, NUCA shall 
compensate the Service Provider. 
Public 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
- - - 
Interpretation 
In the hospital project, the lack of supporting infrastructure risk was 
not mentioned although this is an important risk to take into account. 
In fact, allocating this risk to both risks is better than allocating it to 
the public partner as the private partner may have optimized design 
solutions for the project to have the least impact on the project due to 
the deficiency of the existing infrastructure. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
Factor 8: Construction and Operational Risks 
36- Project/operation changes 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
9.1.11 
& 30.2 
9.1.11 Conditions precedent under the Service Provider's 
responsibility: The Service Provider shall provide a repair and 
replacement plan in which the Service Provider shall outline its 
overall approach and responsibilities in performing repairs and 
replacements, including major repairs and refurbishments for the 
Plant.30.2 Changes at the request of NUCA: NUCA shall be entitled 
to request the Service Provider to undertake any changes, which the 
Service Provider shall undertake at NUCA's expense. 
Both 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
35 
35 Variations: If the Service Provider fails to obtain financing for a 
Variation where Service Provider has used all reasonable endeavors 
to obtain such financing, AU may choose to finance such Variation. 
 
Both 
Interpretation 
It is more reasonable to allocate the variations to both partners 
because the changes can be initiated by the private partner who is the 
project designer or by the public partner. Also, in the hospital project, 
Private (based 
on Survey 
Results) 
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it is mentioned that the public partner can finance the variation if the 
Service Provider fails in obtaining finance to it which is a reasonable 
point to take into consideration. 
37- Inability of concessionaire 
Interpretation 
In spite of the fact that this risk is not addressed in the contracts 
discussed, the Civil code discussed this risk in article 650, mentioning 
that: “If during the performance of the work it is established that the 
contractor is performing the work in a faulty manner or contrary to 
the contract, the employer may call on him to rectify the manner of 
performance within a reasonable period he fixes for him. If the period 
expires and the contractor fails to adopt the proper manner of work, 
the employer may either request rescission of the contract or handing 
over the work to another contractor for its completion at the first 
contractor’s expense. The employer may request immediate rescission 
of the contract without granting a period (for rectification) if 
rectification of the faulty manner of performance is impossible.”  
Accordingly, the technical inability of the private party shall be borne 
by them. This is different from the survey responses which allocated 
this risk to both parties. However, this risk should be borne by the 
private party only as this is the party responsible for construction 
works. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
38- Provision of transformers, substations or backup power 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
20.4 
20.4.1 Obligations of NUCA NUCA shall 3 months prior to the 
Scheduled Plant operation Date supply one electrical power source 
and 12 months prior to the Scheduled Plant Operation Date supply 
potable water to the Plant at the boundary of the Site at its sole risk 
and expenses and shall pay on a quarterly basis on the same date of 
payment of the STC a Pass-Through Charge to the Service Provider 
to reimburse the Service Provider for the full cost of electricity 
consumption, up to the Maximum Electricity Consumption. 20.4.2 
Obligations of the Service Provider The Service Provider shall be 
responsible, at its sole risks and expenses, for the connection charges 
and the construction, operation and maintenance of any required 
electrical transformers, electrical substations or backup power. The 
Service Provider shall install its transformers at least 3 months 
before the Scheduled Plant Operation Date. 
Both 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
23.2.5 
Public Utilities: The Service Provider shall be responsible at its sole 
risk and expense for the connection 
charges and construction operation and maintenance of any required 
electrical transformers, electrical 
substations or backup power; 
Private 
Interpretation 
This risk was conforming to the survey results in the New Cairo 
Waste water treatment plant project where the risk of providing 
transformers was shred between the private and public parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
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However, in the hospital project, the provision of transformers as 
well as their operation and maintenance. 
39- Construction Risk 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
20.2.1 
& 
20.2.9 
(b) 
Design and Construction:  The Service Provider shall, at his own 
cost and expense, design and construct the Plant in accordance with: 
1- The Final Design approved by NUCA 2- The Technical 
Specifications and requirements 3- All relevant Egyptian design 
codes and standards and 4- Good Industry Practice. 20.2.9 (b) The 
Service Provider shall not be relieved from any of its obligations or 
liabilities relating to any defects or delays in the design or the 
Construction Works 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
21.3 
Implementation Requirements: 1- The Service Provider shall 
provide all the Implementation Requirements necessary to complete 
the Construction Works, to provide and install the Equipment and to 
perform the Services. As between the Parties, the ownership or 
possession of the Implementation Requirements shall remain with the 
Service Provider. 2- The Service Provider shall be liable for and 
shall bear all expenses related to any damage or loss that may 
arisefrom the use or presence of any Implementation Requirements 
on the Site. AU shall have the right to be reimbursed by the Service 
Provider for any Loss incurred by AU or any of its Representatives or 
Related Parties resulting from such use or presence of any 
Implementation Requirements on the Site. 3- The Service Provider 
guarantees that allImplementation Requirements used in the 
Construction Works to provide and install the Equipment and to 
perform the Services shall be in conformity with all Egyptian laws, or 
any relevant codes in force at the relevant time and, in particular, 
those relating to the environment, construction and installation and 
Good Industry Practice. 
Private 
Interpretation 
This risk allocation in both contracts applies perfectly to the survey 
results. Since the private partner is the one responsible for the 
construction works on site, then it is reasonable that he bears all the 
risks related to the construction works that are taking place on site. 
Private (based 
on Survey 
Results) 
40- Organization risk 
Interpretation 
 
There are no clauses in the contract referring to the organization risks 
and their allocation. As per the survey results, the private party is the 
best party to bear such risk. 
Private (based on 
Survey Results) 
41- Coordination risks 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
11.2.3 
NUCA Warranties: NUCA warrants that the cables, piping and 
conduits located on the Site on the Date of Signature are in a status 
allowing the Service Provider to perform its obligations under the 
Contract. In case the above representation is found to be incorrect, 
NUCA shall compensate the Service Provider for all the properly 
justified costs incurred by the Service Provider to fix such cables, 
piping or conduits and time extension if so required, as shall be 
Public 
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determined by the Performance Monitoring Committee. 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
 
- - 
Interpretation 
The coordination risk was not addressed in the hospital project. In 
fact, allocating this risk to both parties is better as the private party 
will seek optimized coordination between the various parties and 
during construction while some coordination deficiencies may be 
caused by the public partner. Sometimes, the public partner is better 
in managing some coordination issues such as dealing with other 
governmental agencies for some services. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
42- Land acquisition 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
19.1 
Ownership and Use of the Site:  Ownership of the Site shall at no 
time be transferred to the Service Provider. Any agreement or 
procedure to the contrary shall be considered null and void. The 
Service Provider shall not use or occupy or permit the use of the Site 
for any purpose other than as contemplated under the Contract. 
Public 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
19.1 
Access and Delivery of Site:  As of the Date of Signature, AU shall 
allow the Service Provider to access the Site for the purpose of 
preparing the necessary Design Documents and carrying out Due 
Diligence. 
Public 
Interpretation 
The risk of the land acquisition should be attributed to the public 
partner as this is the responsible party for acquiring the land. 
Allocating this risk to the private partner is better than allocating this 
risk to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
43- Physical Obstacles that cannot be avoided 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
11.3.2 
& 12 
11.3.2 NUCA undertakings NUCA shall guarantee that, on the 
Effective Date, the Site shall be delivered to the Service Provider free 
from legal or physical obstacles except for any fence that may run 
around all or part of the perimeter of the Site.12 Service Provider's 
due diligence:  By signing the Contract, the Service Provider 
confirms that it has performed and completed Due Diligence of the 
Site and that it has reviewed all necessary documents and 
information relating thereto. Such Due Diligence shall include a soil 
analysis, including geotechnical studies performed by the Service 
Provider at its own expense. The Service Provider shall bear all risks 
and responsibilities related to its Due Diligence. 
Both 
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Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
2, 5.2.4 
& 
19.1.7 
2 Service Provider’s due diligence:  The Service Provider’s 
signature to the Contract shall be deemed as a declaration that it has 
completed the Due Diligence of the Site and the Project, and has 
reviewed the Disclosed Data, as well as any other documents 
concerning the Project. Such Due Diligence shall include a soil 
analysis, including geotechnical studies performed by the Service 
Provider at its own expense. The Service Provider shall bear all risks 
and responsibilities related to its Due Diligence. 5.2.4 Conditions 
Precedent under the AU's responsibility:  AU shall remove any 
existing physical obstacles on the Site to surface level.19.1.7 Access 
and Delivery of the Site:  If the obstacle discovered on Site is 
physical in nature and if the Hospital Buildings cannot be positioned 
so as to avoid such physical obstacle, AU shall remove such obstacle 
or may request the Service Provider to do so at AU's cost. In the 
event that the obstacle prevents or delays the Construction Works, 
this shall constitute a Compensation Event. 
Both 
Interpretation 
In spite of the fact that the Service Provider in both contracts should 
have completed the Due Diligence of the Site, at his own costs and 
shall bear all its related risks, the Public Partner should deliver the 
Site to the Private Partner free from any physical obstacles and in 
case a physical obstacle is found and it cannot be avoided, in the case 
of the hospital project, then this shall form a Compensation event to 
the Service Provider. Therefore, in this case, the risk of physical 
obstacles is partially borne by the public partner and partially borne 
by the private partner which is similar to the survey results where the 
respondents allocated this risk to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
44- Maintenance Risks 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
21.1 
Operations and Maintenance: 21.1.1 The Service Provider shall 
operate, maintain, repair and renew the Plant and Equipment in 
accordance with the Technical Specifications and Requirements of 
the Plant at its own cost and risk, and in accordance with the 
provisions of the Contract and Egyptian Law (including health, safety 
and Environmental Law). 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
21.8.7 , 
24.1.1 
& 44 
21.8.7 Equipping the Hospital: The Service Provider shall supply at 
its cost, install, commission, maintain and replace (as applicable) all 
Equipment together with all Durables, Maintenance Consumables, 
materials, stock, spare parts and other consumables (except for 
Operational consumables) required pursuant to the terms of this 
Contract to enable the proper and satisfactory provision of the 
Services and/or comply with all relevant statutory requirements 
and/or health and safety regulations.24.1.1 Obligations of the 
Service Provider: The Service Provider shall operate, maintain, 
repair and renew the Hospital and Equipment at his own cost and 
risk, and in accordance with the provisions of this Contract, Egyptian 
law, Good Industry Practice, relevant codes and standards referred 
Private 
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to in the Contact and Annexes 44 Indemnities For the avoidance of 
doubt, the 
Service Provider shall be responsible for the Maintenance and repair 
of all 
damage occurring to the Hospital during the Contract Duration and 
will be reimbursed for the cost and Availability Failure Deductions 
when the 
Performance Monitoring Committee determines that such damage 
occurred as a direct result of the deliberate act or negligence of AU 
or an 
AU Related Party. 
Interpretation 
In this case, the risk allocation of the maintenance to the private party 
perfectly matches the survey output as this risk shall be borne by the 
private party who shall be responsible for the operations and 
maintenance in PPP projects. 
Private (based 
on Survey 
Results) 
45- Access and delivery of site 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
8.2, 
11.3.2 
& 19.1 
8.2 Service Provider Essential Rights: As of the Date of Signature, 
NUCA shall grant the Service Provider access to the Site for the 
purpose of preparing the Final Design and commencing preparation 
works on the Site under the Service Provider's own responsibility. 
11.3.2 NUCA undertakings NUCA shall guarantee that, on the 
Effective Date, the Site shall be delivered to the Service Provider free 
from legal or physical obstacles except for any fence that may run 
around all or part of the perimeter of the Site.19.1 Ownership and 
Use of the Site:  Ownership of the Site shall at no time be transferred 
to the Service Provider. Any agreement or procedure to the contrary 
shall be considered null and void. The Service Provider shall not use 
or occupy or permit the use of the Site for any purpose other than as 
contemplated under the Contract. 
Public 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
7.2, 
11.4.2 
,19.1.1 
& 
19.1.7 
7.2 Essential Rights: As of the Date of Signature, AU shall grant the 
Service Provider access to the Site for the purpose of preparing the 
Final Design and Working Drawings.11.4.2 AU undertakings AU 
shall deliver the Site to the Service Provider free from any surface 
physical and legal obstacles. 19.1.1 Access and Delivery of Site:  As 
of the Date of Signature, AU shall allow the Service Provider to 
access the Site for the purpose of preparing the necessary Design 
Documents and carrying out Due Diligence. 19.1.7 Access and 
Delivery of the Site:  If the obstacle discovered on Site is physical in 
nature and if the Hospital Buildings cannot be positioned so as to 
avoid such physical obstacle, AU shall remove such obstacle or may 
request the Service Provider to do so at AU's cost. In the event that 
the obstacle prevents or delays the Construction Works, this shall 
constitute a Compensation Event. 
Public 
Interpretation 
The Access and delivery of site risk shall be borne by the Public 
Partner as it should be his responsibility to deliver the site to the 
Service Provider free from any obstacles in order for the Service 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
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Provider to start working and preparing the necessary documents. On 
the other hand, this risk should not be project dependent and should 
always be allocated to the public partner. Based on the survey results, 
this risk is dependent on the project. 
Results) 
46- Connection of Public utilities to boundaries of site 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
21.1.2 
21.1.2 Obligations of NUCA:  NUCA shall supply influent to the 
Reception Point at no cost to the Service Provider 180 days prior to 
Scheduled Plant Operation Date; operate and maintain the Influent 
Pipeline System in a Good Industry Practice manner not causing any 
Material Adverse Effect. In the event that the operation and 
maintenance of the Influent Pipeline System by NUCA shall have a 
Material Adverse Effect, the Service Provider shall be compensated. 
Public 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
23.1 
Public Utilities: AU shall 1- connect all necessary Public Utilities 
(except the telephone lines and any natural gasconnections) to the 
boundaries of the Site as indicated in Annex 3 and shall bear all the 
costs thereof. AU shall informthe Service Provider when such Public 
Utilities are connected to the boundaries of the Site which must occur 
no later than one hundred and eighty (180) Days prior to the 
Scheduled Services Availability Date; 2- acquire all 
necessaryapprovals for connecting the Public Utilities inside the Site 
and pay all invoices and connection fees pertaining tothe usage of 
Public Utilities during the Services Availability Period, except the 
cost of use of Public Utilities related toAdditional Facilities; and 3- 
on or before the Services Availability Date, procure the connection of 
any necessarytelephone lines and natural gas pipelines (if 
applicable). 
Public 
Interpretation 
This risk is allocated in both cases to the public partner as it is his 
sole responsibility to connect the utilities to the boundaries of the site. 
Since this risk is not concerned with the actual construction 
operations taking place on site, then, it is reasonable to allocate this 
risk to the public partner who will be better in managing this risk 
since it needs permits and governmental procedures and steps. The 
allocation of such risk to the public partner is more reasonable than 
letting the allocation of such risk be dependent on the project type. 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
47- Connection to boundary of Site of telephone lines and natural gas provision 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
- - - 
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Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
23.1 
Public Utilities: AU shall 1- connect all necessary Public Utilities 
(except the telephone lines and any natural gas connections) to the 
boundaries of the Site as indicated in Annex 3 and shall bear all the 
costs thereof. AU shall inform the Service Provider when such Public 
Utilities are connected to the boundaries of the Site which must occur 
no later than one hundred and eighty (180) Days prior to the 
Scheduled Services Availability Date; 2- acquire all necessary 
approvals for connecting the Public Utilities inside the Site and pay 
all invoices and connection fees pertaining to the usage of Public 
Utilities during the Services Availability Period, except the cost of 
use of Public Utilities related to Additional Facilities; and 3- on or 
before the Services Availability Date, procure the connection of any 
necessary 
telephone lines and natural gas pipelines (if applicable). 
Private 
Interpretation 
Concerning this specific risk, it was not mentioned in New Cairo 
waste water treatment Plant project. However, it is clearly stated in 
Alexandria University New Hospital project that all the public 
utilities should be connected to the boundaries of site. Concerning the 
natural gas and the telephone line, they will also be provided either 
on or before the Service Availability Date. According to the survey 
results, the allocation of this risk will be based on the project type 
which is reasonable. 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
Factor 9: Resources Risks 
48- Labor unavailability 
Interpretation 
 
There are no clauses in the contract referring to the labor 
unavailability. Such risk factors are not covered in the contract. 
According to the survey results, this risk will be allocated to the 
private party as this party is the one responsible for labor delivery. 
Private (based on 
Survey Results) 
49- Material shortage 
Interpretation 
 
There are no clauses in the contracts referring to the material 
shortage. According to the survey results, this risk will be allocated 
to the private party as this party is the one responsible for material 
delivery. 
Private (based on 
Survey Results) 
Factor 10: Production Risks 
50- Third party delay/violation 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
41 
Indemnities: The Service Provider shall indemnify AU and the AU 
Related Parties against any Loss incurred by AU or any AU Related 
Party, including any Loss suffered by any third party whom AU is 
legally or contractually responsible to indemnify against such Loss, 
as a result of any of the following: the gross negligence or willful 
misconduct of the Service Provider or any Service Provider Related 
Party; or any material breach by the Service Provider of any of its 
obligations under the Contract; provided that, in all cases, such 
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indemnity shall not apply to the extent that the Loss has been caused 
by the gross negligence or misconduct of AU or any AU 
Related Party. 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
10 
Responsibility for related parties: Each Party shall be responsible 
for the behavior or acts committed by its related Parties in relation to 
the performance of the Contract. 
Both 
Interpretation 
In this particular risk factor, the third party delay/violation risk was 
not addressed in New Cairo Waste Water Treatment Plant Project. 
However, in Alexandria University New Hospital Project, this risk 
was addressed by mentioning that each party should be responsible 
for its related parties in the Contract. Therefore, this risk should be 
allocated to both parties which do not conform to the survey results 
where the majority of the respondents allocated this risk to the private 
partner only. 
Private 
51- Planning risks 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
20.2.3 
& 
20.2.9 
(b) 
20.2.3 Construction Program and Scheduled Plant operation Date: 
No more than 30 days after the Effective Date, the Service Provider 
shall provide NUCA with a detailed monthly construction schedule 
showing in detail the activities, their sequence and the duration 
planned to achieve the Scheduled Plant Operation Date. 20.2.9 (b) 
The Service Provider shall not be relieved from any of its obligations 
or liabilities relating to any defects or delays in the design or the 
Construction Works. 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
21.1 
21.2 Construction Programme: No more than 30 days after the 
Effective Date, the Service Provider shall provide AU with a detailed 
monthly construction schedule (based on and consistent with the 
Scheduled Services availability Date and draft construction schedule 
included in the Technical Offer) showing in detail the activities, their 
sequence and the duration planned to achieve the Scheduled Services 
availability Date. The Service Provider shall complete all of the 
Construction Works in accordance with its proposals in its Technical 
Offer. 
Private 
Interpretation 
In both contracts and according to the survey results, the private 
partner is responsible for his planning and for his time schedule to 
perform the works. This risk allocation makes sense as the private 
partner should be the best party to bear such risk since the private 
partner is the one responsible for the construction works on site. 
Therefore, it will be the best party to manage such risk. 
Private (based 
on Survey 
Results) 
52- Supervision, organization and control for inspection of Construction works 
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Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
20.2.4 
& 
20.2.7 
20.2.4 Quality Assurance and Quality Control: NUCA, represented 
by EWRA shall have the right upon 3 Business Days’ notice to attend 
or examine the quality control inspections and methods to confirm 
that any item of the Construction Works complies with the 
requirements of the Contract, without interfering or hindering 
Construction Works. 20.2.7 Monitoring and Inspection of the 
Construction of the Plant In addition to any monitoring and 
inspection by the relevant Governmental authorities in accordance 
with Egyptian law or by the Performance Monitoring Committee in 
accordance with the Contract, NUCA and any NUCA related party 
may monitor and inspect the construction at NUCA's cost during the 
Construction Period in the presence of either the Service Provider or 
any Service Provider related party upon 3 Business Days' notice to 
the Service Provider and should comply with the Site's health and 
safety regulations. Such monitoring and inspection shall not cause 
any material impediment or interfere with the construction progress 
or disrupt construction. Otherwise, the matter shall be referred to the 
Performance Monitoring Committee to determine the required time 
extension equivalent. Monitoring and inspection results shall be 
summarized in a written report and shall be forwarded to the Service 
Provider no later than 15 Business Days form the inspection date to 
allow the Service Provider to remedy potential issues raised in such 
report. 
Public 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
21.6 
21.6 Monitoring, Inspection and access In addition to any 
monitoring and inspection by the relevant Governmental authorities 
in accordance with Egyptian law or by the Performance Monitoring 
Committee ,AU and any AU related party may monitor and inspect 
the construction at AU's cost during the Construction Period in the 
presence of either the Service Provider or any Service Provider 
related party upon 3 Business Days' notice to the Service Provider 
and should comply with the Site's health and safety regulations. Such 
monitoring and inspection shall not cause any material impediment 
or interfere with the construction progress or disrupt construction. 
Otherwise, the matter shall be referred to the Performance 
Monitoring Committee to determine the required time extension 
equivalent. Monitoring and inspection results shall be summarized in 
a written report and shall be forwarded to the Service Provider no 
later than 15 Business Days form the inspection date to allow the 
Service Provider to remedy potential issues raised in such report. 
Public 
Interpretation 
According to both contracts, the monitoring operations for quality 
assurance should be performed by the public partner. This does not 
match the survey results which mentioned that such risk should be 
borne by the private partner. On the other hand, the public partner 
will be better able to bear and manage such risk on the condition that 
competent personnel and technical experts are hired in this process in 
order not to cause any disruption of the work. 
Private (based 
on Survey 
Results) 
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53- Technological Risks 
Interpretation 
 
The technological risks are not covered under the contract as usually 
in the projects performed in Egypt, there are rarely technological 
challenges in any project. 
Private (based on 
Survey results) 
54- Completion risk 
Interpretation 
 
According to the definitions provided for the risks, the completion 
risks are not covered under the contracts. The contracts do not 
provide any provision for the risks associated with the Completion of 
the project. 
Project 
Dependent(based 
on Survey 
results) 
Factor 11: Environmental Risks 
55- Sustainability Risk 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
9.1.2, 
9.1.10 
,19.3 & 
20.2.8 
Conditions precedent under the Service Provider's responsibility: 
9.1.2 The Service Provider shall submit a comprehensive 
Environmental Impact Assessment in conformity with Environmental 
Law to the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency and obtain 
approval from the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency. 9.1.10 
The Service Provider should specify the location of a landfill site for 
off-specification sludge and letter(s) of confirmation from the landfill 
operators thereof that they are licensed to accept such sludge. Sludge 
stockpiling site, sale and disposal of sludge, carbon credits: 19.3.1 
All sludge related risks should be borne by the Service Provider. The 
Service Provider shall be entitled to treat and sell sludge for 
agricultural reuse and/or energy production. The Service Provider 
shall be responsible for applying for any approvals required at his 
cost. 19.3.4 If the Service Provider at any time elects not to treat and 
sell sludge for agricultural reuse and/or energy production, after 
having identified an appropriate landfill site and having obtained (at 
his cost) any approvals required for the transport and / or disposal of 
sludge, the Service Provider shall transport and dispose of such 
sludge at a landfill site in accordance with Egyptian law and Good 
Industry Practice. 19.3.7 The Service Provider shall be the 
beneficiary of the revenues generated from the sale of sludge. 19.3.8 
The Service Provider shall be the beneficiary of any Carbon Credits 
obtained for the operation of the Plant. 20.2.8 (c) Other Duties The 
Service Provider shall prevent and control any environmental 
contamination caused by any Construction Works. (e) Dispose of 
construction waste and Project debris in accordance with Egyptian 
Law and Good Industry Practice. 
Private 
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Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
19.1.4, 
21.11.2 
& 
21.11.3 
19.1.4 Access and delivery of site: AU shall bear the responsibility 
for all the environmental risks arising in or existing at the Site before 
the Site Delivery Date. In the event that such an environmental 
condition is discovered at the Site at a later date the Service Provider 
shall immediately notify AU. In the event that remedial action is 
required pursuant to Egyptian law, AU shall either request the 
Service Provider to undertake such remedial measures at AU's cost 
or otherwise take action to remedy the condition itself or through 
third parties. In the event that the environmental condition prevents 
or delays the Construction Works this shall constitute a 
Compensation Event to be administered in accordance with Article 
21.7. 
21.11 Other Duties The Service Provider shall prevent and control 
any environmental pollution caused by any Construction Works and 
Dispose of construction waste and Project debris in accordance with 
Egyptian Law and Good Industry Practice. 
Both 
Interpretation 
Concerning the Sustainability risk, in the case of New Cairo Waste 
Water treatment Plant, it is clearly mentioned that all sustainability 
and environment related risks should be borne by the Service 
Provider. On the other hand, in Alexandria University New Hospital 
Project, all the environmental risks shall be borne by the public 
partner who shall also compensate the Service Provider in case of the 
presence of any remedial measures related to the environment until 
the Site Delivery Date. On the other hand, the private partner shall be 
responsible for preventing pollution related to his construction works 
on site after the Site Delivery Date. This conforms to the survey 
results which mentioned that the allocation of this risk should be 
dependent on the project and this is the cause of the difference of risk 
allocation in both projects. In the first project, as it is a waste water 
treatment plant and as the Service Provider is responsible for the 
operation of the plant, then, the environmental risks should be borne 
by him. On the other hand, in the case of the hospital, the same risk 
was allocated to the public partner as the project type is different. 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
56- Antiquities Risks 
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Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
16 
Fossils and Antiquities: 1- Without prejudice to the Service 
Provider's rights to any extension of the Scheduled Plant Operation 
Date and to any compensation in accordance with Article 21.7, the 
Service Provider shall, upondiscovery of any fossils or antiquities, 
immediately notify NUCA and the Supreme Council of Antiquities 
and cease Construction Works on the Site. 2- Upon receipt of the 
Service Provider’s notification, NUCA shall notify the Supreme 
Council of Antiquities within five (5) Business Days to coordinate 
with NUCA and determine the existence or not of the fossils or 
antiquities. 3-In the event that the written report of the Supreme 
Council for Antiquities concludes the existence of antiquities or 
fossils at the Site or the issuance of the report was delayed for 6 
months from the date of issuance of the Service Provider notice to 
NUCA, NUCA shall provide the Service Provider with another 
geographically comparable site of similar surface area within New 
Cairo City (the "Replacement Site"), this shall give the Service 
Provider an extension as determined by the Independent Technical 
Expert, if so required and shall pay the costs of transferring the Plant 
to the Replacement Site as well as the costs and expenses that the 
Service Provider incurred in performing its obligations herein on, or 
in relation to, the initial Site as determined by the independent 
Financial Expert. 4- The Service Provider acknowledges and agrees 
that it shall have no ownership or financial interest in any fossils or 
antiquities discovered at the Site. 
Public 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
16 
Fossils and Antiquities: 1- Without prejudice to the Service 
Provider's rights to any extension of the Scheduled Services 
Availability Date and to any compensation in accordance with 
Article 21.7, the Service Provider shall, upon discovery of any fossils 
or antiquities, immediately notify AU and the Supreme Council of 
Antiquities and ceaseConstruction Works on the Site. 2- Upon receipt 
of the Service Provider’s notification, AU shall notify the Supreme 
Council of Antiquities within five (5) Business Days to inspect the 
Site and determine the existence or not of the fossils or antiquities. 
All fees of the Supreme Council shall be borne by AU. 3-In the event 
that the written report of the Supreme Council for Antiquities 
concludes the existence of antiquities or fossils at the Site, this shall 
constitute a Compensation Event. If the Supreme Council determines 
that it is possible to remove the antiquities or fossils discovered at the 
Site the Service Provider shall coordinate with the Supreme Council 
for Antiquities before commencing any excavation works. 4- In the 
event that: (i) the written report of the Egyptian Supreme Council of 
Antiquities prohibits further Construction Works at the Site, or (ii) 
the issuance of the report was delayed for, orthe antiquities or fossils 
are not removed within, six (6) months from the date of issuance of 
the Service Provider notice to AU, AU shall have the option to 
provide the Service Provider with a Replacement Site within six (6) 
Public 
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months from the date of issuance of the Service Provider notice to AU 
or otherwise in case on nonexistence of a ReplacementSite, either 
Party may issue an Early Termination Notice to the other Party and 
AU shall compensate the ServiceProvider for all direct expenses 
associated from Date of Signature until Calculation Date as 
computed and verified bythe Independent Financial Expert. If the 
reports do not conclude presence of Fossils/Antiques, the 
ServiceProvider will be entitled to an extension equivalent to the 
inspection period. 5- In the event that AU provides aReplacement 
Site, the Service Provider shall, as soon as possible, take the 
necessary measures to commence theConstruction Works at the 
Replacement Site. The Service Provider shall be entitled to a time 
extension as determinedby the Independent Technical Expert and AU 
shall pay any additional costs related to transferring the Hospital to 
theReplacement Site as well as the direct costs and expenses that the 
Service Provider reasonably incurred in performing its obligations 
herein on, or in relation to, the initial Site as determined by the 
Independent Financial Expert and without double recovery. 6- The 
Service Provider acknowledges and agrees that it shall have no 
ownership or financial interest in any fossils or antiquities 
discovered at the Site. 
Interpretation 
According to both contracts, the public partner bears the 
responsibility in case any fossils or antiquities are found on site. In 
Alexandria University New Hospital Project, it is clearly mentioned 
that the Public partner even bears the fees of the Supreme Council for 
Antiquities. In both cases, the Public Partner is responsible for 
providing a replacement site for the Service Provider in case 
construction works are stopped in the original site. The Service 
Provided will be compensated in terms of time and cost. However, 
according to the survey results, this risk will be dependent on the 
project as none of the results were chosen by more than 50 % of the 
respondents. However, allocating the fossils and antiquities risks to 
the public partner makes more sense as the Private Partner should be 
properly compensated in case of such event. 
Project 
Dependent 
(based on Survey 
Results) 
Factor 12: Unforeseen Risks 
57- Unforeseen Weather conditions 
Interpretation 
 
 
The unforeseen weather condition is not covered in the contracts as 
usually; Egypt is not exposed to unforeseen weather conditions. At 
the beginning of each project the parties should have a report from 
the meteorological authorities that state the weather in the area of the 
project. Any exception from this report is a force majeure. 
Private (based on 
Survey Results) 
58- Unforeseen geotechnical conditions 
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Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
12 
Service Provider's Due Diligence:  By signing the Contract, the 
Service Provider confirms that it has performed and completed Due 
Diligence of the Site and that it has reviewed all necessary 
documents and information relating thereto. Such Due Diligence 
shall include a soil analysis, including geotechnical studies 
performed by the Service Provider at his own expense. The Service 
Provider shall bear all risks and responsibilities related to its Due 
Diligence. 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
2 
Service Provider's Due Diligence: The Service Provider's signature 
to the Contract shall be deemed as a declaration that it has 
completed the Due Diligence of the Site and the Project, and has 
reviewed the Disclosed Data, as well as any other documents 
concerning the Project. Such Due Diligence shall include soil 
analysis, including geotechnical studies performed by the Service 
Provider at its own expense. The Service Provider shall bear all risks 
related to such Due Diligence. 
Private 
Interpretation 
In both contracts, the private partner should have performed his Due 
Diligence of the Site at his own cost and at his own risk. It is the sole 
responsibility of the private partner to perform his geotechnical 
studies and no claims shall be raised by him due to such cause. This 
was the same choice of the survey respondents as they chose to 
allocate such risk to the Private Partner as he should have already 
done his own inspection to the site at his own cost regarding the 
geotechnical and soil conditions. 
Private (based 
on Survey 
Results) 
59- Force majeure 
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Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
28 
1- Except as expressly provided otherwise in the Contract, no Party 
shall be entitled to claim any Losses from the other Party for any 
Event of Default if such Event of Default results from Force Majeure. 
Each Party shall be relieved from performance and shall not be 
deemed to be in breach of any of its obligations as long as, and to the 
extent that, it is due to Force Majeure. 2- Upon the occurrence of an 
event of Force Majeure, the affected Party shall notify the other 
Party within fifteen (15)Days of the occurrence of such event. The 
notification shall include details of the Force Majeure, including its 
anticipated or actual effect on the obligations of the affected Party 
and any action proposed to mitigate the same. In all cases, both 
NUCA and the Service Provider shall use their best efforts to 
mitigate the consequences of the Force Majeure. 3- In case of a 
Prolonged Force Majeure Event, either Partymay give an Early 
Termination Notice to the other Party. 4- As from the occurrence of a 
Force Majeure (and following the Services Availability Date), NUCA 
shall continue to pay the Capital Value of any Services Availability 
Payments due to the Service Provider, provided however, that NUCA 
shall have the right to deduct from such payments any insurance 
proceeds being paid under business interruption insurance policies 
taken out by the Service Provider in relation to the Project. In the 
event that part of the Plant is still available, NUCA shall also pay the 
pro-rata portion of the Operation and Maintenance Value of the 
Services Availability Payment. The obligation to pay such Services 
Availability Payments shall continue for as long as theevent of Force 
Majeure continues, subject to a maximum of one hundred and eighty 
(180) consecutive Days. 5- In the event that the Force Majeure 
ceases, the affected Party shall notify the other Party thereof and 
resume performance of any obligation previously made impossible by 
the relevant Force Majeure within seven (7) Days or such other 
period, as both Parties agree, is necessary to restore Services. 6- In 
the event that an event of Force Majeure shall lead to the complete or 
partial destruction of the Plant, the Service Provider shall rebuild the 
portion destroyed and restore it to its condition prior to the 
occurrence of the Force Majeure, but only to the extent it receives 
insurance proceeds following such destruction (provided that the 
Service Provider has complied with all its insurance obligations and 
policies under the Contract). In the event that the Service Provider 
does not receive sufficient proceeds from insurance providers as 
aforesaid, NUCA may choose to bear the additional cost required to 
restore the Plant to its condition prior to theoccurrence of the Force 
Majeure, otherwise the Service Provider shall be entitled to give an 
Early Termination Notice and this shall be treated in the same 
manner as aProlonged Force Majeure Event. In such circumstances 
NUCA shall be entitled to receivethe insurance proceeds. 
Both 
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Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
33 
1- Except as expressly provided otherwise in the Contract, no Party 
shall be entitled to claim any Losses from the other Party for any 
Event of Default if such Event of Default results from Force Majeure. 
Each Party shall be relieved from performance and shall not be 
deemed to be in breach of any of its obligations as long as, and to the 
extent that, it is due to Force Majeure. 2- Upon the occurrence of an 
event of Force Majeure, the affected Party shall notify the other 
Party within fifteen (15)Days of the occurrence of such event. The 
notification shall include details of the Force Majeure, including its 
anticipated or actual effect on the obligations of the affected Party 
and any action proposed to mitigate the same. In all cases, both AU 
and the Service Provider shall use their best efforts to mitigate the 
consequences of the Force Majeure. 3- In case of a Prolonged Force 
Majeure Event, either Partymay give an Early Termination Notice to 
the other Party. 4- As from the occurrence of a Force Majeure (and 
following the Services Availability Date), AU shall continue to pay 
the Capital Value of any Services Availability Payments due to the 
Service Provider, provided however, that AU shall have the right to 
deduct from suchpayments any insurance proceeds being paid under 
business interruption insurancepolicies taken out by the Service 
Provider in relation to the Project. In the event thatpart of the 
Hospital is still available, AU shall also pay the pro-rata portion of 
theOperation and Maintenance Value of the Services Availability 
Payment. Theobligation to pay such Services Availability Payments 
shall continue for as long as theevent of Force Majeure continues, 
subject to a maximum of one hundred andeighty (180) consecutive 
Days. 5- In the event that the Force Majeure ceases, the affected 
Party shall notify the other Party thereof and resume performance of 
any obligation previously made impossible by the relevant Force 
Majeure within seven (7) Days or such other period, as both Parties 
agree, is necessary to restore Services. 6- In the event that an event 
of Force Majeure shall lead to the complete or partial destruction of 
the Hospital, the Service Provider shall rebuild the portion destroyed 
and restore it to its condition prior to the occurrence of the Force 
Majeure, but only to the extent it receives insurance proceeds 
following such destruction (provided that the Service Provider has 
complied with all its insurance obligations and policies under the 
Contract). In the event that the Service Provider does not receive 
sufficient proceeds from insurance providers as aforesaid, AU may 
choose tobear the additional cost required to restore the Hospital to 
its condition prior to theoccurrence of the Force Majeure, otherwise 
the Service Provider shall be entitled togive an Early Termination 
Notice and this shall be treated in the same manner as aProlonged 
Force Majeure Event. In such circumstances AU shall be entitled to 
receivethe insurance proceeds. 
Both 
Interpretation This complies with the survey results as in the case of Force Majeure, Both (based on 
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both parties will be affected.  
 
Survey Results) 
Factor 12: Other Risks 
60-Death or bodily injury 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
21.1.1 
21.1.1 Obligations of the Service Provider: The Service Provider 
shall ensure the safe operation of the Plant, take all precautions and 
provide all such protection as may be necessary or appropriate to 
safeguard persons and property. 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
New 
Hospital 
Project 
21.1.2 
21.1 Construction Works Conditions: The Service Provider shall 
take the necessary measures to ensure the safety of all occupants of 
the Site, AU related Parties and all residents of the neighborhood of 
the Site in accordance with applicable law, relevant codes and Good 
Industry Practice. The Service Provider shall indemnify AU against 
any third party claims arising from the Construction Works. 
Private 
Interpretation 
In both contracts, the private partner is the one responsible for the 
safety of all personnel on site. In the hospital project, the Service 
Provider shall be responsible for the safety of the neighborhood as 
well. Since, the Service Provider is the Party responsible for 
construction works taking place on site, then it should be responsible 
for the safety. However, the safety precautions should be a shared 
responsibility between both the private and public partners in order to 
ensure the implementation of safety measures on site. This conforms 
to the survey results. This risk factor was chosen by one respondent 
who allocated this risk to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
61- Safety Breaches 
Sub-Clause 
# in New 
Cairo Waste 
Water 
Treatment 
Plant 
Project 
20.2.4, 
20.2.8 
& 
21.1.1 
20.2.4 Quality Assurance and Quality Control: If the Construction 
Works or any item thereof fails to conform in any material respect 
with the requirements of the Contract (including the quality or safety 
requirements), NUCA, based on EWRA's recommendations, may give 
notice to the Service Provider of such failure. The Service Provider 
shall correct or materially start correcting the noncompliance as 
soon as possible but in any case within 15 days of receipt of NUCA's 
notice. 20.2.8 Other Duties The Service Provider shall take all 
required safety measures with respect to the Site. 21.1.1 Obligations 
of the Service Provider:  The Service Provider shall ensure the safe 
operation of the Plant, take all precautions and provide all such 
protection as may be necessary or appropriate to safeguard persons 
and property. 
Private 
Sub-Clause 
# in 
Alexandria 
University 
21.1.2 
21.1 Construction Works Conditions: The Service Provider shall 
take the necessary measures to ensure the safety of all occupants of 
the Site, AU related Parties and all residents of the neighborhood of 
the Site in accordance with applicable law, relevant codes and Good 
Private 
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New 
Hospital 
Project 
Industry Practice. The Service Provider shall indemnify AU against 
any third party claims arising from the Construction Works. 
Interpretation 
In both contracts, the private partner is the one responsible for the 
safety of all personnel on site. In the hospital project, the Service 
Provider shall be responsible for the safety of the neighborhood as 
well. Since, the Service Provider is the Party responsible for 
construction works taking place on site, then it should be responsible 
for the safety. However, the safety precautions should be a shared 
responsibility between both the private and public partners in order to 
ensure the implementation of safety measures on site. This conforms 
to the survey results. This risk factor was chosen by one respondent 
who allocated this risk to both parties. 
Both (based on 
Survey Results) 
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5.3 Major Outcomes of Contract Risk Mapping 
According to the above study, it is concluded that most of the risks have been mapped. In 
other words, the majority of the risks factors obtained and included in the Survey are 
covered under the Contract. For instance, the Performance Security risk, the Permits risk, 
the Changes in Law risk, the Dispute Resolution risk, the Deficiency of Design are all 
explicitly covered and addressed in both Contracts.  
However, there are some exceptions. For instance, the Interest Rate Fluctuation Risk is 
not explicitly covered in New Cairo Waste Water Treatment Plant contract while it is not 
covered at all in Alexandria University New Hospital Project Contract. In the light of the 
current conditions prevailing in the country, such risk should be covered in the Contract 
and allocated to the party able to manage such risk. For instance, fixing the interest rate 
throughout the project can be a way to minimize such risk. The same applies for the 
Inflation risk which is not covered in the Contract conditions of both projects. One of the 
risks that should also be covered in the PPP contracts is the Price Change Risk. In order 
to cover such risk, a suggestion is added from the Egyptian Civil Code which allows the 
Contractor to notify the Employer in case any increase occurs in the price. Other risk 
factors were not covered in the PPP contracts such as the Supply and Demand risks, the 
Change in Market Demand, the Public Credit risks, the public opposition risk and the 
swings in public opinion. 
Concerning the comparison between the allocation of the risks under the actual case 
contracts and their allocation according to the survey results, it is noticed that for some 
risks, the allocation of the risks in both contracts perfectly matches its allocation 
according to the survey results. For instance, in the case of the Performance Security 
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risks, both contracts and the majority of the respondents to the survey allocated this risk 
to the Private Party which makes perfect sense as the Private Party is the one responsible 
for the Performance Security. Also, the same case applies for the Permits risk. The risk 
allocation in both contracts perfectly matches the survey results as it is allocated to both 
parties. This is due to the fact that in some cases, the Private Party is required to acquire 
some permits and the Public Party may be required to get other permits for the project. 
The same applies for the risk of delay in project approvals and permits. Also, the 
Construction risk is allocated in all cases to the Private Partner which conforms to the 
reality and to the nature of PPP where the Private Partner in general is the party bearing 
the responsibility of the Construction. The same applies for Maintenance risk, for 
Planning risks and unforeseen geotechnical conditions risk.  
In other cases, the risk allocation for both contracts is slightly different from the survey 
results. For instance, in the case of the Legislation Changes risk, it is covered and 
allocated under both contracts to the Public Party while according to the survey results; 
the allocation of this risk should be dependent on the project and should be determined 
individually. However, the allocation of this risk under the actual contracts is better as 
such risk can be better borne by the Public Party and not the Private Party in case the 
Change in Law that occurs was not accounted for and caused a dramatic impact on the 
project. This risk is properly addressed under the World Bank suggestions. The Dispute 
Resolution risk allocation under both contracts also matches the survey results as it is 
allocated to both parties. This risk also is properly addressed according to the World 
Bank suggestions for the drafting of PPP contracts. The researcher suggests that for the 
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latent defect risk, the article from the Egyptian Civil Code can apply as it conforms to the 
long term nature of PPP projects.  
On the other hand, the allocation of Nationalization/expropriation risk is to the Public 
Party according to both contracts as it is considered as an Employer‟s event of default. 
However, according to the survey results, this risk was allocated to the Private Party. It 
can be concluded that this risk definition may be misunderstood by the majority of the 
Survey respondents as this risk shall not be borne by the Private Party. Also, concerning 
the Government Corruption risk, it was not covered under the real case contracts. 
However, this risk shall be allocated to the Public Party rather than to the Private Party 
which does not conform to the survey results.  
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Chapter 6: Model Development, 
Verification and Validation 
6.1 Risk Severity Calculation 
After the probability and impact of each risk was determined through the survey results, 
the severity of each risk is calculated by multiplying the probability of the risk by the risk 
impact. 
                                            
Afterwards, for each risk, the mean (µ), standard deviation (σ) and median are 
determined.  
Then, the Minimum severity value and Maximum severity value are obtained.  
Also, the minimum set value is obtained through the following formula: 
                                               
The maximum set value is obtained through the following formula: 
                                               
If the minimum severity is smaller than the minimum set value or if the maximum 
severity is larger than the maximum set value, then, the data contains outliers that should 
be removed. After the outliers‟ removal, the mean (µ), standard deviation (σ) and median 
are calculated again.  (This process is illustrated and shown in Appendix 1). 
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Finally, after the outlier removal, an average severity and standard deviation are obtained 
for each risk factor. These results are the ones which will be used in the future 
calculations of this study. 
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6.2 Risk Ranking 
In order to rank the risks, the average severities that were obtained in the previous step 
are normalized using the following rule: 
Normalized Value = 
                                           
                                          
 
The objective of the normalization procedure is to unify and adjust the data to a common 
scale so it can be better interpreted and analyzed.  According to Xu et al. (2012), only the 
risk factors with a normalized value equal or greater than 0.5 are included. However, 
since the researcher found that there were risk factors with a value close to 0.5, such as 
values equal to 0.48 and 0.47, then, the researcher widened the range and took into 
account the risk factors with a normalized value equal to or greater than 0.4. 
Accordingly, only the risks with a normalized value equal to or greater than 0.4 will be 
taken into consideration for future analysis as they are considered as “critical risk 
factors”.  The below table shows the average severity of each risk as well the average 
normalized severity after being calculated. The risks with normalized values equal to or 
greater than 0.4 are highlighted in their descending order: 
# Risk Factor 
Average 
Severity 
Normalized 
Value 
1 Foreign exchange fluctuation  16.92 1.00 
2 Political Risk 16.71 0.98 
3 Inflation 15.24 0.87 
4 
Poor public decision making 
process 
15.16 0.86 
5 Government policy 14.72 0.83 
6 Political/Public opposition 14.28 0.79 
7 
Lack of supporting 
infrastructure 
14.24 0.79 
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8 Change in tax regulation 13.4 0.73 
9 Government corruption 13.16 0.71 
10 Legislation changes 12.88 0.69 
11 Public Credit 12.48 0.65 
12 Swings in Public Opinion 12.44 0.65 
13 Dispute resolution  12.17 0.63 
14 Nationalization/expropriation 11.88 0.61 
15 Force majeure 10.92 0.53 
16 
Inadequate law and supervision 
system 
10.6 0.51 
17 Interest Rate Fluctuation 10.4 0.49 
18 Regulatory/Contractual Risk 10.26 0.48 
19 
Delay in project 
approvals/permits 
10.16 0.47 
20 Price Change 10.04 0.46 
21 Revenue Risk 10 0.46 
22 Completion risk 9.95 0.46 
23 Government Intervention 9.74 0.44 
24 Permits Risks 9.63 0.43 
25 Operation cost overrun 9.58 0.43 
26 Supply and demand  9.17 0.40 
27 Quality Control 8.88 0.37 
28 Quality Assurance 8.76 0.36 
29 
Insufficient project finance 
supervision 
8.72 0.36 
30 Project/operation changes 8.68 0.36 
31 Third party delay/violation 8.67 0.36 
32 Planning risks 8.5 0.34 
33 
Connection of Public utilities to 
boundaries of site 
8.48 0.34 
34 Construction Risk 8.38 0.33 
35 Material shortage 8.32 0.33 
36 Latent Defect Risk 8.13 0.32 
37 Deficiency of design 8.08 0.31 
38 
Provision of transformers, 
substations or backup power 
8.08 0.31 
39 
Connection to boundary of Site 
of telephone lines and natural 
gas provision 
8.08 0.31 
40 Maintenance Risks 7.83 0.29 
41 Imperfect contract documents 7.57 0.27 
42 Land acquisition 7.52 0.27 
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43 
Supervision, organization and 
control for inspection of 
Construction works 
7.43 0.26 
44 Inability of concessionaire 7.36 0.26 
45 Coordination risks 7.35 0.25 
46 Organization risk 7.3 0.25 
47 Change in Market demand 7.22 0.24 
48 
Unforeseen geotechnical 
conditions 
7.17 0.24 
49 Market competition 7.08 0.23 
50 Inability of concessionaire 6.96 0.22 
51 Technological Risks 6.74 0.21 
52 Sustainability Risk 6.74 0.21 
53 Performance Security Risk 6.73 0.21 
54 
Physical Obstacles that cannot 
be avoided 
6.71 0.20 
55 Labor unavailability 6.54 0.19 
56 Access and delivery of site 5.96 0.15 
57 
Subjective Project evaluation 
method 
5.83 0.14 
58 Antiquities Risks 5.75 0.13 
59 Unforeseen Weather conditions 4.08 0.00 
    
 
Minimum Value 4.08 
 
 
Maximum Value 16.92 
 
Table 57: Risk Ranking 
The top 26 risks having a severity of 0.4 or more were identified and selected for the 
quantitative risk analysis presented in the next section. After performing the contract 
mapping step, it was found that some different risks are covered by the same clause under 
the contracts such as the following pairs of risks which are: the permits risk and the delay 
in project approvals/permits risk, the Legislation Changes risk and the change in tax 
regulation risk, the Contractual risk and the Imperfect Contract documents risk, the 
deficiency of design risk and the latent defect risk, the provision of transformers, 
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substations or backup power risk and the connection of public utilities to boundaries of 
site risk. Accordingly, grouping the risks which can be covered by the same contract 
clause can be done in future research.  
On the other hand, the following table shows the number of risks that will be taken into 
consideration if only the risks with a normalized severity equal to or greater than 0.5 are 
taken into account. If only the risks with a normalized value equal to or greater than 0.5 
are taken into account, then the risks that will be taken into consideration for the Risk 
Decision Support System will be equal to 16 risks only (around 27%) of the risks. 
Accordingly, it is more representative to include the risks with a normalized value equal 
to or greater than 0.4 in the calculations in order to wider the range of the top ranked 
risks. 
# Risk Factor 
Average 
Severity 
Normalized 
Value 
1 Foreign exchange fluctuation  16.92 1.00 
2 Political Risk 16.71 0.98 
3 Inflation 15.24 0.87 
4 
Poor public decision making 
process 
15.16 0.86 
5 Government policy 14.72 0.83 
6 Political/Public opposition 14.28 0.79 
7 
Lack of supporting 
infrastructure 
14.24 0.79 
8 Change in tax regulation 13.4 0.73 
9 Government corruption 13.16 0.71 
10 Legislation changes 12.88 0.69 
11 Public Credit 12.48 0.65 
12 Swings in Public Opinion 12.44 0.65 
13 Dispute resolution  12.17 0.63 
14 Nationalization/expropriation 11.88 0.61 
15 Force majeure 10.92 0.53 
16 
Inadequate law and supervision 
system 
10.6 0.51 
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17 Interest Rate Fluctuation 10.4 0.49 
18 Regulatory/Contractual Risk 10.26 0.48 
19 
Delay in project 
approvals/permits 
10.16 0.47 
20 Price Change 10.04 0.46 
21 Revenue Risk 10 0.46 
22 Completion risk 9.95 0.46 
23 Government Intervention 9.74 0.44 
24 Permits Risks 9.63 0.43 
25 Operation cost overrun 9.58 0.43 
26 Supply and demand  9.17 0.40 
27 Quality Control 8.88 0.37 
28 Quality Assurance 8.76 0.36 
29 
Insufficient project finance 
supervision 
8.72 0.36 
30 Project/operation changes 8.68 0.36 
31 Third party delay/violation 8.67 0.36 
32 Planning risks 8.5 0.34 
33 
Connection of Public utilities to 
boundaries of site 
8.48 0.34 
34 Construction Risk 8.38 0.33 
35 Material shortage 8.32 0.33 
36 Latent Defect Risk 8.13 0.32 
37 Deficiency of design 8.08 0.31 
38 
Provision of transformers, 
substations or backup power 
8.08 0.31 
39 
Connection to boundary of Site 
of telephone lines and natural 
gas provision 
8.08 0.31 
40 Maintenance Risks 7.83 0.29 
41 Imperfect contract documents 7.57 0.27 
42 Land acquisition 7.52 0.27 
43 
Supervision, organization and 
control for inspection of 
Construction works 
7.43 0.26 
44 Inability of concessionaire 7.36 0.26 
45 Coordination risks 7.35 0.25 
46 Organization risk 7.3 0.25 
47 Change in Market demand 7.22 0.24 
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48 
Unforeseen geotechnical 
conditions 
7.17 0.24 
49 Market competition 7.08 0.23 
50 Inability of concessionaire 6.96 0.22 
51 Technological Risks 6.74 0.21 
52 Sustainability Risk 6.74 0.21 
53 Performance Security Risk 6.73 0.21 
54 
Physical Obstacles that cannot 
be avoided 
6.71 0.20 
55 Labor unavailability 6.54 0.19 
56 Access and delivery of site 5.96 0.15 
57 
Subjective Project evaluation 
method 
5.83 0.14 
58 Antiquities Risks 5.75 0.13 
59 Unforeseen Weather conditions 4.08 0.00 
    
 
Minimum Value 4.08 
 
 
Maximum Value 16.92 
 
Table 58: Risk Ranking-Normalized Value equal to or greater than 0.5 
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6.3 Decision Support System Development 
In order to develop the risk decision support system, the top 26 risks (with a normalized 
value equal to or larger than 0.4) are inserted in the model for the Quantitative risk 
analysis.  
In the Decision Support System, there are two concepts: the first one is the “Experts 
Opinion” which is the Opinion that was obtained through the analysis of the 25 surveys. 
The second one is the “End user‟s opinion” which is the opinion of the user who is going 
to use the Decision Support System. This end user can be from the public sector or from 
the private sector.  
The idea of the Decision Support System is based on the fact that the end user starts by 
selecting the weighing of his opinion with respect to the experts opinion.  If the end user 
has a considerable background about risk management and about investment in PPP 
projects, then, he/she can assign a large weight to his/her opinions. On the other hand, if 
the end user does not have an experience about risk management or cannot determine the 
probability and the impacts of the risks, therefore, he/she should depend more on the 
experts‟ opinion. 
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Below is a screen shot from the model showing the drop-down menu including the 
experts‟ opinion weight. Based on the weight assigned to the experts, the end user‟s 
opinion will be automatically updated. 
 
Figure 56: Screen Shot 1 from Crystal Ball model 
The experts‟ opinions were developed through the analysis of the surveys.  Accordingly, 
the values inserted under the section of the “Experts opinion” will remain fixed 
throughout the calculations unless new questionnaires are filled or unless a larger sample 
size is inserted. 
Moreover, experts‟ opinions can regularly be updated if the conditions change in the 
country through the development of new surveys or through distributing a second round 
of questionnaires. Another screen shot is showing the experts opinion section for the top 
26 critical risks: 
This section is already filled according to the previous survey results and is 
not to be filled by the end user 
Risk Factor 1: Macroeconomic and Financial Risks 
Item P I S 
Normalized 
Severity 
Interest Rate Fluctuation 3.08 3.28 10.10 0.20 
Inflation 3.88 3.8 14.74 0.80 
Foreign Exchange Fluctuation 4.04 4.04 16.32 1.00 
Price Change 3.48 3.16 11.00 0.31 
Operation Cost Overrun 3 3.12 9.36 0.10 
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Revenue Risk 2.84 3.64 10.34 0.23 
    
 
Risk Factor 2: Commercial and Market Environmental Risks 
Item P I S 
Normalized 
Severity 
Supply and Demand 2.79 3.08 8.59 0.00 
Public Credit 3.24 3.64 11.79 0.41 
     
Risk Factor 3: Legal Risks 
Item P I S 
Normalized 
Severity 
Permits Risks 2.71 3.42 9.27 0.09 
Delay in project approvals/permits 2.8 3.4 9.52 0.12 
Legislation Changes 3.32 3.76 12.48 0.50 
Dispute resolution 3.21 3.75 12.04 0.45 
Change in tax Regulation 3.36 3.92 13.17 0.59 
Government policy 3.6 3.92 14.11 0.71 
    
 
Risk Factor 4: Political Risks 
Item P I S 
Normalized 
Severity 
Political/Public opposition 3.4 3.96 13.46 0.63 
Swings in Public Opinion 3.12 3.68 11.48 0.37 
Political Risk 4 4.08 16.32 1.00 
Nationalization/Expropriation 2.92 4 11.68 0.40 
     
Risk Factor 5: Regulatory Risks 
Item P I S 
Normalized 
Severity 
Regulatory/ Contractual Risk 2.96 3.35 9.92 0.17 
Government Intervention 3 3.13 9.39 0.10 
     
Risk Factor 6: Government Maturity Risks 
Item P I S 
Normalized 
Severity 
Page | 183  
 
Poor Public Decision Making Process 3.68 3.92 14.43 0.75 
Government Corruption 3.36 3.72 12.50 0.51 
Inadequate law and supervision system 2.8 3.48 9.74 0.15 
     
Risk Factor 7: Technical Risks 
Item P I S 
Normalized 
Severity 
Lack of supporting infrastructure 3.28 4.16 13.64 0.65 
     
Risk Factor 10: Production Risks 
Item P I S 
Normalized 
Severity 
Completion Risks 2.77 3.64 10.08 0.19 
     
Risk Factor 12: Unforeseen Risks 
Item P I S 
Normalized 
Severity 
Force Majeure 2.83 3.83 10.84 0.29 
Table 59: Experts Opinion part of the model 
The green cells in the above section of the model are called “Assumptions Cells”.  The 
assumptions cells, in this case, are the probability and the impact. 
The End user is asked to fill the probability and the impact of each risk factor based on 
his personal experience and based on the weight of the end user‟s opinion which he/she 
selects as a first step in the model. 
The inputs that the end user is required to fill are: 
 The probability of each risk 
 The impact of each risk 
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Below is another screen shot for the model, with the area required to be filled by the end 
user: 
 
Figure 57: Screen shot for the model 
 
The Decision Support System‟s output is the following: 
 The Average risk level based on the experts opinion 
 The Average normalized risk level based on the experts opinion 
 The Average risk level based on the end user‟s opinion 
 The Average normalized risk level based on the end user‟s opinion 
 The overall risk level for the whole project 
 The overall normalized risk level for the whole project 
 The Contingency percentage for the whole project based on the most critical risks 
included in the questionnaire and based on the severity obtained. 
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Based on the severity of the project and based on the contingency percentage associated 
with the risks in this specific project, the end user can decide whether this specific project 
should be accepted or not.  
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6.4 Principle of Operation of the Decision Support System 
Due to the limited number of PPP projects in Egypt, and due to the fact that the PPP 
project that has been completed in Egypt is only finished in terms of construction while 
the operations have not yet started. The major case study used to develop the decision 
support system is “New Cairo Waste Water treatment Plant”. In this project the 
construction phase only has been completed.  In order to better understand the role and 
use of the Decision Support System, the different types of expenses incurred by the 
Private party should be understood. These are the pre-operating expenses, the Bank Fees 
and the Costs associated with the EPC contractor.  On the other hand, the public party 
incurs the inflation costs associated with the Operations and Maintenance during the 
concession period (18 to 20 years or more).  The Operations and Maintenance costs are 
usually subject to increase according to the escalation formula agreed upon in the 
Contract. In the case of New Cairo Waste Water Treatment Plant, the operation fees are 
calculated per m³ of the delivered clean water. On the other hand, the project 
development costs and the costs related to the EPC contractor cannot be changed 
backwards as these costs are only incurred during the construction period of the project.  
Below is a summary for the important costs incurred by the Private Party in the pre-
operation phase of a PPP project: 
 
 
 
Pre-operating expenses 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) fees 
SPV insurance during construction 
Construction Permits 
Environmental consultants 
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Technical Experts 
Banks legal fees 
 Bank Insurance and Environmental fees 
 
Bank Fees 
Performance Security fees 
Administration fees 
Stamp duties 
 
 
EPC 
Buildings 
Equipment 
Mechanical, Electrical and Plumbing 
Maintenance 
Table 60: Major expenses incurred by the Private Party in PPP projects 
In the case of New Cairo waste water treatment plant, and since the operation phase of 
the project has not started yet, then the contingency percentage obtained is only for the 
costs associated with the investment into the project. These costs are divided into two 
sections: the project development cost and the costs related to the EPC contractor. The 
contingency percentage incurred for the investment cost of the project was around 3 %.  
Due to the lack of the PPP projects that are already performed in Egypt, an assumption 
was settled in order to develop the Decision Support system.  This assumption is that 
there is a linear relationship between the severity of the project and the percentage of 
contingency cost associated with this specific project.  Accordingly, it is assumed that, 
theoretically, if the severity of the project is null, then, there will be no contingency costs 
associated with the project. This was the first point in the graph representing the linear 
relationship between the severity and the contingency. In order to get the second point 
and develop the graph, the case study taken into consideration is that of New Cairo waste 
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water treatment plant. In this case, the severity of the project is obtained through the 
model, by getting an end user acquainted with the project‟s conditions fill the part related 
to the end user as it is shown in the below figure extracted from the model: 
 
Figure 58: Extract from the Decision Support System-end user’s opinion 
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On the other hand, the contingency of the project was obtained through asking experts 
who have worked in this project. Accordingly, the linear relationship was developed as 
follows: 
 
Figure 59: Normalized Severity Vs. Contingency % 
However, this relationship is subject to change, because in the above case, the end user‟s 
opinion weight was chosen to affect the results by only 10 % whereas the larger weight 
was given to the experts (90 %).  
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Changing the experts‟ opinion‟s weight with respect to the end user‟s opinion‟s weight 
will affect the severity obtained for the project as it will change the probability and 
impact entered to the Decision Support System. Below is a table showing the effect of 
changing the percentage to the experts‟ opinion weight and the end user‟s opinions 
weight on the overall severity of the project:  
Experts 
Opinion’s 
weight 
End 
User's 
opinion 
weight 
Project's 
Overall 
Severity 
100 0 0.41 
90 10 0.42 
80 20 0.42 
70 30 0.42 
60 40 0.43 
50 50 0.43 
40 60 0.44 
30 70 0.44 
20 80 0.44 
10 90 0.45 
Table 61: Effect of changing the percentage to the experts’ opinion weight and the end user’s opinions weight on 
the overall severity of the project 
Running the crystal ball model depends on defining Assumptions Cells and Forecast 
Cells. The Assumptions Cells are the cells that contain uncertain variables which, in this 
case are the probability and the impact determined from the survey results. The 
probability and the impact for each risk factor are chosen to have a normal distribution 
with a mean and standard deviations equal to the ones obtained in the calculations of the 
survey results (explained in Chapter 4 and present in Appendix 1).   
Also, an additional assumption cell is defined which is the percentage of Contingency 
cost in New Cairo Waste Water treatment plant project. This assumption cell is having a 
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triangular probability distribution ranging from having a minimum value of 2.7 % and a 
maximum value of 3 % as shown in the below distribution: 
 
Figure 60: Probability Distribution for % of contingency cost in New Cairo Waste Water treatment Plant 
project 
(An illustration for the probability distribution assumed for developing the Decision 
Support System is presented in Appendix 2).  
When the user runs the model, the forecasts cells of the Decision Support System are the 
overall risk level of the project (overall normalized severity) in addition to the percentage 
of contingency of the project. The Overall severity of the project is calculated through the 
combined probability and impact of the experts and the end user.  Crystal Ball uses 
Monte Carlo simulation in order to deliver the results. “During a simulation, Crystal Ball 
calculates numerous scenarios of a model by repeatedly picking values from the 
probability distribution for the uncertain variables and using those values for each 
assumption cell. Commonly, a Crystal Ball simulation calculates hundreds or thousands 
of scenarios, or trials, in just a few seconds. The value to use for each assumption for 
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each trial is selected randomly from the defined possibilities. For every assumption cell, 
Crystal Ball generates a random number according to the probability distribution 
defined and places it into the spreadsheet, then Crystal Ball recalculates the spreadsheet 
and finally retrieves a value from every forecast” (Crystal Ball 7.2.2 User Manual).  
The figure below is an extract from the Decision support system (RDSS-PPP) showing 
the different deliverables of the Decision Support System after running the simulation: 
    
3- Click "Start" 
   
 
Average 
Risk 
Level 
(Experts 
Opinion) 
11.7
8 
   
Average 
Risk 
Level 
(Previous 
End 
User(s) 
Opinion) 
11.8
5 
 
Average 
Normalize
d Risk 
Level 
(Experts 
Opinion) 
0.41 
 
  
Average 
Normalize
d Risk 
Level 
(End 
User's 
Opinion) 
0.45 
 
Maximum 
Severity 
16.3
2 
   
Maximum 
Severity 
25.0
0 
 
Minimum 
Severity 
8.59 
   
Minimum 
Severity 
1.00 
    
Overall Risk Level 11.84 
  
    
Normalized 
Overall Risk Level 
0.45 
 
 
       
    
% of Contingency 
Cost in Orasqualia 
Project 
3 
  
    
Severity/Contingen
cy (Slope of the 
Line) for 
Orasqualia Project 
0.15 
  
    
Contingency % for 
the New Project 
3.00 
 
 Figure 61: Deliverables of the Decision Support System 
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6.5 Analysis of Simulation results 
The Decision Support System (RDSS-PPP) delivers two forecast values based on 1000 
iterations: 
1- The expected project overall severity (based on the experts and the end users‟ 
opinions) 
2- The expected contingency percentage for any new project 
Along with the forecast values, the Decision Support System developed using Crystal 
Ball displays forecast charts which show each forecast along with its confidence level 
and range.  
6.5.1 Expected Project Overall Normalized Severity 
The below chart shows that with a confidence level of 80 %, the Normalized Overall Risk 
for a given project ranges from 0.33 to 0.5.  
 
Figure 62: Forecast Chart Normalized Overall Risk Level- 80 % confidence 
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The minimum normalized severity value is 0.21 and the maximum severity value is 0.68.  
The Mean and the Median are equal to 0.42 and the standard deviation is equal to 0.07.  
Also, it is noticed from the first forecast chart that the distribution that best fits those 
results is the normal distribution as shown in the below chart: 
 
Figure 63: Normalized Overall risk level-normal distribution fitting 
The following chart shows the cumulative frequency, or in other words the range for the 
normalized overall risk level from the minimum value up to the maximum value, with a 
probability of 50 %. It is noticed that with a certainty of 50 %, the overall normalized risk 
level for a given project ranges from 0.4 to 0.5.  
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Figure 64: Normalized Overall risk level-cumulative frequency 
The Decision Support System delivers as well Sensitivity data through correlation 
coefficients. “Correlation coefficients provide a meaningful measure of the degree to 
which assumptions and forecasts change together. If an assumption and a forecast have a 
high correlation coefficient, it means that the assumption has a significant impact on the 
forecast (both through its uncertainty and its model sensitivity). Positive coefficients 
indicate that an increase in the assumption is associated with an increase in the forecast. 
Negative coefficients imply the opposite situation. The larger the absolute value of the 
correlation coefficient, the stronger the relationship” (Crystal Ball 7.2.2 User Manual).  
This is illustrated through the Decision Support System output as it is shown: 
Page | 196  
 
 
Figure 65: Normalized Overall Risk Level-Contribution to Variance chart 
 
Figure 66: Normalized Overall Risk Level-Contribution to Variance pie chart 
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Table 62: Sensitivity Data View- Normalized Overall Risk Level 
From the above two figures and above table, the impact of the change in tax regulation is 
the assumption that accounts for approximately 14.3 % of the variance in forecast value 
of the overall risk level of the project and can be considered as the most important 
assumption in the model. This assumption needs more investigation by the end user in 
order to reduce its uncertainty in the future.  The probability of the regulatory/contractual 
risks accounts for 11.7 % of the variance in the forecast value of overall risk level of the 
project. On the other hand, the assumption of the percentage of contingency contributes 
to only 0.9% to the variance of the forecast value of the overall risk level. This result is 
reasonable and makes sense since this assumption has almost no effect on the overall risk 
level of the project.  
The role of the trend chart is to determine the confidence intervals of the forecast in one 
chart. For instance, according to the following chart, the values situated in the 90 % 
confidence level show the range of values (forecasts) that have a 90 % probability of 
occurrence. 
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Figure 67: Trend Chart- Cumulative View-Overall Risk Level 
 
6.5.2 Expected Contingency Percentage for the project 
The below forecast chart is for the expected contingency percentage of the project. It is 
shown that with a confidence of 80 % the expected contingency percentage that should be 
taken into account for the project will range from 2.84% and 3.16 %.  
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Figure 68: Expected contingency percentage-80 % Confidence Level 
The Probability distribution that fits this data the most is the Beta Distribution as shown 
in the below figure: 
 
Figure 69: Expected contingency percentage-Beta Distribution 
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The mean and median of the above probability distribution are equal to 3. The standard 
deviation is equal to 0.12. 
The below chart shows the cumulative frequency for the percentage of contingency cost 
for the project which in the case of 50 % certainty ranges from 2.92 to 3.09 as shown in 
the below chart: 
 
Figure 70: cumulative frequency for the percentage of contingency cost for the project 
 Concerning the sensitivity chart, it is shown that the assumption of the percentage of 
contingency in New Cairo Waste Water treatment plant accounts for 95.1 % to the 
variance in forecast value of the percentage of contingency that should be assigned to the 
project. This makes perfect sense as this assumption plays a major role in forecasting the 
percentage of contingency of the project while the other assumptions are less important to 
the forecast of the contingency percentage that should be assigned to the project as they 
had a greater importance in the first forecast value related to the overall normalized 
severity of the project. 
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Figure 71: Sensitivity Chart-percentage of contingency cost for the project 
According to the below chart, the values situated in the 90 % confidence level show the 
range of values (forecasts) that have a 90 % probability of occurrence. 
 
Figure 72: Trend Chart-Contingency % 
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The below figure shows both forecast charts along with their probability distributions: 
 
Figure 73: Overlay Charts 
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6.6 Decision Support System Limitations 
The major limitations of the decision support system developed are the following: 
1- The top ranked 26 risks inserted in the model are based only on the current status 
prevailing in Egypt and is depending on the opinion of 25 experts in addition to 
any end user that will use the decision support system 
2- Due to the lack of PPP projects in Egypt, the researcher assumed a linear 
relationship between the severity of the project and the contingency percentage 
that should be assigned to the project based on its severity. In case more 
information has been available concerning the severity of already executed PPP 
projects and contingency percentage allocated to those projects, the researcher 
would have been to obtain a best fit line for those values or a suitable probability 
distribution which will lead to more accurate results concerning the contingency 
cost of the PPP projects. 
3- The case study project which New Cairo waste water treatment plant has not yet 
reached the operation phase. Therefore, the concession period has not yet 
commenced. Accordingly, the contingency percentage assumed to this project is 
based on the construction phase only which includes the project development cost 
and the EPC cost without taking into consideration the O & M costs. 
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6.7 Validation for Top Ranked risks 
In order to check for the validity and accuracy of the top ranked risks identified and 
which were inserted in the Risk Decision Support System, a comparison is performed 
between the top 26 risks (with a normalized Severity equal to or greater than 0.4) are 
compared to the top risks identified through the Literature Review in two countries: 
China and India.  
6.7.1Validation of the Top Ranked Risks with the Chinese Case 
According to the studies published by Xu et al. in 2010 and 2012, the survey results 
identified 17 critical risk factors with a normalized severity equal to or greater than 0.5. 
Those critical risk factors are compared to the critical risk factors identified in Egypt. The 
similar risks in both countries are highlighted. 
Risk # Egypt (2013) China (2012) 
1 
Foreign exchange fluctuation 
Government Intervention 
2 
Political Risk 
Poor public decision making 
process 
3 
Inflation 
Government corruption 
4 Poor public decision making 
process 
Financing risk 
5 
Government policy 
Inadequate law and supervision 
system 
6 
Political/Public opposition 
Public credit 
7 
Lack of supporting infrastructure 
Subjective project evaluation 
method 
8 
Change in tax regulation 
Interest rate fluctuation 
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9 
Government corruption 
Conflicting or imperfect contract 
10 
Legislation changes 
Change in Market demand 
11 
Public Credit 
Insufficient Project Finance 
Supervision 
12 
Swings in Public Opinion 
Operation Cost Overrun 
13 
Dispute resolution  
Foreign exchange fluctuation 
14 
Nationalization/expropriation 
Inflation 
15 
Force majeure 
Project/Operation changes 
16 Inadequate law and supervision 
system 
Completion risks 
17 
Interest Rate Fluctuation 
Price Change 
Table 63: Comparison between top risks in Egypt and China 
From the above tables, it is noticed that when comparing the top 17 risks in Egypt to the 
top 17 risks in China, some risks are repeated with different ranking. For instance, the 
most critical risk in Egypt is the Foreign Exchange Fluctuation risk. This risk is taking 
the twelfth rank in China. On the other hand, the Government Intervention Risk which is 
the most critical risk in China occupies the twenty third position in Egypt. Also, other 
risks occupy almost the same position in both countries such as the poor public decision 
making process risk which occupies the second position in terms of criticality in China 
and the fourth position in Egypt. Also, the Price Change risk is ranked number 17 in 
China while it is number 20 in Egypt.  
6.7.2 Validation of the Top Ranked Risks with the Indian Case 
According to the study performed by Lyer and Sagheer (2010), 17 critical risks are 
identified for India through interviews, literature review and case studies. The similar 
risks in both countries are highlighted: 
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Risk # Egypt (2013) India (2010) 
1 
Foreign exchange fluctuation 
Preinvestment risks 
2 
Political Risk 
Delay in Financial Closure 
3 
Inflation 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation 
4 Poor public decision making 
process 
Delay in Land acquisition 
5 
Government policy 
Permit/Approval risk 
6 
Political/Public opposition 
Technology risk 
7 
Lack of supporting infrastructure 
Design and latent defect risk 
8 
Change in tax regulation 
Cost Overrun risk 
9 
Government corruption 
Schedule risk 
10 
Legislation changes 
Direct political risk 
11 
Public Credit 
Indirect political risk 
12 
Swings in Public Opinion 
Legal risk 
13 
Dispute resolution  
Financial risk 
14 
Nationalization/expropriation 
Nonpolitical force majeure risk 
15 
Force majeure 
Partnering risk 
16 Inadequate law and supervision 
system 
Environmental risk 
17 
Interest Rate Fluctuation 
Physical risk 
Table 64: Comparison between top risks in Egypt and India 
When comparing the Egyptian model to the Indian model for PPP projects, it is noticed 
that the risk grouping according to the Indian study is different from that of the Egyptian 
study. For instance, according to the Indian study, the political risk is divided into direct 
political risks and indirect political risks. The direct political risks being the risks 
associated with expropriation, changes in law and the indirect political risks being the 
risks of war, riots or terrorism. According to the Egyptian study, the division of risks is 
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different where the political risks are not divided as in the Indian case and the 
nationalization/expropriation risk is identified as a separate risk factor. In India, the 
Preinvestment risks and the delay in financial closure are the top ranked risks while those 
risks are not identified in the Egyptian study. The delay in land acquisition, which is the 
fourth ranked risk in India is taking the forty second rank in Egypt. Also, some risks have 
a different nomenclature in both countries such as the interest rate fluctuation risk in 
Egypt which is taking the seventeenth position is already covered under the financial risk 
in India.  Also, due to the difference in the conditions between both countries, India 
identified a separate risk factor named “nonpolitical force majeure” which is related to 
the natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes. This risk is not likely to occur in 
Egypt. For instance, the unforeseen weather conditions risk in Egypt is taking the last 
position in the 59 identified risks in the questionnaire. The latent defect risk which has a 
low severity according to the Egyptian study is taking the sixth position in India. 
6.7.3 Validation of the Top Ranked Risks with the Singaporean Case 
A third comparison is presented in this research which is the comparison with study 
performed by Hwang et al. (2012). In this study, the top ranked risks are identified along 
with the proposed risk allocation for each risk. The risk ranking and the risk allocation of 
the top 26 ranked risks in Singapore are compared with the top 26 ranked risks in Egypt 
in the following table. The similar risks in both countries are highlighted: 
Risk # Egypt (2013) Singapore (2012) 
Risk Factor Allocation Risk Factor Allocation 
1 Foreign exchange 
fluctuation 
Both Lack of support Public 
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from Government 
2 
Political Risk 
Both Availability of 
finance 
Private 
3 
Inflation 
Both Construction time 
delay 
Private 
4 
Poor public decision 
making process 
Project Dependent Inadequate 
experience in 
PPP 
Both 
5 
Government policy 
Both Unstable 
government 
Public 
6 
Political/Public opposition 
Both Lack of 
legal/regulatory 
framework 
Public 
7 
Lack of supporting 
infrastructure 
Both Site Safety and 
Security 
Private 
8 
Change in tax regulation 
Project Dependent Construction cost 
overrun 
Private 
9 
Government corruption 
Private Organizational 
and 
communication 
risk 
Private 
10 
Legislation changes 
Project Dependent Strong political 
interference 
Public 
11 
Public Credit 
Both Inflation Both 
12 
Swings in Public Opinion 
Both Interest rate Both 
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13 
Dispute resolution 
Both Corruption and 
bribery 
Both 
14 
Nationalization/expropriati
on 
Private Inadequate 
distribution of 
responsibilities 
Both 
15 
Force majeure 
Both Delay in approval 
and permits 
Project 
Dependent 
16 
Inadequate law and 
supervision system 
Project Dependent Inconsistent 
Legal/regulatory 
framework 
Public 
17 
Interest Rate Fluctuation 
Both Inadequate 
distribution of 
authority 
Both 
18 
Regulatory/Contractual 
Risk 
Project Dependent Lack of 
commitment 
between parties 
Both 
19 
Delay in project 
approvals/permits 
Both Poor financial 
market 
Private 
20 
Price Change 
Both Differences in 
working method 
Both 
21 
Revenue Risk 
Project Dependent Excessive 
contract variation 
Project 
Dependent 
22 
Completion risk 
 
Private 
Financial 
attraction of 
project to 
Private 
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investors 
23 
Government Intervention 
Project Dependent Level of demand 
for project 
Private 
24 
Permits Risks 
Both Operation Cost 
overrun 
Private 
25 
Operation cost overrun 
Private Material 
availability 
Private 
26 
Supply and demand 
Both Low operation 
productivity 
Private 
Table 65: Comparison between top risks in Egypt and Singapore 
From the above table, it is concluded that, the Government Corruption risk in Egypt is 
called Corruption and Bribery risk in Singapore. However, the risk allocation in the 
Singaporean case is more logical as it is allocated to both parties rather than to a specific 
party.  This risk is ranked number nine in Egypt while is ranked number thirteen in 
Singapore. Also, the inadequate law and supervision system risk in Egypt which 
corresponds to the inconsistent legal/regulatory framework in Singapore has exactly the 
same ranking (16) in both countries. In Singapore, this risk is purely allocated to the 
Public party while in Egypt, it is mentioned that its allocation will be based on the 
specific circumstances of the project. The inflation risk is occupying a high rank in both 
Egypt and Singapore. The Operation cost overrun is occupying almost the same ranking 
in both countries as well. The top ranked risk in Singapore is the lack of support from the 
government which differs from Egypt where the top ranked risk is the foreign exchange 
fluctuation risk.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and 
Recommendations for Future 
Research 
7.1 Research Conclusions 
This research focuses on contract management and risk analysis for PPP projects in 
Egypt. The major goal of this study is to perform a contract and risk analysis for PPP 
projects in Egypt by: (1) Identifying and ranking the various risks affecting PPP projects 
in Egypt and determining their allocation, (2) An attempt for mapping the identified risks 
and the risk allocation identified  to contract clauses where the risk allocation is defined 
clearly in the clause (public private or both), and finally (3) Developing a prototype for 
Risk Decision Support System for the top ranked risks. 
Fifty nine risk factors were identified through the literature review and through 
interviewing experts. The identified risks were included in a questionnaire distributed 
among 25 experts who assessed the probability, impact and severity of each risk factor in 
addition to the risk allocation. The following risks were identified to be the top risk 
groups: Financial and Macroeconomic risk group, Commercial risk group, Legal risk 
group, Political risk group, Regulatory risk group, Government maturity risk group, 
Technical risk group, Production risk group and Unforeseen risk group.  
After the attempt for contract mapping was performed, it is concluded that most of the 
risks have been mapped. The Performance Security risk, the Permits risk, the Changes in 
Law risk, the Dispute Resolution risk, the Force Majeure and the Deficiency of Design 
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are all explicitly covered and addressed in both Contracts. In some cases, the risk 
allocation according to the survey results was perfectly conforming to the risk allocation 
according to the real case contracts as in the case of the Performance Security risk, the 
Permits risk, the Unforeseen Geotechnical conditions risk and the Latent Defect risk. On 
the other hand, the allocation of Nationalization/Expropriation risk is to the Public Party 
according to both contracts as it is considered as an Employer‟s event of default. 
However, according to the survey results, this risk was allocated to the Private Party. 
Also, concerning the Government Corruption risk, it was not covered under the real case 
contracts. However, this risk shall be allocated to the Public Party rather than to the 
Private Party which does not conform to the survey results. It was also found that some 
different risks are covered by the same clause under both contracts which are the 
following pairs of risks:  
 The permits risk and the delay in project approvals/permits risk,  
 The Legislation Changes risk and the change in tax regulation risk,  
 The Contractual risk and the Imperfect Contract documents risk,  
 The deficiency of design risk and the latent defect risk,  
 The provision of transformers, substations or backup power risk and the 
connection of public utilities to boundaries of site risk.  
The prototype for Risk Decision Support System for the top ranked risks was developed 
in order to determine the overall risk level (overall normalized severity) and the overall 
contingency percentage that should be assigned to the project.  
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Based on the comparison performed between the top ranked risks identified in Egypt and 
the top ranked risks identified in China, India and Singapore in 2012, 2010 and 2012 
respectively in order to determine whether the top ranked risks identified in Egypt are 
similar to the top ranked risks identified in the aforementioned three countries, it was 
concluded the interest rate fluctuation risk, the permits risks, the political risks and the 
government corruption risks are identified in various countries and are top rankled in 
terms of their impact on the PPP projects.  
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7.2 Future Work 
In order to overcome the current Decision Support System limitations and in order to 
increase the accuracy of the results, future work is suggested: 
1- The relatively small sample size is due to the unfamiliarity of many experts in the 
domain of Construction Engineering with the nature and with the risks associated 
with PPP projects. However, with the expected expansion in the domain of PPP, 
experts will get more acquainted with PPP projects. Also, the questionnaire 
should be repeated in case of any change in the conditions of the country in order 
to assess how this change is reflected in the domain of PPP. 
2- In case more projects are executed under the PPP scheme, the following table can 
be added to the decision support system:  
Severity 
Contingency 
% Min Max 
      
      
      
Table 66: Future additions to the DSS 
This table will include a summary for the data obtained from previous projects. It will 
include the severity ranges and the corresponding contingency percentage that was 
allocated for each severity range. In this case, after the end user assigns the weight of his 
opinion in addition to the probability and impact of each risk, the end user will insert the 
estimated project cost. Based on the severity obtained from the model, the decision 
support system will help the user knowing the range in which his project falls and 
accordingly it will calculate the additional project cost caused by the contingency as well 
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as the percentage of contingency cost as shown in the below extract form the future 
model: 
 
Table 67: Deliverables of the modified RDSS-PPP 
3- After performing the contract mapping step, it was found that some different risks 
are covered by the same clause under the contracts. Accordingly, grouping the 
risks which can be covered by the same contract clause can be done in future 
research in order to reduce the number of risk factors.  
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Appendix 1: Survey calculations 
Factor 1: Macroeconomic and Financial Risks 
1- Interest Rate Fluctuation 
2- Inflation 
3- Foreign Exchange Fluctuation 
4- Price Change 
5- Operation Cost Overrun 
6- Revenue Risk 
7- Inability of Concessionaire 
8- Subjective Project Evaluation method 
9- Insufficient Project Finance Supervision 
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Respondent # 
Interest Rate 
Fluctuation - 
Probability 
Interest Rate 
Fluctuation - 
Impact 
Interest Rate 
Fluctuation-
Severity 
1 2 4 8 
2 4 4 16 
3 3 2 6 
4 2 4 8 
5 4 4 16 
6 2 2 4 
7 2 2 4 
8 4 5 20 
9 2 4 8 
10 2 3 6 
11 3 2 6 
12 3 4 12 
13 4 2 8 
14 3 4 12 
15 4 4 16 
16 4 4 16 
17 4 4 16 
18 4 4 16 
19 3 2 6 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 4 4 16 
23 3 3 9 
24 3 3 9 
25 2 2 4 
    
  
Mean 10.40 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.78 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
1 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
20 
    
 
 
Minimum Value 4 
 
 
Maximum Value 20 
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Respondent # 
Inflation - 
Probability 
Inflation - 
Impact 
Inflation-
Severity 
1 5 5 25 
2 5 5 25 
3 4 4 16 
4 3 4 12 
5 3 4 12 
6 5 2 10 
7 2 2 4 
8 4 5 20 
9 3 2 6 
10 4 4 16 
11 4 4 16 
12 4 3 12 
13 4 2 8 
14 4 4 16 
15 4 3 12 
16 4 5 20 
17 4 5 20 
18 4 4 16 
19 4 4 16 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 5 5 25 
23 5 5 25 
24 5 5 25 
25 2 3 6 
    
  
Mean 15.24 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.60 
  
Median 16 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
2 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
28 
    
 
 
Minimum Value 4 
 
 
Maximum Value 25 
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Respondent # 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Fluctuation - 
Probability 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Fluctuation - 
Impact 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Fluctuation-
Severity 
1 5 5 25 
2 5 5 25 
3 4 4 16 
4 2 3 6 
5 4 5 20 
6 2 2 4 
7 5 5 25 
8 3 5 15 
9 2 2 4 
10 5 5 25 
11 4 4 16 
12 5 3 15 
13 4 4 16 
14 5 5 25 
15 4 4 16 
16 5 1 5 
17 4 4 16 
18 5 5 25 
19 4 4 16 
20 2 4 8 
21 4 4 16 
22 5 5 25 
23 5 5 25 
24 5 5 25 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 16.92 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
7.49 
  
Median 16 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
2 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
32 
    
 
 
Minimum Value 4 
 
 
Maximum Value 25 
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Respondent # 
Price Change 
- Probability 
Price Change 
- Impact 
Price Change-
Severity 
1 4 4 16 
2 5 5 25 
3 3 2 6 
4 3 2 6 
5 3 3 9 
6 2 2 4 
7 5 5 25 
8 3 3 9 
9 3 2 6 
10 4 2 8 
11 4 3 12 
12 3 2 6 
13 4 4 16 
14 4 4 16 
15 4 4 16 
16 5 1 5 
17 4 3 12 
18 4 4 16 
19 4 4 16 
20 2 2 4 
21 3 3 9 
22 3 3 9 
23 1 5 5 
24 4 4 16 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 11.24 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.01 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
23 
    
 
 
Minimum 
Value 
4 
 
 
Maximum 
Value 
25 
 
   
 
 
After Outlier Removal 
 
 
Mean 10.04 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
4.55 
 
 
Median 9 
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Respondent # 
Operation Cost 
Overrun - 
Probability 
Operation Cost 
Overrun - 
Impact 
Operation Cost 
Overrun-
Severity 
1 3 4 12 
2 4 4 16 
3 2 3 6 
4 1 1 1 
5 3 3 9 
6 1 1 1 
7 4 4 16 
8 3 3 9 
9 2 2 4 
10 5 5 25 
11 3 4 12 
12 4 4 16 
13 3 3 9 
14 4 4 16 
15 4 4 16 
16 3 4 12 
17 2 2 4 
18 4 4 16 
19 2 2 4 
20 3 3 9 
21 2 3 6 
22 3 3 9 
23 3 3 9 
24 4 3 12 
25 3 2 6 
    
  
Mean 10.20 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.70 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
22 
    
 
 
Minimum Value 1 
 
 
Maximum 
Value 
25 
 
   
 
 
After Outlier Removal 
 
 
Mean 9.58 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
4.90 
 
 
Median 9 
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Respondent # 
Revenue Risk 
- Probability 
Revenue Risk 
- Impact 
Revenue 
Risk-Severity 
1 2 2 4 
2 5 5 25 
3 1 4 4 
4 1 5 5 
5 4 4 16 
6 3 4 12 
7 3 3 9 
8 4 2 8 
9 1 4 4 
10 1 1 1 
11 3 5 15 
12 3 5 15 
13 3 3 9 
14 3 3 9 
15 3 3 9 
16 4 5 20 
17 4 4 16 
18 4 4 16 
19 4 4 16 
20 1 5 5 
21 2 3 6 
22 3 3 9 
23 4 4 16 
24 2 2 4 
25 3 4 12 
    
  
Mean 10.60 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.97 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
23 
    
 
 
Minimum 
Value 
1 
 
 
Maximum 
Value 
25 
 
   
 
 
After Outlier Removal 
 
 
Mean 10.00 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
5.27 
 
 
Median 9 
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Respondent # 
Inability of 
Concessionaire 
- Probability 
Inability of 
Concessionaire 
- Impact 
Inability of 
Concessionaire-
Severity 
1 1 3 3 
2 1 1 1 
3 4 5 20 
4 1 5 5 
5 3 4 12 
6 1 5 5 
7 2 2 4 
8 5 5 25 
9 1 5 5 
10 3 2 6 
11 2 4 8 
12 1 2 2 
13 2 2 4 
14 3 3 9 
15 3 3 9 
16 1 5 5 
17 4 4 16 
18 3 3 9 
19 1 1 1 
20 3 4 12 
21 2 3 6 
22 2 4 8 
23 2 5 10 
24 2 4 8 
25 3 4 12 
    
  
Mean 8.20 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.72 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-3 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
20 
    
 
 
Minimum Value 1 
 
 
Maximum 
Value 
25 
 
   
 
 
After Outlier Removal 
 
 
Mean 6.96 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
3.87 
 
 
Median 6 
  
Page | 227  
 
Respondent # 
Subjective 
Project 
Evaluation 
Method - 
Probability 
Subjective 
Project 
Evaluation 
Method - 
Impact 
Subjective 
Project 
Evaluation 
method-
Severity 
1 3 1 3 
2 3 4 12 
3 3 4 12 
4 1 1 1 
5 3 3 9 
6 2 3 6 
7 1 1 1 
8 3 5 15 
9 3 1 3 
10 3 2 6 
11 1 3 3 
12 1 1 1 
13 3 2 6 
14 3 3 9 
15 2 4 8 
16 3 3 9 
17 3 3 9 
18 4 4 16 
19 3 3 9 
20 1 1 1 
21 1 4 4 
22 1 1 1 
23 1 2 2 
24 2 2 4 
25 3 2 6 
    
  
Mean 6.24 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.46 
  
Median 6 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-3 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
15 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum 
Value 
16 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 5.83 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.05 
  
Median 6 
  
Page | 228  
 
Respondent # 
Insufficient 
project finance 
supervision - 
Probability 
Insufficient 
project finance 
supervision - 
Impact 
Insufficient 
project finance 
supervision - 
Severity 
1 1 3 3 
2 1 1 1 
3 4 5 20 
4 3 3 9 
5 3 3 9 
6 1 3 3 
7 2 5 10 
8 5 5 25 
9 3 3 9 
10 5 5 25 
11 1 3 3 
12 3 1 3 
13 3 3 9 
14 3 4 12 
15 2 3 6 
16 1 5 5 
17 2 1 2 
18 5 5 25 
19 2 3 6 
20 2 2 4 
21 4 5 20 
22 1 1 1 
23 1 4 4 
24 1 2 2 
25 1 2 2 
    
  
Mean 8.72 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
7.96 
  
Median 6 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-7 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
25 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
 
 
Maximum Value 25 
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Factor 2: Commercial and Market Environmental Risks 
 
10- Market Competition 
11- Supply and Demand 
12- Change in Market Demand 
13- Public Credit 
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Respondent # 
Market 
Competition - 
Probability 
Market 
Competition - 
Impact 
Market 
Competition - 
Severity 
1 3 2 6 
2 2 2 4 
3 1 3 3 
4 1 3 3 
5 3 3 9 
6 1 1 1 
7 2 2 4 
8 4 3 12 
9 1 4 4 
10 2 2 4 
11 2 2 4 
12 4 4 16 
13 3 2 6 
14 2 2 4 
15 3 3 9 
16 2 4 8 
17 3 4 12 
18 4 4 16 
19 3 4 12 
20 2 4 8 
21 3 2 6 
22 5 5 25 
23 3 3 9 
24 2 3 6 
25 2 2 4 
    
    
  
Mean 7.80 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.38 
  
Median 6 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-2.95 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
18.55 
  
  
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum 
Value 
25 
  
  
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 7.08 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.10 
  
Median 6 
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Respondent # 
Supply and 
demand - 
Probability 
Supply and 
demand - 
Impact 
Supply and 
demand - 
Severity 
1 1 2 2 
2 5 5 25 
3 3 3 9 
4 3 4 12 
5 3 3 9 
6 3 5 15 
7 2 2 4 
8 3 5 15 
9 3 4 12 
10 2 2 4 
11 2 3 6 
12 4 4 16 
13 3 2 6 
14 2 2 4 
15 3 4 12 
16 1 1 1 
17 2 4 8 
18 4 4 16 
19 4 4 16 
20 4 2 8 
21 4 3 12 
22 4 4 16 
23 3 3 9 
24 2 2 4 
25 2 2 4 
    
    
 
 
Mean 9.80 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
5.78 
 
 
Median 9 
 
 
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.76 
 
 
Maximum Set 
Value 
21.36 
 
   
 
 
Minimum 
Value 
1 
 
 
Maximum 
Value 
25 
 
   
 
 
After Outlier Removal 
 
 
Mean 9.17 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
4.94 
 
 
Median 9 
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Respondent # 
Change in 
market demand 
- Probability 
Change in 
market demand 
- Impact 
Change in 
market demand 
- Severity 
1 1 1 1 
2 4 4 16 
3 2 3 6 
4 2 4 8 
5 3 3 9 
6 1 4 4 
7 2 2 4 
8 2 2 4 
9 2 4 8 
10 3 3 9 
11 2 4 8 
12 3 3 9 
13 3 2 6 
14 3 3 9 
15 2 4 8 
16 1 5 5 
17 4 4 16 
18 5 5 25 
19 5 5 25 
20 4 2 8 
21 2 2 4 
22 1 5 5 
23 3 3 9 
24 1 2 2 
25 2 4 8 
   
stdev 
    
 
 
Mean 8.64 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
6.04 
 
 
Median 8 
 
 
Minimum Set 
Value 
-3.44 
 
 
Maximum Set 
Value 
20.72 
 
   
 
 
Minimum Value 1 
 
 
Maximum Value 25 
 
   
 
 
After Outlier Removal 
 
 
Mean 7.22 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
3.66 
 
 
Median 8 
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Respondent # 
Public credit - 
Probability 
Public credit - 
Impact 
Public credit - 
Severity 
1 2 2 4 
2 5 5 25 
3 4 4 16 
4 3 3 9 
5 4 4 16 
6 2 5 10 
7 2 2 4 
8 5 5 25 
9 3 3 9 
10 3 3 9 
11 3 3 9 
12 3 3 9 
13 4 3 12 
14 3 3 9 
15 4 5 20 
16 5 5 25 
17 2 4 8 
18 4 4 16 
19 3 4 12 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 1 5 5 
23 1 1 1 
24 5 5 25 
25 4 4 16 
 
  
 
    
 
 
Mean 12.48 
 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
7.04 
 
 
Median 9 
 
 
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.59 
 
 
Maximum Set 
Value 
26.55 
 
   
 
 
Minimum Value 1 
 
 
Maximum Value 25 
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Factor 3: Legal Risks 
 
14- Performance Security Risk 
15- Permits Risk 
16- Delay in Project Approvals/Permits 
17- Legislation Changes 
18- Dispute Resolution 
19- Change in Tax Regulation 
20- Government Policy 
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Respondent # 
Performance 
Security Risk - 
Probability 
Performance 
Security Risk - 
Impact 
Performance 
Security Risk - 
Severity 
1 3 5 15 
2 5 5 25 
3 1 2 2 
4 2 5 10 
5 2 2 4 
6 1 3 3 
7 2 2 4 
8 2 3 6 
9 2 5 10 
10 2 3 6 
11 2 2 4 
12 2 1 2 
13 2 2 4 
14 4 4 16 
15 3 4 12 
16 5 5 25 
17 4 4 16 
18 3 3 9 
19 5 5 25 
20 2 2 4 
21 2 2 4 
22 2 4 8 
23 1 3 3 
24 1 2 2 
25 2 2 4 
    
  
Mean 8.92 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
7.43 
  
Median 6 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-5.95 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
23.79 
    
  
Minimum 
Value 
2 
  
Maximum 
Value 
25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 6.73 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.60 
  
Median 4 
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Respondent # 
Permits Risks - 
Probability 
Permits Risks - 
Impact 
Permits Risks - 
Severity 
1 3 4 12 
2 5 5 25 
3 3 3 9 
4 2 4 8 
5 3 3 9 
6 5 3 15 
7 2 2 4 
8 2 3 6 
9 2 4 8 
10 1 1 1 
11 1 3 3 
12 1 1 1 
13 4 3 12 
14 3 4 12 
15 3 4 12 
16 4 4 16 
17 4 4 16 
18 3 3 9 
19 3 3 9 
20 3 3 9 
21 1 5 5 
22 2 4 8 
23 3 5 15 
24 4 5 20 
25 3 4 12 
    
  
Mean 10.24 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.67 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.09 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
21.57 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum 
Value 
25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 9.63 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.86 
  
Median 9 
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Respondent # 
Delay in Project 
approvals/permits 
- Probability 
Delay in Project 
approvals/permits 
- Impact 
Delay in Project 
approvals/permits 
- Severity 
1 4 5 20 
2 4 5 20 
3 3 3 9 
4 1 3 3 
5 3 2 6 
6 4 3 12 
7 2 2 4 
8 2 3 6 
9 1 3 3 
10 1 1 1 
11 1 3 3 
12 2 2 4 
13 4 3 12 
14 3 4 12 
15 3 4 12 
16 4 4 16 
17 4 4 16 
18 4 4 16 
19 4 5 20 
20 3 1 3 
21 1 4 4 
22 2 4 8 
23 3 4 12 
24 4 5 20 
25 3 4 12 
    
  
Mean 10.16 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.30 
  
Median 12 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-2.45 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
22.77 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 20 
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Respondent # 
Legislation 
changes - 
Probability 
Legislation 
changes - 
Impact 
Legislation 
changes - 
Severity 
1 3 4 12 
2 5 5 25 
3 3 4 12 
4 4 4 16 
5 4 4 16 
6 2 3 6 
7 4 1 4 
8 3 5 15 
9 4 3 12 
10 1 1 1 
11 2 4 8 
12 4 4 16 
13 5 4 20 
14 4 5 20 
15 3 3 9 
16 5 5 25 
17 3 5 15 
18 4 4 16 
19 3 3 9 
20 2 4 8 
21 3 3 9 
22 2 5 10 
23 4 5 20 
24 3 2 6 
25 3 4 12 
 
  
 
  
Mean 12.88 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.17 
  
Median 12 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
0.55 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
25.21 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 25 
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Respondent # 
Dispute 
resolution - 
Probability 
Dispute 
resolution - 
Impact 
Dispute 
resolution - 
Severity 
1 3 4 12 
2 4 5 20 
3 3 4 12 
4 4 4 16 
5 3 4 12 
6 2 4 8 
7 3 4 12 
8 3 4 12 
9 4 4 16 
10 5 5 25 
11 2 3 6 
12 4 3 12 
13 3 2 6 
14 4 5 20 
15 3 4 12 
16 3 3 9 
17 4 4 16 
18 4 4 16 
19 2 4 8 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 4 4 16 
23 3 4 12 
24 3 4 12 
25 3 3 9 
 
  
 
  
Mean 12.68 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.59 
  
Median 12 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
3.50 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
21.86 
    
  
Minimum Value 6 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 12.17 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
3.89 
  
Median 12 
 
Page | 240  
 
Respondent # 
Change in tax 
regulation - 
Probability 
Change in tax 
regulation - 
Impact 
Change in tax 
regulation - 
Severity 
1 4 5 20 
2 5 5 25 
3 4 4 16 
4 4 4 16 
5 3 4 12 
6 2 3 6 
7 4 5 20 
8 5 5 25 
9 4 3 12 
10 2 3 6 
11 3 4 12 
12 4 4 16 
13 3 2 6 
14 4 5 20 
15 3 4 12 
16 1 5 5 
17 4 4 16 
18 4 4 16 
19 2 4 8 
20 4 3 12 
21 3 3 9 
22 3 5 15 
23 3 5 15 
24 3 3 9 
25 3 2 6 
 
  
 
  
Mean 13.40 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.80 
  
Median 12 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
1.81 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
24.99 
    
  
Minimum Value 5 
  
Maximum Value 25 
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Respondent # 
Government 
policy - 
Probability 
Government 
policy - Impact 
Government 
policy - Severity 
1 3 4 12 
2 5 5 25 
3 3 3 9 
4 5 4 20 
5 3 4 12 
6 3 3 9 
7 4 5 20 
8 5 5 25 
9 4 4 16 
10 1 2 2 
11 2 4 8 
12 4 4 16 
13 3 2 6 
14 4 5 20 
15 3 3 9 
16 5 5 25 
17 4 4 16 
18 5 5 25 
19 4 4 16 
20 3 4 12 
21 3 3 9 
22 3 5 15 
23 4 4 16 
24 4 4 16 
25 3 3 9 
 
  
 
  
Mean 14.72 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.41 
  
Median 16 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
1.91 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
27.53 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 25 
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Factor 4: Political Risks 
 
21- Political/Public Opposition 
22- Swings in Public Opinion 
23- Political Risk 
24- Nationalization/Expropriation 
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Respondent # 
Political/Public 
Opposition - 
Probability 
Political/Public 
Opposition - 
Impact 
Political/Public 
Opposition - 
Severity 
1 3 4 12 
2 5 5 25 
3 4 4 16 
4 2 3 6 
5 3 3 9 
6 1 3 3 
7 5 5 25 
8 3 2 6 
9 2 3 6 
10 5 5 25 
11 1 5 5 
12 4 5 20 
13 4 3 12 
14 5 5 25 
15 3 4 12 
16 5 5 25 
17 3 5 15 
18 4 4 16 
19 5 5 25 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 2 5 10 
23 1 1 1 
24 4 5 20 
25 5 4 20 
 
  
 
  
Mean 14.28 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
7.92 
  
Median 12 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.57 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
30.13 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 25 
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Respondent # 
Swings in public 
opinion - 
Probability 
Swings in public 
opinion - Impact 
Swings in public 
opinion - 
Severity 
1 2 2 4 
2 4 5 20 
3 3 4 12 
4 5 4 20 
5 3 3 9 
6 1 5 5 
7 5 5 25 
8 4 3 12 
9 4 3 12 
10 3 3 9 
11 1 4 4 
12 4 5 20 
13 4 3 12 
14 5 5 25 
15 3 3 9 
16 5 5 25 
17 4 5 20 
18 4 4 16 
19 4 4 16 
20 1 1 1 
21 1 1 1 
22 2 5 10 
23 1 1 1 
24 3 5 15 
25 2 4 8 
 
  
 
  
Mean 12.44 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
7.60 
  
Median 12 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-2.76 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
27.64 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 25 
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Respondent # 
Political Risk - 
Probability 
Political Risk - 
Impact 
Political Risk - 
Severity 
1 4 3 12 
2 5 5 25 
3 4 4 16 
4 3 4 12 
5 4 4 16 
6 1 3 3 
7 5 5 25 
8 5 4 20 
9 4 4 16 
10 3 3 9 
11 2 3 6 
12 4 5 20 
13 4 3 12 
14 5 5 25 
15 4 4 16 
16 5 5 25 
17 4 5 20 
18 4 4 16 
19 5 5 25 
20 3 4 12 
21 3 4 12 
22 3 3 9 
23 4 4 16 
24 4 4 16 
25 5 4 20 
 
  
 
  
Mean 16.16 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.18 
  
Median 16 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
3.81 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
28.51 
    
  
Minimum Value 3 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 16.71 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.65 
  
Median 16 
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Respondent # 
Nationalization/expropri
ation - Probability 
Nationalization/expropri
ation - Impact 
Nationalization/expropri
ation -Severity 
1 3 2 6 
2 4 4 16 
3 2 5 10 
4 1 5 5 
5 4 4 16 
6 1 5 5 
7 2 2 4 
8 5 3 15 
9 1 5 5 
10 4 4 16 
11 1 2 2 
12 4 5 20 
13 3 3 9 
14 5 5 25 
15 2 4 8 
16 5 5 25 
17 4 5 20 
18 5 5 25 
19 2 2 4 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 1 5 5 
23 3 5 15 
24 2 4 8 
25 3 5 15 
 
   
  
Mean 11.88 
  
Standard Deviation 7.17 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set Value -2.45 
  
Maximum Set Value 26.21 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 25 
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Factor 5: Regulatory Risks 
 
25- Regulatory/Contractual Risk 
26- Government Intervention 
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Respondent # 
Regulatory/Contractual 
Risk - Probability 
Regulatory/Contractual 
Risk - Impact 
Regulatory/Contractual 
Risk -Severity 
1 2 1 2 
2 4 5 20 
3 3 3 9 
4 3 3 9 
5 3 3 9 
6 1 2 2 
7 3 2 6 
8 3 2 6 
9 3 3 9 
10 2 2 4 
11 3 4 12 
12 4 5 20 
13 3 3 9 
14 5 5 25 
15 3 4 12 
16 5 5 25 
17 3 3 9 
18 3 3 9 
19 4 3 12 
20 2 4 8 
21 2 5 10 
22 3 5 15 
23 4 4 16 
24 3 4 12 
25 4 4 16 
    
  
Mean 11.44 
  
Standard Deviation 6.19 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set Value -0.93 
  
Maximum Set Value 23.81 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 10.26 
  
Standard Deviation 4.85 
  
Median 9 
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Respondent # 
Government 
Intervention - 
Probability 
Government 
Intervention - 
Impact 
Government 
Intervention - 
Severity 
1 3 2 6 
2 4 5 20 
3 4 3 12 
4 1 2 2 
5 3 3 9 
6 3 3 9 
7 3 2 6 
8 3 2 6 
9 2 2 4 
10 3 3 9 
11 1 3 3 
12 3 3 9 
13 3 3 9 
14 5 5 25 
15 3 4 12 
16 5 5 25 
17 3 3 9 
18 4 4 16 
19 3 2 6 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 4 12 
22 3 4 12 
23 4 4 16 
24 3 4 12 
25 4 4 16 
    
  
Mean 10.96 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.04 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.12 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
23.04 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 9.74 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.50 
  
Median 9 
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Factor 6: Government Maturity Risks 
 
27- Poor Public Decision Making Process 
28- Government Corruption 
29- Inadequate Law and Supervision System 
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Respondent # 
Poor public 
decision making 
process - 
Probability 
Poor public 
decision making 
process - 
Impact 
Poor public 
decision making 
process -
Severity 
1 3 2 6 
2 5 5 25 
3 3 4 12 
4 5 5 25 
5 2 3 6 
6 2 3 6 
7 4 2 8 
8 3 2 6 
9 5 5 25 
10 4 4 16 
11 3 4 12 
12 5 5 25 
13 2 4 8 
14 4 4 16 
15 4 4 16 
16 4 4 16 
17 4 5 20 
18 4 4 16 
19 5 4 20 
20 2 4 8 
21 2 3 6 
22 5 5 25 
23 2 3 6 
24 5 5 25 
25 5 5 25 
 
  
 
  
Mean 15.16 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
7.65 
  
Median 16 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-0.14 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
30.46 
  
  
  
Minimum Value 6 
  
Maximum Value 25 
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Respondent # 
Government 
corruption - 
Probability 
Government 
corruption - 
Impact 
Government 
corruption - 
Severity 
1 2 2 4 
2 4 5 20 
3 2 2 4 
4 5 3 15 
5 2 3 6 
6 1 3 3 
7 4 3 12 
8 2 4 8 
9 5 3 15 
10 5 5 25 
11 3 4 12 
12 5 5 25 
13 5 4 20 
14 4 4 16 
15 2 5 10 
16 4 3 12 
17 5 5 25 
18 5 5 25 
19 5 5 25 
20 1 5 5 
21 1 4 4 
22 1 1 1 
23 4 3 12 
24 4 4 16 
25 3 3 9 
 
   
  
Mean 13.16 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
7.90 
  
Median 12 
  
Minimum 
Set Value 
-2.64 
  
Maximum 
Set Value 
28.96 
  
  
  
Minimum 
Value 
1 
  
Maximum 
Value 
25 
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Respondent # 
Inadequate law 
and supervision 
system - 
Probability 
Inadequate law 
and supervision 
system - Impact 
Inadequate law 
and supervision 
system -
Severity 
1 1 2 2 
2 5 5 25 
3 2 3 6 
4 3 2 6 
5 2 2 4 
6 1 3 3 
7 4 3 12 
8 2 5 10 
9 3 2 6 
10 4 4 16 
11 2 3 6 
12 5 5 25 
13 5 4 20 
14 4 4 16 
15 3 4 12 
16 2 5 10 
17 3 4 12 
18 5 5 25 
19 1 2 2 
20 1 4 4 
21 1 4 4 
22 1 1 1 
23 2 3 6 
24 4 4 16 
25 4 4 16 
    
  
Mean 10.60 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
7.55 
  
Median 10 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-4.50 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
25.70 
  
  
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 25 
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Factor 7: Technical Risks 
 
30- Imperfect Contract Documents 
31- Deficiency of Design 
32- Quality Assurance 
33- Quality Control 
34- Latent Defect Risk 
35- Lack of Supporting Infrastructure 
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Respondent # 
Imperfect 
contract 
documents - 
Probability 
Imperfect 
contract 
documents - 
Impact 
Imperfect 
contract 
documents - 
Severity 
1 1 2 2 
2 5 5 25 
3 2 4 8 
4 2 3 6 
5 2 4 8 
6 1 2 2 
7 3 4 12 
8 2 2 4 
9 2 3 6 
10 3 3 9 
11 2 3 6 
12 3 2 6 
13 3 3 9 
14 2 4 8 
15 4 4 16 
16 2 5 10 
17 4 4 16 
18 5 5 25 
19 1 3 3 
20 3 3 9 
21 1 4 4 
22 1 5 5 
23 1 4 4 
24 3 4 12 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 8.96 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.10 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-3.24 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
21.16 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 7.57 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
3.89 
  
Median 8 
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Respondent # 
Deficiency of 
design - 
Probability 
Deficiency of 
design - Impact 
Deficiency of 
design - 
Severity 
1 2 4 8 
2 4 5 20 
3 3 4 12 
4 1 5 5 
5 2 4 8 
6 1 4 4 
7 2 3 6 
8 2 1 2 
9 1 5 5 
10 2 2 4 
11 1 3 3 
12 3 3 9 
13 3 4 12 
14 3 4 12 
15 3 4 12 
16 2 5 10 
17 4 4 16 
18 4 4 16 
19 1 1 1 
20 1 5 5 
21 1 5 5 
22 2 5 10 
23 1 5 5 
24 2 4 8 
25 4 4 16 
    
  
Mean 8.56 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.97 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.37 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
18.49 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 20 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 8.08 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.45 
  
Median 8 
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Respondent # 
Quality 
Assurance - 
Probability 
Quality 
Assurance - 
Impact 
Quality 
Assurance - 
Severity 
1 2 3 6 
2 4 3 12 
3 3 5 15 
4 1 4 4 
5 3 4 12 
6 2 3 6 
7 3 2 6 
8 2 1 2 
9 2 4 8 
10 3 5 15 
11 2 4 8 
12 2 4 8 
13 4 4 16 
14 3 4 12 
15 4 4 16 
16 2 5 10 
17 2 3 6 
18 4 4 16 
19 1 3 3 
20 2 4 8 
21 2 4 8 
22 2 4 8 
23 1 2 2 
24 2 3 6 
25 2 3 6 
    
  
Mean 8.76 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.40 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-0.04 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
17.56 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 16 
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Respondent # 
Quality Control 
- Probability 
Quality Control 
- Impact 
Quality Control 
- Severity 
1 3 3 9 
2 3 4 12 
3 3 5 15 
4 1 4 4 
5 3 4 12 
6 2 3 6 
7 2 3 6 
8 2 1 2 
9 2 3 6 
10 2 5 10 
11 2 4 8 
12 2 4 8 
13 4 4 16 
14 3 4 12 
15 4 4 16 
16 4 5 20 
17 3 2 6 
18 4 4 16 
19 3 3 9 
20 2 4 8 
21 2 4 8 
22 2 4 8 
23 1 2 2 
24 2 4 8 
25 3 2 6 
    
  
Mean 9.32 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.58 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
0.16 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
18.48 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 20 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 8.88 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.09 
  
Median 8 
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Respondent # 
Latent Defect 
Risk - 
Probability 
Latent Defect 
Risk - Impact 
Latent Defect 
Risk - Severity 
1 3 4 12 
2 2 5 10 
3 2 4 8 
4 2 5 10 
5 3 4 12 
6 1 4 4 
7 3 3 9 
8 2 1 2 
9 2 5 10 
10 2 5 10 
11 2 4 8 
12 2 3 6 
13 2 2 4 
14 4 4 16 
15 3 3 9 
16 1 5 5 
17 2 4 8 
18 5 5 25 
19 2 1 2 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 2 3 6 
23 2 4 8 
24 3 4 12 
25 2 3 6 
    
  
Mean 8.80 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.70 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-0.60 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
18.20 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 8.13 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
3.34 
  
Median 8.5 
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Respondent # 
Lack of 
supporting 
infrastructure - 
Probability 
Lack of 
supporting 
infrastructure - 
Impact 
Lack of 
supporting 
infrastructure - 
Severity 
1 4 5 20 
2 5 5 25 
3 3 3 9 
4 4 5 20 
5 3 3 9 
6 2 4 8 
7 2 4 8 
8 2 1 2 
9 4 5 20 
10 4 5 20 
11 2 3 6 
12 4 4 16 
13 3 5 15 
14 4 4 16 
15 3 4 12 
16 4 5 20 
17 4 5 20 
18 5 5 25 
19 4 4 16 
20 1 4 4 
21 1 4 4 
22 5 5 25 
23 2 4 8 
24 3 4 12 
25 4 4 16 
 
  
 
  
Mean 14.24 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.98 
  
Median 16 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
0.28 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
28.20 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 25 
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Factor 8: Construction and Operational Risks 
 
36- Project/Operations Changes 
37- Inability of Concessionaire 
38- Provision of Transformers, Substations or backup power 
39- Construction risk 
40- Organization risk 
41- Coordination risk 
42- Land acquisition 
43- Physical Obstacles that cannot be avoided 
44- Maintenance risks 
45- Access and Delivery of site 
46- Connection of Public Utilities to boundaries of site 
47- Connection to boundary of site of telephone lines and natural gas provision 
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Respondent # 
Project/Operation 
changes - 
Probability 
Project/Operation 
changes - Impact 
Project/Operation 
changes - 
Severity 
1 1 1 1 
2 4 5 20 
3 2 2 4 
4 3 2 6 
5 4 4 16 
6 2 2 4 
7 4 2 8 
8 2 1 2 
9 3 2 6 
10 1 3 3 
11 2 2 4 
12 2 4 8 
13 3 2 6 
14 3 3 9 
15 3 3 9 
16 4 4 16 
17 4 4 16 
18 4 4 16 
19 4 4 16 
20 2 2 4 
21 2 3 6 
22 2 3 6 
23 4 4 16 
24 1 3 3 
25 3 4 12 
    
  
Mean 8.68 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.60 
  
Median 6 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-2.53 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
19.89 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 20 
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Respondent # 
Inability of 
concessionaire 
- Probability 
Inability of 
concessionaire 
- Impact 
Inability of 
concessionaire 
-Severity 
1 1 1 1 
2 1 5 5 
3 1 4 4 
4 1 5 5 
5 4 4 16 
6 1 3 3 
7 3 2 6 
8 3 2 6 
9 1 4 4 
10 2 4 8 
11 2 4 8 
12 2 4 8 
13 3 3 9 
14 3 3 9 
15 2 4 8 
16 1 5 5 
17 2 4 8 
18 4 4 16 
19 1 1 1 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 2 4 8 
23 4 4 16 
24 1 4 4 
25 2 4 8 
    
  
Mean 7.36 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.04 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-0.72 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
15.44 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 16 
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Respondent # 
Provision of 
transformers, 
substations or 
backup power - 
Probability 
Provision of 
transformers, 
substations or 
backup power - 
Impact 
Provision of 
transformers, 
substations or 
backup power - 
Severity 
1 1 2 2 
2 2 3 6 
3 3 3 9 
4 2 5 10 
5 3 4 12 
6 2 2 4 
7 2 3 6 
8 3 2 6 
9 1 5 5 
10 2 5 10 
11 2 3 6 
12 2 5 10 
13 2 2 4 
14 4 3 12 
15 2 4 8 
16 3 4 12 
17 2 4 8 
18 4 4 16 
19 4 4 16 
20 1 1 1 
21 1 4 4 
22 3 3 9 
23 3 4 12 
24 2 5 10 
25 2 2 4 
    
  
Mean 8.08 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.00 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
0.08 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
16.08 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 16 
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Respondent # 
Construction 
risk - 
Probability 
Construction 
risk - Impact 
Construction 
risk -Severity 
1 2 2 4 
2 2 5 10 
3 3 3 9 
4 1 3 3 
5 2 3 6 
6 1 2 2 
7 2 4 8 
8 2 1 2 
9 2 3 6 
10 3 5 15 
11 3 4 12 
12 2 4 8 
13 3 3 9 
14 3 3 9 
15 4 4 16 
16 4 5 20 
17 3 3 9 
18 5 5 25 
19 2 1 2 
20 2 3 6 
21 2 2 4 
22 2 4 8 
23 3 4 12 
24 3 4 12 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 9.04 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.60 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-2.16 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
20.24 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum 
Value 
25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 8.38 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.60 
  
Median 8.5 
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Respondent # 
Organization 
risk - Probability 
Organization 
risk - Impact 
Organization 
risk -Severity 
1 1 1 1 
2 2 4 8 
3 3 4 12 
4 1 3 3 
5 2 3 6 
6 1 2 2 
7 3 3 9 
8 2 1 2 
9 1 3 3 
10 3 3 9 
11 3 4 12 
12 1 3 3 
13 3 3 9 
14 3 3 9 
15 4 3 12 
16 4 5 20 
17 4 5 20 
18 3 3 9 
19 3 2 6 
20 2 3 6 
21 2 2 4 
22 2 4 8 
23 1 3 3 
24 3 4 12 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 7.88 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.03 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-2.18 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
17.94 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 20 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 7.30 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.53 
  
Median 8 
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Respondent # 
Coordination 
risks - 
Probability 
Coordination 
risks - Impact 
Coordination 
risks -Severity 
1 3 2 6 
2 2 3 6 
3 3 2 6 
4 1 3 3 
5 2 4 8 
6 3 2 6 
7 3 3 9 
8 2 1 2 
9 2 3 6 
10 3 4 12 
11 3 3 9 
12 2 3 6 
13 3 3 9 
14 3 3 9 
15 4 3 12 
16 4 5 20 
17 4 3 12 
18 5 5 25 
19 4 4 16 
20 2 3 6 
21 2 2 4 
22 2 4 8 
23 1 3 3 
24 1 2 2 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 8.56 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.43 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-2.30 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
19.42 
    
  
Minimum 
Value 
2 
  
Maximum 
Value 
25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 7.35 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
3.52 
  
Median 6 
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Respondent # 
Land 
acquisition - 
Probability 
Land 
acquisition - 
Impact 
Land 
acquisition -
Severity 
1 1 3 3 
2 1 5 5 
3 3 3 9 
4 1 4 4 
5 3 4 12 
6 1 3 3 
7 3 3 9 
8 2 1 2 
9 1 4 4 
10 3 4 12 
11 1 4 4 
12 1 5 5 
13 3 3 9 
14 3 3 9 
15 2 4 8 
16 1 5 5 
17 2 4 8 
18 4 4 16 
19 2 1 2 
20 2 3 6 
21 1 4 4 
22 3 5 15 
23 2 5 10 
24 3 5 15 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 7.52 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.15 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-0.79 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
15.83 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 16 
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Respondent # 
Physical 
obstacles that 
cannot be 
avoided - 
Probability 
Physical 
obstacles that 
cannot be 
avoided - 
Impact 
Physical 
obstacles that 
cannot be 
avoided - 
Severity 
1 2 2 4 
2 2 5 10 
3 3 3 9 
4 1 5 5 
5 3 4 12 
6 2 4 8 
7 3 2 6 
8 2 1 2 
9 1 4 4 
10 3 3 9 
11 1 3 3 
12 1 5 5 
13 2 4 8 
14 3 3 9 
15 2 4 8 
16 1 5 5 
17 2 4 8 
18 5 5 25 
19 3 3 9 
20 2 3 6 
21 2 3 6 
22 1 5 5 
23 2 3 6 
24 2 4 8 
25 3 2 6 
    
  
Mean 7.44 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.35 
  
Median 6 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.26 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
16.14 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum 
Value 
25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 6.71 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
2.40 
  
Median 6 
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Respondent # 
Maintenance 
risks - 
Probability 
Maintenance 
risks - Impact 
Maintenance 
risks -Severity 
1 2 2 4 
2 5 5 25 
3 3 2 6 
4 3 3 9 
5 3 4 12 
6 3 2 6 
7 4 3 12 
8 2 1 2 
9 3 3 9 
10 2 5 10 
11 1 1 1 
12 4 4 16 
13 2 2 4 
14 3 2 6 
15 4 4 16 
16 1 4 4 
17 2 3 6 
18 4 4 16 
19 3 3 9 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 2 3 6 
23 5 5 25 
24 1 2 2 
25 3 2 6 
    
  
Mean 9.20 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.35 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-3.50 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
21.90 
    
  
Minimum 
Value 
1 
  
Maximum 
Value 
25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 7.83 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.40 
  
Median 6 
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Respondent # 
Access and 
delivery of site - 
Probability 
Access and 
delivery of site - 
Impact 
Access and 
delivery of site -
Severity 
1 2 3 6 
2 1 5 5 
3 2 4 8 
4 2 2 4 
5 3 3 9 
6 2 1 2 
7 4 2 8 
8 2 1 2 
9 2 2 4 
10 2 4 8 
11 1 1 1 
12 2 4 8 
13 2 2 4 
14 3 2 6 
15 2 3 6 
16 3 4 12 
17 2 3 6 
18 4 4 16 
19 1 1 1 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 4 12 
22 2 3 6 
23 2 3 6 
24 1 4 4 
25 3 2 6 
    
  
Mean 6.36 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
3.55 
  
Median 6 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-0.73 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
13.45 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 16 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 5.96 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
2.99 
  
Median 6 
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Respondent # 
Connection of 
public utilities to 
boundaries of 
site - Probability 
Connection of 
public utilities to 
boundaries of 
site - Impact 
Connection of 
public utilities to 
boundaries of 
site - Severity 
1 5 5 25 
2 5 5 25 
3 3 4 12 
4 4 5 20 
5 2 3 6 
6 3 3 9 
7 4 2 8 
8 2 1 2 
9 3 5 15 
10 2 5 10 
11 1 3 3 
12 1 4 4 
13 3 3 9 
14 3 2 6 
15 2 4 8 
16 1 5 5 
17 3 4 12 
18 4 4 16 
19 3 4 12 
20 2 2 4 
21 1 5 5 
22 3 4 12 
23 2 5 10 
24 1 3 3 
25 2 2 4 
    
  
Mean 9.80 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.42 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-3.03 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
22.63 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 8.48 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.70 
  
Median 8 
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Respondent # 
Connection to 
boundary of site 
of telephone 
lines and natural 
gas provision - 
Probability 
Connection to 
boundary of site 
of telephone 
lines and natural 
gas provision - 
Impact 
Connection to 
boundary of site 
of telephone 
lines and natural 
gas provision - 
Severity 
1 4 3 12 
2 2 2 4 
3 3 4 12 
4 4 5 20 
5 2 3 6 
6 5 2 10 
7 5 3 15 
8 2 1 2 
9 3 5 15 
10 2 5 10 
11 1 3 3 
12 2 4 8 
13 3 3 9 
14 3 2 6 
15 2 4 8 
16 1 4 4 
17 3 4 12 
18 4 4 16 
19 4 3 12 
20 1 1 1 
21 1 5 5 
22 3 4 12 
23 2 3 6 
24 1 4 4 
25 2 1 2 
    
  
Mean 8.56 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.01 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.46 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
18.58 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 20 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 8.08 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.50 
  
Median 8 
 
Page | 274  
 
Factor 9: Resources Risks 
 
48- Labor unavailability 
49- Material Shortage 
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Respondent # 
Labor 
unavailability - 
Probability 
Labor 
unavailability - 
Impact 
Labor 
unavailability - 
Severity 
1 1 3 3 
2 3 3 9 
3 3 4 12 
4 1 3 3 
5 2 3 6 
6 1 3 3 
7 2 3 6 
8 1 1 1 
9 1 3 3 
10 2 3 6 
11 3 4 12 
12 1 1 1 
13 4 3 12 
14 3 2 6 
15 1 4 4 
16 1 3 3 
17 4 4 16 
18 5 5 25 
19 3 4 12 
20 2 4 8 
21 3 3 9 
22 2 3 6 
23 2 3 6 
24 2 4 8 
25 2 1 2 
    
  
Mean 7.28 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.42 
  
Median 6 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-3.56 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
18.12 
  
  
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 6.54 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.05 
  
Median 6 
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Respondent # 
Material 
shortage - 
Probability 
Material 
shortage - 
Impact 
Material 
shortage - 
Severity 
1 2 4 8 
2 2 5 10 
3 3 3 9 
4 2 3 6 
5 2 4 8 
6 1 3 3 
7 3 1 3 
8 2 1 2 
9 2 3 6 
10 2 4 8 
11 2 4 8 
12 3 2 6 
13 3 3 9 
14 3 2 6 
15 2 4 8 
16 2 2 4 
17 4 4 16 
18 4 4 16 
19 4 4 16 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 2 3 6 
23 2 4 8 
24 2 4 8 
25 4 4 16 
    
  
Mean 8.32 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.00 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
0.33 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
16.31 
  
  
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 16 
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Factor 10: Production Risks 
 
50- Third Party Delay/Violation 
51- Planning Risks 
52- Supervision, Organization and Control for inspection of Construction works 
53- Technological Risks 
54- Completion Risks 
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Respondent # 
Third Party 
delay/violation - 
Probability 
Third Party 
delay/violation - 
Impact 
Third Party 
delay/violation - 
Severity 
1 3 2 6 
2 4 5 20 
3 4 4 16 
4 1 2 2 
5 2 3 6 
6 2 2 4 
7 3 2 6 
8 3 2 6 
9 1 2 2 
10 4 4 16 
11 3 3 9 
12 2 3 6 
13 3 3 9 
14 3 2 6 
15 3 4 12 
16 3 4 12 
17 4 4 16 
18 5 5 25 
19 2 3 6 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 3 3 9 
23 2 3 6 
24 3 3 9 
25 2 3 6 
    
  
Mean 9.32 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.57 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.81 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
20.45 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum 
Value 
25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 8.67 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.60 
  
Median 7.5 
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Respondent # 
Planning risks - 
Probability 
Planning risks - 
Impact 
Planning risks -
Severity 
1 2 2 4 
2 3 3 9 
3 3 4 12 
4 1 3 3 
5 3 3 9 
6 3 3 9 
7 3 2 6 
8 2 2 4 
9 1 3 3 
10 4 4 16 
11 1 4 4 
12 3 3 9 
13 3 3 9 
14 2 2 4 
15 3 4 12 
16 4 4 16 
17 2 4 8 
18 5 5 25 
19 3 3 9 
20 3 3 9 
21 2 2 4 
22 3 3 9 
23 4 5 20 
24 4 3 12 
25 2 2 4 
    
  
Mean 9.16 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.53 
  
Median 9 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.90 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
20.22 
    
  
Minimum Value 3 
  
Maximum 
Value 
25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 8.50 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.53 
  
Median 9 
  
Page | 280  
 
Respondent # 
Supervision, 
organization and 
control for 
inspection of 
construction 
works - 
Probability 
Supervision, 
organization and 
control for 
inspection of 
construction 
works - Impact 
Supervision, 
organization and 
control for 
inspection of 
construction 
works -Severity 
1 1 2 2 
2 2 3 6 
3 3 3 9 
4 2 3 6 
5 3 3 9 
6 2 4 8 
7 1 2 2 
8 3 3 9 
9 2 3 6 
10 3 4 12 
11 2 3 6 
12 2 3 6 
13 3 3 9 
14 2 2 4 
15 3 4 12 
16 4 5 20 
17 2 3 6 
18 5 5 25 
19 3 3 9 
20 2 4 8 
21 3 2 6 
22 2 3 6 
23 3 3 9 
24 3 4 12 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 8.64 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.99 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.34 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
18.62 
    
  
Minimum Value 2 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 7.43 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
2.76 
  
Median 8 
  
Page | 281  
 
Respondent # 
Technological 
risks - 
Probability 
Technological 
risks - Impact 
Technological 
risks -Severity 
1 2 2 4 
2 4 5 20 
3 2 2 4 
4 2 3 6 
5 3 3 9 
6 1 2 2 
7 2 3 6 
8 2 2 4 
9 3 4 12 
10 2 4 8 
11 1 1 1 
12 1 3 3 
13 3 3 9 
14 2 2 4 
15 2 5 10 
16 4 1 4 
17 2 2 4 
18 4 4 16 
19 3 3 9 
20 2 4 8 
21 3 3 9 
22 2 4 8 
23 3 3 9 
24 2 3 6 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 7.36 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.29 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.22 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
15.94 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 20 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 6.74 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
3.51 
  
Median 6 
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Respondent # 
Completion 
risks - 
Probability 
Completion 
risks - Impact 
Completion 
risks - Severity 
1 3 3 9 
2 5 5 25 
3 4 4 16 
4 2 3 6 
5 4 4 16 
6 4 3 12 
7 3 2 6 
8 3 3 9 
9 2 2 4 
10 4 4 16 
11 1 4 4 
12 2 5 10 
13 3 3 9 
14 2 2 4 
15 2 5 10 
16 5 5 25 
17 4 4 16 
18 5 5 25 
19 2 4 8 
20 2 4 8 
21 2 5 10 
22 1 5 5 
23 4 4 16 
24 4 4 16 
25 3 3 9 
   
 
  
Mean 11.76 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
6.44 
  
Median 10 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-1.11 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
24.63 
    
  
Minimum Value 4 
  
Maximum 
Value 
25 
   
 
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 9.95 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.35 
  
Median 9 
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Factor 11: Environmental Risks 
 
55- Sustainability Risk 
56- Antiquities Risk 
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Respondent # 
Sustainability 
risk - Probability 
Sustainability 
risk - Impact 
Sustainability 
risk - Severity 
1 2 4 8 
2 5 5 25 
3 3 3 9 
4 1 3 3 
5 3 2 6 
6 1 4 4 
7 3 3 9 
8 2 1 2 
9 1 3 3 
10 3 3 9 
11 1 1 1 
12 2 4 8 
13 2 3 6 
14 2 2 4 
15 2 4 8 
16 1 5 5 
17 2 2 4 
18 4 4 16 
19 4 4 16 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 3 9 
22 2 3 6 
23 1 1 1 
24 4 5 20 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 8.00 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.85 
  
Median 8 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-3.69 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
19.69 
  
  
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 6.74 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
3.99 
  
Median 6 
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Respondent # 
Antiquities risk - 
Probability 
Antiquities risk - 
Impact 
Antiquities risk - 
Severity 
1 1 5 5 
2 1 2 2 
3 3 3 9 
4 1 3 3 
5 3 2 6 
6 1 4 4 
7 4 3 12 
8 2 1 2 
9 1 5 5 
10 3 4 12 
11 1 4 4 
12 2 2 4 
13 2 2 4 
14 2 2 4 
15 2 5 10 
16 1 4 4 
17 2 2 4 
18 5 5 25 
19 1 1 1 
20 2 4 8 
21 3 2 6 
22 1 5 5 
23 3 2 6 
24 3 3 9 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 6.52 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.87 
  
Median 5 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-3.23 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
16.27 
  
  
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 5.75 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
3.05 
  
Median 5 
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Factor 12: Unforeseen Risks 
57- Unforeseen Weather Conditions 
58- Unforeseen Geotechnical Conditions 
59- Force Majeure 
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Respondent # 
unforeseen 
Weather 
conditions - 
Probability 
unforeseen 
Weather 
conditions - 
Impact 
unforeseen 
Weather 
conditions - 
Severity 
1 1 2 2 
2 1 1 1 
3 3 1 3 
4 1 3 3 
5 3 2 6 
6 1 1 1 
7 2 4 8 
8 2 4 8 
9 1 2 2 
10 3 3 9 
11 1 3 3 
12 1 2 2 
13 1 3 3 
14 3 2 6 
15 2 4 8 
16 1 3 3 
17 2 2 4 
18 4 4 16 
19 1 1 1 
20 1 1 1 
21 3 3 9 
22 1 1 1 
23 1 1 1 
24 2 2 4 
25 3 3 9 
    
  
Mean 4.56 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
3.75 
  
Median 3 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-2.95 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
12.07 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 16 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 4.08 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
2.96 
  
Median 3 
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Respondent # 
unforeseen 
Geotechnical 
conditions - 
Probability 
unforeseen 
Geotechnical 
conditions - 
Impact 
unforeseen 
Geotechnical 
conditions - 
Severity 
1 3 5 15 
2 1 1 1 
3 3 3 9 
4 1 2 2 
5 3 4 12 
6 2 2 4 
7 2 3 6 
8 2 4 8 
9 2 3 6 
10 2 3 6 
11 1 4 4 
12 3 3 9 
13 2 3 6 
14 2 2 4 
15 3 4 12 
16 1 3 3 
17 2 4 8 
18 4 4 16 
19 3 4 12 
20 2 2 4 
21 3 4 12 
22 3 4 12 
23 1 5 5 
24 2 3 6 
25 3 2 6 
    
  
Mean 7.52 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
4.06 
  
Median 6 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
-0.61 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
15.65 
    
  
Minimum Value 1 
  
Maximum Value 16 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 7.17 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
3.74 
  
Median 6 
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Respondent # 
Force Majeure - 
Probability 
Force Majeure - 
Impact 
Force Majeure - 
Severity 
1 2 4 8 
2 4 5 20 
3 3 3 9 
4 2 3 6 
5 3 3 9 
6 1 5 5 
7 4 2 8 
8 3 4 12 
9 2 4 8 
10 4 4 16 
11 1 4 4 
12 5 5 25 
13 3 4 12 
14 2 2 4 
15 4 4 16 
16 3 5 15 
17 4 4 16 
18 3 3 9 
19 4 5 20 
20 3 3 9 
21 3 4 12 
22 2 2 4 
23 2 5 10 
24 4 5 20 
25 2 5 10 
 
  
 
  
Mean 11.48 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.70 
  
Median 10 
  
Minimum Set 
Value 
0.08 
  
Maximum Set 
Value 
22.88 
    
  
Minimum Value 4 
  
Maximum Value 25 
    
  
After Outlier Removal 
  
Mean 10.92 
  
Standard 
Deviation 
5.06 
  
Median 9.5 
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Factor 13: Other Risks 
 
60- Death or Bodily Injury 
61- Safety Breaches 
Respondent # 
Death or Bodily 
injury-
Probability 
Death or Bodily 
injury - Impact 
Death or Bodily 
injury - Severity 
1 3 5 15 
 
Respondent # 
Safety 
Breaches - 
Probability 
Safety 
Breaches - 
Impact 
Safety 
Breaches - 
Severity 
1 4 4 16 
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Appendix 2: Probability Distributions 
for the development of the Decision 
Support System 
Factor 1: Macroeconomic and Financial Risks 
1- Interest Rate Fluctuation 
2- Inflation 
3- Foreign Exchange Fluctuation 
4- Price Change 
5- Operation Cost Overrun 
6- Revenue Risk 
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Factor 2: Commercial and Market Environmental Risks 
1- Supply and Demand 
2- Change in Market Demand 
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Factor 3: Legal Risks 
 
1- Permits Risk 
2- Delay in Project Approvals/Permits 
3- Legislation Changes 
4- Dispute Resolution 
5- Change in Tax Regulation 
6- Government Policy 
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Factor 4: Political Risks 
 
1- Political/Public Opposition 
2- Swings in Public Opinion 
3- Political Risk 
4- Nationalization/Expropriation 
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Factor 5: Regulatory Risks 
 
1- Regulatory/Contractual Risk 
2- Government Intervention 
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Factor 6: Government Maturity Risks 
1- Poor Public Decision Making Process 
2- Government Corruption 
3- Inadequate Law and Supervision System 
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Factor 7: Technical Risks 
1- Lack of Supporting Infrastructure 
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Factor 10: Production Risks 
1- Completion Risks 
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Factor 12: Unforeseen Risks 
1- Force Majeure 
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